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Abstract
This thesis approaches the global cooperation problem of climate change mit-
igation from a cultural standpoint. The research is inspired by the observation
that voluntary efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions exist and more in-
terestingly that there is heterogeneity in the level of voluntary action across
countries. To what extent could this be explained by cultural differences? In
Chapter 1, I argue the within-country culture of cooperation sustained by
trust – the expectation that a random member of society is trustworthy –
positively affects cooperative behavior in the international arena via repu-
tation effects. I theoretically motivate this hypothesis and provide empirical
evidence that countries associated with high trust have reduced greenhouse
gas emissions more substantially than countries that display low levels of so-
cial trust. I further explore this line of argument in Chapter 2 by looking at
how trust affects compliance. This chapter provides empirical evidence that
trust facilitates firms’ compliance decisions in an international climate change
regulation (EU ETS), which makes enforcement less costly in high-trust coun-
tries. In Chapter 3, I turn my attention to potential determinants of trust.
The paper focuses on the effect of migration on trust among neighbors in the
context of Mexico. The findings suggest that migration negatively affects the
formation of trust between individuals due to the expected short-term nature
of the relationship.
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Introduction
The importance of culture has gained recognition in the economics literature. As a key
cultural trait, trust – the expectation that a random member of society is trustworthy
– has attracted particular attention from economists. Previous studies have documented
the influence of trust on a variety of outcomes ranging from; economic growth (Knack
and Keefer, 1997; La Porta et al., 1997; Zak and Knack, 2001; Tabellini, 2010; Algan and
Cahuc, 2010), financial development (Guiso et al., 2004) to patterns of trade (Guiso et al.,
2009). Furthermore, a number of papers have studied how trust affects the design of a
wide variety of formal regulations (Algan and Cahuc, 2009; Aghion et al., 2010, 2011).
Can this growing literature also tell us something about the environment? In my thesis,
I have attempted to apply the insights and methodologies developed in this literature to
the field of environmental economics, which led to a number of new research questions.
For instance, given the consensus that trust facilitates local cooperation, does it have
implications for global cooperation problems such as climate change mitigation? Does
trust affect the stringency of environmental regulations and if so, what are the specific
mechanisms? This thesis sets out to rigorously address these questions.
In Chapter 1, jointly co-authored with Stefano Carattini, we argue that the within-
country cooperative culture sustained by trust positively affects international cooperative
behavior via reputation effects. We theoretically motivate this argument and then provide
empirical evidence that an increase in trust leads to more global cooperation measured
by larger reductions in CO2 emissions over time in a macro-level regression with country
fixed effects. The findings provide a plausible explanation for the existence of national
and region-level mitigation efforts in the absence of a global agreement, which is difficult
to reconcile with the conventional theory of collective action.
Chapter 2 explores the influence of trust on the design of climate change regulation
by focusing on the role of trust in compliance at the firm level. The paper begins with
the following observation: contrary to the existing literature that documents a negative
relationship between trust and regulation (since trust shared among citizens reduces the
demand for formal regulation), high-trust countries tend to be more stringent with their
regulatory policies than low-trust countries when it comes to climate change regulation.
I reconcile these two conflicting observations by focusing on the effect of trust on compli-
ance. Specifically, I test if compliance is higher in high-trust countries, which allows their
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governments to implement more stringent regulations that deal with global externalities
given the same level of international pressure.
The European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) offers a unique opportu-
nity to see whether installations located in different countries differ in their compliance
patterns with respect to the same international regulation due to differences in trust
and civicness. The findings reveal that noncompliance was significantly lower in high-
trust countries. A distinguishing feature of the empirical design is that I later restrict my
sample to installations owned by multinational firms (MNEs) and compare installations
operating in the same geographical area but whose headquarters are located in different
countries. This allows me to estimate the influence of trust prevalent in the country where
the headquarters are located on compliance behavior of the firm’s foreign affiliate, with
country of operation fixed effects. This exercise yields robust findings that installations
owned by firms headquartered in high-trust countries were more likely to comply with
the regulation than those owned by MNEs based in low trust countries, even when they
operate in the same country and therefore exposed to the same external environment.
To deepen our understanding in the formation of trust, I turn my attention to the
determinants of trust in Chapter 3. The paper focuses on the effect of migration on
trust among neighbors in the context of Mexico and tests the hypothesis that migration
negatively affects the formation of trust due to the expected short-term nature of the
relationship. I find empirical support for the hypothesis: residents in areas with high out-
migration were more likely to adjust trust in their neighbors downward, pointing to the
detrimental impact of migration on trust in origin areas.
These papers provide new insights into the role cultural traits play in environmental
issues or more specifically, how local norms, such as trust, could affect global cooperation
problems such as climate change. However, despite the growing evidence on the role of
culture in economic activities, the question of specific workings of culture remains open.
Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2015a) notes that this has been largely because (1) it is
difficult to know where culture comes from, (2) it is sticky with rare drastic changes, and
(3) even when these cultural changes occur they take place over a long period with many
other things happening at the same time. They then suggest corporations as an alternative
environment to study the role of culture. This is indeed a promising approach since
with corporate culture, we know (1) when, how, and based on what values corporations
are founded, (2) corporate culture is subject to more frequent changes (e.g., through
hiring, firing and M&As), and (3) performance is more easily measured (Guiso et al.,
2015a). There is an increasing interest in this line of reasoning that sheds light on specific
mechanisms behind the documented effect of culture at the macro-level. For instance,
Bloom et al. (2012b) provides evidence on the influence of trust in firms’ decision to
decentralize, which allows more efficient resource allocation within and across firms that
leads to higher firm productivity and economic growth. This serves as microevidence for
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the long-held belief that trust facilitates economic growth through lower transactions
costs (Arrow, 1972). Similarly, I attempted to provide a plausible mechanism for the
relationship between trust and climate change regulation by providing microevidence on
the role of trust in compliance at the firm level in Chapter 2. I concur with Guiso et al.
(2015a) that these approaches substantially enhance our understanding of how cultural
norms affect economic behavior and relate to formal institutions. There are a number
of interesting questions in this direction, for example, the evolution of preferences for
environmental quality as a function of formal regulations, which I am pursuing in related
work.
3
Chapter 1
Trust and CO2 Emissions:
Cooperation on a Global Scale
1.1 Introduction
As globalization accelerates, we are faced with an increasing number of global cooperation
problems. Climate change is one example of such global collective action dilemmas on an
unprecedented scale. The conventional collective action theory predicts that there should
be no voluntary action since unilateral mitigation efforts impose costs while the benefits
of climate change mitigation are dissipated across the globe. Yet, the reality is not as
bleak. We do observe that a number of countries, regions and even individuals have
taken independent action to reduce carbon emissions despite the absence of external
enforcement. What is even more interesting is that there exists heterogeneity in the
level of contribution across these voluntary actors —some are more active than others
in their contribution to this global public good problem.1 In this paper, we attempt to
provide a plausible explanation for this puzzling phenomenon based on the microeconomic
foundation on the relationship between trust, social norms and cooperation.
There seems to be a broad consensus that trust facilitates cooperative behavior in
the presence of incomplete contracts and imperfect information (see, for example, Algan
and Cahuc (2013)). However, what remains unanswered is to what extent, if at all, intra-
group trust affects intergroup cooperation, or more generally, the scope of cooperation
that could be sustained by such individual values and incentives. Tabellini (2008b) studies
this question and observes that people who are trustworthy cooperate on a wider range of
1For instance, the European Union tends to be more active than the rest of the world in their efforts
to tackle climate change with a target of 40 percent reduction in greenhouse gas emissions by 2030
compared with 1990 levels. We also see variation within Europe. Norway has made a pledge to achieve
carbon neutrality by 2030, which is more ambitious than the Europe-wide goal of 80 to 95 reduction in
emissions by 2050 while Sweden intends to reach the same target earlier by 2045. There is also growing
empirical evidence for pro-environmental consumption behavior at the individual level (e.g. Welsch and
Ku¨hling (2009) among many others).
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situations (e.g. via markets, institutions, etc.) than the untrustworthy who tend to coop-
erate only with a small set of people nearby (e.g. family members). In a different setting
with reputation but no individual values such as trustworthiness, Dixit (2004) finds that
incentives to maintain a good reputation are stronger with players located nearby, be-
cause they are more likely to be future partners and information about cheating can easily
reach them. Unfortunately, the probability of cooperation goes to zero in both models as
the distance between players goes to infinity. It makes them inappropriate for studying
global cooperation, or why some people are willing to cooperate with foreigners who are
located far away. This suggests that cooperation sustained only by individual incentives
eventually gives way to institutions, as economies grow large and more globalized (Dixit,
2004). Thus, we provide a simple model that incorporates the role of social norms, an
informal institution, in facilitating cooperation between trustworthy individuals and how
it affects global cooperation via reputation effects. The model yields theoretical support
for our hypothesis —individuals who live in a country where people trust and cooperate
with each other, are more likely to cooperate with foreigners.
We then provide empirical evidence for the relationship between trust and global co-
operation measured by the reduction in CO2 emissions. Identifying the causal effect of
trust faces a number of challenges. First, it is difficult to control for unobservable time-
invariant national characteristics that could codetermine the level of trust and the level
of emissions such as geography, legal origins and history due to the lack of long time-
series data on trust across countries. A number of papers have dealt with this obstacle
using time-invariant instruments such as religions (La Porta et al., 1997), ethnic frac-
tionalization (Knack and Keefer, 1997) or historical literacy rates (Tabellini, 2010). One
remaining concern related to this approach of using time-invariant instruments is that we
are unsure whether the instruments picks up the effect of trust or some deeper influence
of other time-invariant features related to trust on the level of emissions. A measure of
trust with intertemporal variation could be one remedy. However, the difficulty is that
cross-country data on trust only go back to the late 1980s, which does not provide mean-
ingful time variation given the documented persistence of trust across generations (Rice
and Feldman, 1997; Putnam, 2000; Guiso et al., 2009).
Second, even if we are able to include country fixed effects in our estimation, there
remains another challenge in the identification, namely, time-varying omitted variable
bias. There could be factors that affect trust and emissions simultaneously such as con-
temporaneous changes in the economic, political, cultural, and social environment of the
country.
We rely on the methodology developed in Algan and Cahuc (2010) to deal with these
identification issues. They provide a novel way to uncover the causal effect of trust (on
economic development in their case) by focusing on the inherited component of trust
and on its time variation over long time periods. Based on the evidence that trust is
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highly persistent across generations (Rice and Feldman, 1997; Putnam, 2000; Guiso et al.,
2009), they estimate trust held by previous generations by looking at the level of trust
that US immigrants have inherited from their ancestors who came to America from
different countries and at different points in time. Time variation in inherited trust thus
comes from the ancestors’ time of arrival in America, assuming that they brought with
themselves the prevailing social norms and attitudes from their home countries at the time
of their departure and passed them on to their descendants. To explain, they estimate the
differences in trust between France and Germany, for example, by comparing Americans
with ancestors who came to the US from France and Germany in similar periods, say,
between 1950 and 1980. Running the same exercise for descendants whose ancestors
came earlier, say, between 1920 and 1950, provides time variation in the inherited trust
between the two source countries. A time-varying measure of inherited trust obtained
by such logic serves as a proxy for trust held by people back in the source countries
at the time periods that we look at. It allows us to include country fixed effects and
control for unobservable time-invariant features that affect CO2 emissions and trust at
the same time such as geography (that is correlated with energy consumption patterns,
fossil fuel endowments and potential damage from changing climate, etc) and history.
The estimation of inherited trust is based on the General Social Survey that provides
information on the contemporaneous trust of US descendants of immigrants, where their
ancestors came from and the generation of the immigrants. The methodology provides
credible information on the level of trust held by previous generations and thus allows
tracing the evolution of trust for 26 countries around the world, including most European
countries, Japan, India, Mexico and Africa.
This methodology can also help us reduce the concern stemming from time-varying
factors by imposing a lag of minimum 25 years (one generation) between the time when
trust was transmitted (that is, ancestors’ time of arrival in America) and the contempo-
raneous level of CO2 emissions in the source country. It is then less likely that the level
of emissions and the level of trust held by people who left the source country at least
25 years ago were driven by some unobservable factors simultaneously. We control for a
number of changes in the economic, political, cultural and social environment to further
reduce the bias that may arise from other time-varying factors.
Our findings suggest that increase in inherited trust is a statistically significant factor
that explains the reduction of CO2 emissions over the period between 1950 and 2010, even
when we include country fixed effects and control for the changes in economic growth, in-
dustrial composition, and trade patterns. The results are robust when we look at different
periods such as 1970 and 2010 and include additional controls such as changes in political
institutions, religious or social attitudes, education, urbanization, and population density.
We also run a placebo test on the period between 1920 and 1980, which is an era when
there was no awareness of man-made climate change, thus no reason for the relationship
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between trust and CO2 emissions to exist. As expected, we do not see the link between
trust and CO2 emissions between 1920 and 1980, while trust still had a positive impact
on economic growth over the same period.
Our paper relates to two distinct strands of literature. First, it has grown out of the
literature that concerns social norms and cooperation. In contrast to the conventional
collective action theory, Ostrom (1990) documents a wide range of empirical evidence that
local social norms —a set of shared beliefs on how one ought to behave in a given situation
—enable individuals to cooperate to sustainably manage local natural resources in the
absence of external enforcement. In fact, she observes that such self-governed resource
management regimes often outperform formal enforcement regimes. One of the central
characteristics of the cases of successful cooperation is trust between involved parties,
or the capability of group members to gain a reputation for being trustworthy (Ostrom,
2000; Milinski et al., 2002; Poteete et al., 2010).2 Taking this insight one step further, we
show that the intragroup cooperative culture sustained by trust and trustworthiness may
also affect intergroup cooperation through reputation effects.3 We provide theoretical and
empirical support for this hypothesis.
Also related is the well-established literature on the effect of trust, or social capital at
large, on various economic outcomes. Most notably, a number of papers have documented
the strong and positive influence of trust on economic development. Knack and Keefer
(1997) and La Porta et al. (1997) provide early empirical evidence on the relationship
between social capital and economic performance in a cross-country investigation. Zak
and Knack (2001) provide theoretical support and further empirical evidence from a
larger cross-sectional sample of countries. Recently, Tabellini (2010) and Algan and Cahuc
(2010) corroborate the effects of trust on economic development controlling for country
fixed effects. Trust has also been shown to affect financial development (Guiso et al.,
2004), trade patterns (Guiso et al., 2009), and the design of institutions and regulations
(Algan and Cahuc, 2009; Aghion et al., 2010, 2011). Closely related to the current article
is Jo (2017) where the author provides support for our findings by showing that high-
trust countries tend to have more stringent climate change legislation through lower
enforcement costs.4
2Ostrom (2010) argues that this relationship between social norms and local cooperation could have
implications for global collective action dilemma by generating multi-level externalities that go beyong
the local level. Communities with solar power networks, better waste disposal facilities and efforts to
reduce pollution levels in metropolitan areas are the examples put forward that help reduce local pollution
levels as well as potentially decrease global greenhouse gas emissions. However, this argument has yet to
be tested empirically. A recent paper by Brunel and Johnson (2017) provide empirical evidence against
her argument.
3Carattini et al. (2015) also study the relationship between within-country trust and greenhouse gas
emissions, but the paper fails to provide a compelling theoretical explanation for the observed relationship
between the two variables. Also, the analysis provides correlational evidence only, relying on short-run
variations in the average trust measure across countries between 1990 and 2007.
4We also draw insights for our theoretical framework from the repeated game with random matching
literature. A group of papers investigate community enforcement mechanisms in this setting, where
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The paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 provides theoretical support for our
hypothesis. We discuss the data in Section 1.3. Section 1.4 presents the estimation strategy
and Section 1.5 discusses our findings and present the results from a placebo test and
robustness checks. Section 1.6 concludes.
1.2 Conceptual Framework
In this section we present a simple model to theoretically motivate our hypothesis. We
begin by discussing the relevant literature that provides insights for understanding the
relationship between trust and cooperation. We then modify the standard model to in-
corporate the possibility of global cooperation to answer the following question —when
people live in a society where people trust and cooperate with each other, are they also
more likely to cooperate globally?
1.2.1 Trust, Social Norms and Cooperation
In his relation-based governance model, Dixit (2004) shows that cooperation is easier to
sustain if the size of the group is small and individuals are close to each other. Given that
information transmission is localized, incentives to maintain a reputation are stronger for
individuals nearby since information about cheating is more likely to reach them than
those who are located far away. Tabellini (2008b) also studies the range of situations in
which individuals cooperate and reaches similar conclusions but in a different context.
He observes that in reality, individuals draw utility from the act of cooperating itself
(i.e., have “warm glow” preferences) and this non-pecuniary utility from cooperation is
stronger among close individuals. In other words, there is no reputation, but norms of
good conduct apply with greater force among close individuals.
Both models yield useful insight as to why we observe cooperation in various situa-
tions, but unfortunately the probability of cooperation being sustained goes to zero as
the distance between individuals goes to infinity in both cases, thus inappropriate to ex-
plain why individuals cooperate globally. This indicates that cooperation sustained only
by individual incentives eventually gives way to institutions as economies grow large and
more globalized (Dixit, 2004). Thus, in this paper we focus on the role of social norms, a
form of informal institution, in inducing global cooperation as one potential mechanism.
players change their opponents in each period and cheating against one opponent triggers sanctions
by other members of the society (Okuno-Fujiwara and Postlewaite, 1995; Kandori, 1992; Ellison, 1994;
Dal Bo´, 2007; Takahashi, 2010). In particular, we focus on the setting of local information processing, first
introduced by Okuno-Fujiwara and Postlewaite (1995) and also studied in Kandori (1992) and Dal Bo´
(2007), that provides players with information on the trustworthiness of the randomly matched opponent.
Such information transmission structure serves as an interesting tool to investigate the incentives of the
players to cooperate with foreigners whose trustworthiness is not provided by the local information
processing system unlike that of local opponents.
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The specification of desirable behavior together with sanction rules in a community
constitutes a social norm. The role of such social norms in guiding human behavior in
conflict situations has been studied in the repeated game literature with random match-
ing (Okuno-Fujiwara and Postlewaite, 1995; Kandori, 1992; Ellison, 1994; Dal Bo´, 2007;
Takahashi, 2010). Among other factors, the literature is concerned about the minimal in-
formation transmission with which the cooperative social norm can be sustained and has
shown that a large community can sustain cooperation through community enforcement
under various levels of information availability.5 We are particularly interested in the
setting where players have access to some local information (as opposed to no or perfect
information), although they do not observe what happens in the entire community; that
is, players can observe the characteristics of their opponent to whom they are randomly
matched in each stage game via their ‘status’, which we label as trustworthy or untrust-
worthy, and players make actions based on the status of their own and their opponent’s.6
We present a simple baseline model of such information structure used in the literature
to illustrate the interaction between trustworthiness, norms and cooperation and more
importantly, to motivate our extension of the model in the following section.
The structure of the repeated game with random matching is as follows. A society
consists of a continuum of players on [0,1]. In each period t=1,2,..., a player is randomly
matched to another player to play a two-player stage game. This procedure is repeated
infinitely and each player’s total payoff is the expected sum of her stage payoffs discounted
by δ ∈ (0, 1), which is common to all players. We assume that the probability distribution
over potential opponents in each period is uniform and independent of the past history.
The stage game that each pair of players plays at time t is shown in Table 1.1. The payoff
g is taken to be positive with l non-negative so that each player has Defect as a dominant
strategy in the stage game.
Apart from their own history, players have access to a local information processing
system that gives them information on the status or type of their opponents. The system
has the following structure: (1) a status zi(t) ∈ Zi is assigned to player i at time t; (2)
when player i and j meet at time t and take actions (ai(t), aj(t)), the update of their
status follows a transition mapping (zi(t+ 1), zj(t+ 1)) = τij (zi(t), zj(t), ai(t), aj(t)); (3)
at time t, player i can only observe (zi(t), zj(t)). The processing of information is treated
as exogenous and assumed to function honestly.
Now, let us consider a simple social norm that prescribes the behavior of each player,
5There can be three broad levels of information availability; perfect information where every player’s
past actions are publicly observable, limited information where players have some information of their
randomly matched opponents’ past actions, and no information where players only observe their own
past history.
6Okuno-Fujiwara and Postlewaite (1995), Kandori (1992) and Dal Bo (2007) use more neutral words,
‘good’ instead of ‘trustworthy’ to describe the type of players who are expected to follow the social norm
and thus cooperate and ‘bad’ instead of ‘untrustworthy’ to describe the type of players who are not
expected to cooperate or have deviated from the norm.
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Cooperate Defect
Cooperate 1,1 -l,1+g
Defect 1+g,-l 0,0
Table 1.1: The Stage Game
σ, as a function of her status and the status of the matched player when there are two
status levels, trustworthy (T ) and untrustworthy (U), i.e., zi = {T, U}. The associated
status transition mapping is also defined below.
σi(zi, zj) =
Cooperate if (zi, zj) = (T, T )Defect otherwise
τi(zi, zj, ai) =
Trustworthy if (zi, zj, ai) = (T, T, C) or (T, U,D)Untrustworthy otherwise
Pi(T ) = 1− r and Pi(U) = r
We suppose there is a fixed share of trustworthy players in the population, 1 − r,
labelled so in the sense that they are expected to cooperate for a mutually beneficial
outcome in a conflict situation such as the prisoner’s dilemma by conforming to the
social norm.7 An immediate implication of the setting of an infinite population is that
each player is of zero measure and hence no unilateral deviation from the social norm by
a single player will alter the distribution, i.e., the status distribution is stationary. The
setting of an infinite population and the resulting stationarity of status distribution is
reasonable since the endogenous formation or dynamic change of status distribution, i.e.,
why there is higher trust or are more trustworthy individuals in some countries than in
others, is beyond the scope of our analysis. We are mainly interested in the extent to
which community enforcement is possible in the presence of local information processing
system and its sustainability as a function of the trustworthiness of the population.
To explain the system above, the social standard behavior σi(zi, zj) prescribes that
a player cooperates if both she and her opponent are trustworthy and defects if either
is untrustworthy. A player’s status is revised according to τi. A player with trustworthy
status remains so as long as she follows the social standard behavior but changes to
untrustworthy if she deviates. Note that each player’s decision making and the update of
7There is strong experimental evidence that suggests there are different types of individuals. There are
‘conditional cooperators’ who are willing to cooperate so long as other people also cooperate, while there
are ‘free riders’ who never cooperate no matter what (Fischbacher et al., 2001; Fehr and Ga¨chter, 2000b;
Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Ostrom, 2000). This structure of the model closely matches this evidence.
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the status is done without the knowledge of the entire society. They are based only on
the local information which consists of the player’s status and her action and the status
of the matched player.
It can be shown that with such social norm that facilitates cooperation between trust-
worthy individuals, any strictly individually rational payoff (cooperative outcome in this
case) can be supported by a sequential equilibrium when the discount factor is sufficiently
high.8
PROPOSITION 1 (i) The social norm, σi(zi, zj), can be sustained as a sequential
equilibrium if players are sufficiently patient or δ ∈ (δ∗, 1) for some δ∗. (ii) Trustworthy
players have greater incentives to conform to the norm if r is low.
Proof. The model we consider here is Example 1 of Okuno-Fujiwara and Postlewaite
(1995) with a generic payoff matrix. Thus we closely follow their approach in proving
the results. It is a player’s best response to follow the norm if the immediate gain from
deviation is less than the resulting loss in the future due to the change in one’s status.
The resulting loss is evaluated along the equilibrium path, or evaluated by the value func-
tion v∞(zi, σi∗). The immediate gain is g, while the present discounted payoff along the
equilibrium path is 1−r
1−δ and zero for trustworthy and untrustworthy players, respectively.
Then the norm is sustained if:
δ∗ =
g
g + 1− r ≤ δ (1.1)
For part b of the proposition, it is straightforward that δ∗ is an increasing function of r.
Q.E.D.
Intuitively, trustworthy players follow the norm if players are patient enough and
sufficiently value future cooperation opportunities. In particular, the main implication of
the equilibrium is that trustworthy players face greater incentives to follow the norm when
there are a large number of trustworthy individuals in the community. The expected loss
in future payoffs from deviation, of becoming untrustworthy and losing future cooperation
opportunities, 1−r
1−δ , is higher or simply cheating is more costly as the share of trustworthy
individuals in the community rises.
8The payoff to a player i is said to be individually rational if it is at least as large as the level she can
guarantee for herself, i.e., ui = min
aj∈A
max
ai∈A
gi(ai, aj).
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1.2.2 Trust and Cooperation in the Global Context
Now, suppose there is a global collective action dilemma that requires attention and
collective effort of all societies (or countries) that constitute the global community. We
model the situation by introducing to the population a number of foreigners whose sta-
tus is ‘unknown’, which constitutes b percent of the population and b is assumed to be
equal across countries. The local information processing structure is not able to provide
information on the trustworthiness of foreigners (one can think of the barriers imposed
by the difference in language, culture, appearance, etc. that could hinder the functioning
of the local information system). The existing social norm then does not advise players
on what to do upon being matched to a foreigner simply because their status is unknown
(recall that the norm prescribes appropriate actions only based on the player’s status and
the status of the matched opponent). The question here is then, is the social norm still
sustainable in the presence of foreigners? Do trustworthy individuals have incentives to
cooperate with foreigners? We show that trustworthy individuals do cooperate with for-
eigners even when their trustworthiness is unknown and the incentives to do so increase
in the fraction of trustworthy individuals in the local population.
PROPOSITION 2 (i) The norm σ′i(zi, zj) can be sustained as a sequential equilibrium
in the presence of foreigners if players are sufficiently patient or δ ∈ (δ∗, 1) for some δ∗.
(ii) Trustworthy players have greater incentives to cooperate with foreigners when r is low.
Proof. Consider the norm σ′i(zi, zj) and the following modified status transition with the
presence of foreigners.
σ′i(zi, zj) =
Cooperate if (zi, zj) = (T, T ), (T,X)Defect otherwise
τi(zi, zj, ai, aj) =

Trustworthy if (zi, zj, ai, aj) = (T, T, C, ·), (T, U,D, ·),
(T,X,C, ·) or (T,X,D,D)
Untrustworthy otherwise
where aj is the opponent’s action and X is the unknown status of foreigners. Players
still play the same prisoner’s dilemma game described in Table 1.1. The best response
strategy can be expressed in terms of unimprovability as in Okuno-Fujiwara and Postle-
waite (1995). That is, it is a player’s best response to follow the norm if the immediate
gain from defecting against a foreigner is less than the resulting loss in the future due
to the change in one’s status. The probability of the foreigner’s cooperation, θ ∈ (0, 1),
is assumed to be random for the sake of simplicity, i.e., E(θ) = 1
2
. The resulting loss is
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evaluated along the equilibrium path, or evaluated by the value function v∞(zi, σi∗). It
is straightforward to check that the expected immediate gain from defecting against a
foreigner is 1
2(g+l)
. The present discounted payoff for a player of each status along the
equilibrium path is as follows.
vi
∞(T ) =
1
1− δ [(1− b)(1− r) + b(
1
2
− 1
2
l)] (1.2)
vi
∞(U) =
b(1 + g)
2(1− δ) (1.3)
The unimprovability requirement 1/2(g+l) ≤ δ[vi∞(T )−vi∞(U)], reduces to the following
condition.
δ∗ =
g + l
(1− b)[2(1− r) + (g + l)] ≤ δ (1.4)
Thus, for δ sufficiently large, the loss caused by the change in status is greater than the
expected gain from a one-shot deviation against a foreigner, and therefore trustworthy
players have incentives to cooperate with foreigners even when their status is unknown.
For the second part of the proposition, it is clear that δ∗ is an increasing function of r. A
large fraction of trustworthy players in the population makes defection against foreigner
costly and thus serves to lower the threshold discount factor beyond which the norm is
sustained. Q.E.D.
The modified transition function is identical to the one in the previous section, so long
as players are matched to local players whose trustworthiness is observable. For matchings
with foreigners, if a trustworthy player cooperates she remains trustworthy irrespective
of the foreigner’s action, aj. On the other hand, if she defects there are two possible
outcomes. In the case where the foreigner defects as well, she remains trustworthy. We
interpret this as the player’s cautiousness being justified. If, however, the foreigner coop-
erates she becomes untrustworthy, which will cost her future cooperation opportunities
that could have been ensured by remaining trustworthy (i.e. local trustworthy partners
who follow the social norm do not cooperate with untrustworthy players).9
The equilibrium provides a simple theory of how local cooperative norms between
trustworthy players create incentives to cooperate with foreigners through the role of
reputation. The most important implication is that individuals face greater incentives to
cooperate with foreigners when they live in a society with a large number of trustworthy
9We have assumed the same payoff structure for cooperation with foreigners (the same g and l). One
might argue that the benefit from global cooperation might be smaller than local cooperation. Assuming
g′ < g, where g′ is the benefit from global cooperation, in fact makes the incentive to cooperate with
foreigners even stronger since vi
∞(U) is smaller when g′ is lower. Similarly, assuming l′ < l, where l′ is a
loss from being cheated by a foreign partner, makes vi
∞(T ) larger. Intuitively, trustworthy players take
the risk of being cheated by foreigners when they cooperate with them and thus a lower price of such
risk-taking induces trustworthy players to be more inclined to cooperate with foreigners.
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individuals. There is a greater benefit of having the reputation for being trustworthy
when most people are trustworthy. The result relies on the status transition function
that specifies, defection against cooperative foreigners is treated similarly as defection
against local trustworthy players —trustworthy players become untrustworthy in both
cases.
This specification is consistent with a growing body of experimental evidence that
shows global cooperation can be sustained by local interaction and local punishment for
global defection. For example, Milinski et al. (2006) run an experiment where players
are first asked to contribute to a “climate fund” that will benefit the entire world and
then play a 2-player prisoner’s dilemma game (PD henceforth). The authors find that
players were much more willing to contribute to the climate fund when the information
on each player’s contribution was going to be shared in the next round PD than when
each contribution remained anonymous, which highlights the role of reputation that flows
across local and global settings.10
A recent work by Hauser et al. (2016) provides further evidence on the interaction
between local and global cooperation through reputation. In alternating rounds of public
goods games (PGG henceforth) and PDs, they find that in a pairwise PD game with two
neighbors, players were more likely to cooperate with neighbors who had contributed at
least as much as themselves in the preceding PGG as well as with neighbors who had
cooperated with them in the previous PD. That is, participants reciprocated not only their
neighbor’s previous pairwise cooperation, but also their contributions in the PGG, which
the authors call local-to-global reciprocity.11 They also provide direct evidence that local
punishment effectively induces global cooperation by showing that when both neighbors
defected in the PD, the player significantly increases contribution in the following PGG.12
10In a more generic setting that replaces the contribution to the climate fund with standard multi-
player public good games, Milinski et al. (2002) find that a higher level of cooperation is sustained in
public good games (played among six players including the pair that will play the PD in the next round)
when they are alternated with 2-player PDs than when all PGGs (Public Good Games) are played first
and followed by a series of PDs. This reflects that not contributing in the PGG harms the reputation of
a player in the following PD, which induces players to contribute in the PGGs. They provide evidence
for this mechanism of reputation in two ways. Firstly, players are more likely to defect in a 2-player PD
if their opponent did not contribute in the preceding PGG (that involved four other players apart from
the pair themselves). In other words, players tend to withhold from cooperating with those who did not
behave in a trustworthy manner in the preceding PGG. Secondly, they show that cooperation in the
PGGs is sustained only when there is the risk of future rounds of PDs. In groups that were told that
there would be no PDs, thus no channel of reputation effects, cooperation declined rapidly.
11Here the group sizes in PGGs are much bigger than usual with 39 players on average and 17 and 60
being minimum and maximum, respectively, compared to, for instance, 6 in Milinski et al. (2002). In a
second experiment, they replicate their findings with a group of 1000 players for the PGGs and provide
further evidence on the scalability of local-to-global reciprocity.
12We also observe similar punishment mechanisms in formal law enforcement. The exercise of extrater-
ritorial jurisdiction, defined as the legal ability of a government to exercise authority beyond its normal
boundaries, is an example similar in spirit in that global defection (or defection against a foreigner) is
punished locally. For some types of crime, a crime committed abroad is prosecuted in the country of
origin of the offender even if the crime may not be illegal in the country where the offence took place
(Colangelo, 2014). Fraud, bribery, sexual offences against children, murder and manslaughter are the
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Most closely related to our model is a recent work by Jordan et al. (2016) where
they provide evidence that reputation concerns drive uncalculating cooperation. They
introduce a novel two-stage incentivised economic game where in the first stage player
A decides whether to pay a cost to benefit a recipient in a way either calculating or
uncalculating and in the second stage player B (who is not involved in the first stage
game) and player A play a trust game, with player B as the truster and player A as the
trustee.13 As in standard trust games, the amount sent by B to A reflects B’s trust of
A and the amount returned from A to B reflects A’s trustworthiness. First, they find
that player A is more likely to be uncalculating when the decision making process in
the first stage is observable to player B than when the process is hidden, indicating that
people tend to use uncalculating cooperation for reputational benefits. Also, their findings
show that uncalculating cooperation is indeed perceived as a signal for trustworthiness as
player B tends to send more money when she observed that player A was uncalculating
in the first stage. Finally, uncalculating cooperation as a signal for trustworthiness seems
to be valid since player A who was uncalculating in the first stage did behave in a more
trustworthy matter (returned more money to player B) in the second stage. In our model,
trustworthy players who follow the social norm cooperate with foreigners without knowing
their trustworthiness and bear the risk of being cheated (thus cooperate uncalculatingly)
in order to keep their reputation for being trustworthy. This specification seems to be
directly supported by this experimental evidence.
The parameters g and l in the prisoner’s dilemma game reflect the quality of formal
institutions that we consider exogenous.14 Better external enforcement implies a smaller
benefit of cheating and a smaller loss from being cheated. It is instructive to discuss the
implications of these parameters on the equilibrium. The immediate gain from deviating
from the social norm falls in both cases, with and without foreigners, as g falls. However,
the gain from defecting against a foreigner, 1
2
(g + l), depends on l as well as g, whereas
it only depends on g without foreigners. This follows from imperfect information. As
players do not observe the trustworthiness of their foreign opponents, they bear the risk
of cooperating with a cheating foreigner in the equilibrium. A smaller l reduces the cost
of being cheated, which increases the incentives to conform to the norm of cooperation
instead of deviating from it.
The equilibrium we discussed here illustrates how trust or trustworthiness of the pop-
examples for which the court can exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction.
13The authors employ two approaches to operationalize uncalculating versus calculating decision-
making. One is to provide a looking choice whereby player A can choose to look at the cost of helping
the recipient before helping. Another approach is to measure the time player A spends before making
the helping decision when the cost is revealed based on experimental evidence that quick cooperative
choices are perceived to be more prosocial.
14Tabellini (2008b) studies how formal institutions and the share of trustworthy individuals (who
cooperate on a wider range of situations than the untrustworthy) dynamically evolve through value
transmissions from parents to children.
15
ulation sustains the norm of cooperation within the country, and how such norms create
incentives to cooperate with foreigners. In the following sections, we provide empirical
evidence for this theoretical prediction by estimating the role of trust on the reduction
in CO2 emissions.
1.3 Data Description
We rely on standard sources for historic emissions and macroeconomic data. CO2 emis-
sions data are from the Carbon Dioxide Information Analysis Center (CDIAC) and mea-
sured in thousand metric tons of carbon dioxide. We focus on the period 1950 - 2010 for
which the emissions estimates are derived from energy statistics published by the United
Nations. Data on population and economic growth measured by income per capita in
1990 US dollars come from the Maddison database (Bolt and van Zanden, 2014) which
covers the period 1820 - 2010.15
To trace the evolution of trust in different countries we use the information on the trust
of US immigrants and the country of origin of their ancestors provided by the General
Social Survey (GSS) since 1978. Individual trust is measured by the following question
commonly used in other surveys and in the relevant literature: “Generally speaking, would
you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing
with people?” Respondents answer the question by choosing one of the following options,
“Most people can be trusted”, “Can’t be too careful,” and “Depends.” We construct a
binary trust variable that takes 1 if the respondent answered that most people can be
trusted and takes 0 otherwise. The fraction of respondents who answered “Depends” is
small, around 4 percent, and thus the categorization has little influence on the results
of our analysis. We report the results from various alternative specifications of the trust
measure in the Appendix A.1.
The country of origin of the respondents’ ancestors is given by the following question:
“From what countries or part of the world did your ancestors come?” Individuals can
name up to three countries in order of preference and when more than one country is
named, respondents are asked to specify one country to which they feel closest. We use this
information to construct the country of origin variable following Algan and Cahuc (2010).
Our baseline sample includes 26 countries including most European countries: Austria,
Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hun-
gary, India, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Russia,
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, former Yugoslavia, and African origins as
a single category. We only include countries of origin with 10 or more observations in our
estimations (Table A.1).
15Here we only discuss two major macro-level variables but subsequently we employ more. Data Ap-
pendix contains a detailed description of all macro-level variables used in the analysis.
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We use the information on the birth year of the respondents and which immigrant
generation they belong to in order to estimate their ancestors’ time of arrival in America
(the way we do this will be explained in detail in the following section). Respondents
are asked if they were born and how many of their parents and grandparents were born
in the United States. Based on this information we distinguish four generations of US
immigrants: first-generation Americans, second-generation Americans with at least one
parent born abroad, third-generation Americans with both parents born in the United
States and at least two grandparents born abroad, and fourth-generation Americans with
both parents and more than two grandparents born in the United States.
Current trust in the source countries, which is to be used to compare with the es-
timated inherited trust from US immigrants, comes from the European Social Survey
(ESS) for European countries and the World Value Survey (WVS) for non-European
countries. The trust question in both surveys is exactly the same as the one used in the
GSS, which makes the variable comparable across these databases.16 Whenever possible,
we use the 2010 wave of both surveys to provide a comparison with trust transmitted in
2010 estimated from the GSS. We rely on the 2005 wave of the WVS for Canada.
1.4 Empirical Analysis
1.4.1 Estimating the Role of Trust in Reducing CO2 Emissions
Our aim is to estimate the effect of trust on global cooperation which we measure by the
reduction of CO2 emissions. To this end we run the following regression:
Emissionsct = α0 + α1Tct + α2Xct + Fc + Ft + ct (1.5)
where Emissionsct is per capita CO2 emissions in country c and time t. Tct measures
the average trust of individuals who live in country c and time t, conditional on a set
of individual characteristics such as age, gender, education, income, employment status
and religious affiliations. Xct includes a vector of time-varying country characteristics
that influence the level of emissions such as the size and structural composition of their
economies and openness to trade. Fc denotes country fixed effects that control for unob-
servable time-invariant national features such as geography that is likely to be correlated
16Although the wording of the question is identical, the scale given for answer differs across these
surveys. GSS offers three options, “Most people can be trusted”, “Can’t be too careful”, and “Depends”,
while the ESS offers a scale from 0 to 10 (with 10 the highest level of trust) and the WVS offers only
two options, “Most people can be trusted”, “Can’t be too careful.” The construction of a binary trust
variable from the GSS allows a straightforward comparison with the answer from the trust question in
WVS and the categorisation has little impact on the comparability of the two variables because as stated
in the main text the fraction of respondents who choose “Depends” is minimal. For the ESS, we also
construct a binary variable from the answer that takes 1 if the respondent chose a number larger than 5
and 0 otherwise.
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with emissions through energy consumption patterns, fossil fuel endowments and poten-
tial damage from changing climate, and also initial economic development or historical
institutional qualities that may have had influence on trust and characteristics of the
economy. Finally, Ft denotes period fixed effects common to all countries.
The task of uncovering the causal effect of trust is not straightforward. First, given
the substantial evidence that trust tends to be highly persistent across generations (Rice
and Feldman, 1997; Putnam, 2000; Guiso et al., 2006; Nunn and Wantchekon, 2011), we
need a measure for trust with intertemporal variation over several generations. However,
the cross-country measure for trust available from the World Value Survey only goes back
to the late 1980s, which does not allow sufficient time for the evolution of trust attitudes
in individuals. Second, the correlation between the change in trust and the change in
CO2 emissions in a model with country fixed effects can be interpreted as causal only if
these two variables are not simultaneously affected by common time-varying factors. For
example, one can imagine there might have been political or social events in a country that
affected generalized trust or trustworthiness of the population and industrial activities
that led to changes in CO2 emissions at the same time.
To overcome these difficulties, we follow the methodology developed in Algan and
Cahuc (2010). The authors suggest a novel way to estimate the causal effect of trust on
economic growth by focusing on the inherited component of trust and its time variation
over long time periods. The key insight here is that trust tends to be persistent across
generations and therefore parents’ trust is a strong predictor of their children’s trust.
Based on this observation they trace the evolution of inherited trust from the trust that
US immigrants have inherited from their ancestors who immigrated to America from
different countries at different points in time. Time variation in inherited trust thus comes
from the ancestors’ time of arrival in America, assuming they brought with themselves
the prevailing social norms and attitudes from their home countries at the time of their
departure. Inherited trust is measured by the country of origin fixed effects in individual
regressions of the current trust of the descendants of US immigrants. The coefficients on
the country of origin fixed effects, which we denote as Tˆct, serve as a proxy variable for
trust by replacing Tct in equation (1). The coefficient on the inherited trust variable α1
then reflects the correlation between inherited trust and contemporaneous CO2 emissions.
The concern for time-varying omitted variable bias is reduced by the 25-year lag that
we impose between the time at which trust was transmitted by immigrant ancestors
(which is their time of arrival in the US) and contemporaneous CO2 emissions in the
home country. The lag structure effectively replaces Tˆct with ˆTct−25. It is then less likely
that the correlation between changes in inherited trust and changes in emissions is driven
by changes in some unobservable factors that affected the two variables simultaneously,
after controlling for a number of channels through which trust in the past may affect the
contemporaneous level of emissions. The way we implement this strategy is explained at
18
length in the section below.
We consider the periods 1950-1952 and 2008-2010 (1950 and 2010 henceforth) in our
baseline estimation. As Figure A.1 shows, the trend in CO2 emissions has been relatively
stable for most countries from 1950 onwards after a structural break due to World War
2 in most OECD countries. It is important to go sufficiently far back in time to allow a
long gap for inherited trust to evolve; however, we are also aware that up to around 1980s
there was no awareness of man-made climate change and therefore there is no conceptual
link between trust and cooperation in climate change mitigation efforts.17 We make a
trade-off between going as far back as to 1950 and including an era when there was no
prior to expect the relationship between trust and CO2 emissions to exist. Later, we take
advantage of the setting by running a placebo test on the period (1920-1980) in which
we do not expect to observe the link between trust and emissions. As robustness checks,
we also consider an alternative period (1970-2010) and find similar results as in the main
analysis.
1.4.2 Inherited Trust of US Immigrants and Contemporary Trust
in the Source Country
1.4.2.1 Inherited Trust
In this section we estimate the evolution of trust transmitted from the home country
through US immigrants from the General Social Survey (GSS) following Algan and Cahuc
(2010). We impose a lag of 25 years between the inherited trust and the contemporaneous
level of CO2 emissions. It implies that we study trust attitudes transmitted at least T−25
before to explain the level of emissions at T. We expect this lag structure to mitigate
the concern of time-varying omitted variable bias since it is then less likely that some
common factors simultaneously affected both emissions at T and trust transmitted at
least 25 years before T.
We use the following mechanism to estimate inherited trust in 1950 and 2010. The
information on the birth year of the respondents (who are descendants of US immigrants)
and their immigrant generation is used to group them into two cohorts, 1950 cohort and
2010 cohort. The two cohorts differ in the timing of their ancestors’ arrival in America
17The first World Climate Conference was held in Geneva in 1979, convened by the World Meteoro-
logical Organization (WMO) with the main focus of the meeting being global warming and how it could
affect human activity. According to our search on the media database Factiva, newspaper articles were
regularly written on the warming effects of carbon dioxide emissions and the use of fossil fuel starting
from the 80’s. Since then the topic has become a major political issue in many developed countries with
varying degrees of intensity since then. In 1988, the WMO and the United Nations Environment Pro-
gramme (UNEP) created the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), whose initial task
was to prepare a comprehensive review and recommendations with respect to the state of knowledge of
the science of climate change; social and economic impact of climate change; possible response strategies.
Thus we believe it is safe to assume that the period between 1920 and 1980 was void of the public’s
awareness for climate change.
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Table 1.2: Cohort decomposition - example with a 25-year lag
Generation Cohort 1950 Cohort 2010
2nd born before 1925 Born 1925-1985
3rd born before 1950 born after 1950
4th born before 1975 born after 1975
from the source countries (before 1925 and between 1925 and 1985, respectively) and
therefore the prevailing social norms and attitudes they are presumed to have inherited.
The 25-year lag pushes back the latest time of arrival in the country by 25 years from
the periods in which we are interested.
Table 1.2 describes the cohort decomposition by immigrant generation. One generation
is assumed to be 25 years. Inherited trust in 1950 is then that of second-generation
Americans born before 1925 (i.e. those whose parents arrived in America before 1925), of
third-generation Americans born before 1950 (i.e. those whose parents were born in the US
before 1925 and therefore whose immigrant grandparents arrived in America before 1925),
and of fourth-generation Americans born before 1975 (i.e. following the same logic, whose
great grandparents arrived in America before 1925). Similarly, inherited trust in 2010 is
that of second-generation Americans born between 1925 and 1985, of third-generation
Americans born after 1950, and of fourth-generation Americans born after 1975. Table
A.1 reports the number of observations for these two cohorts by their country of origin.
Table A.2 presents summary statistics.
We run a single regression on both cohorts with interaction terms between cohort
dummies and country of origin dummies, controlling for age, gender, education, employ-
ment status, religion, and income category in order to provide evidence for time variation
in inherited trust. In another specification, we also try to include parents’ education to
address the possibility that trust is transmitted through parents’ human capital rather
than cultural transmission and find similar results. Table 1.3 reports the OLS estimates
of inherited trust for 1950 and 2010 measured by the coefficients on the country of origin
fixed effects. Trust inherited in 1950 by Swedish Americans is used as the reference group.
We include year dummies to control for common temporal shocks. Standard errors are
clustered at the country of origin level.
Column 1 presents the estimates for inherited trust in 1950 relative to trust inherited
by Swedish Americans in 1950. The results suggest that having ancestors coming from a
country that is not Sweden has a statistically significant effect on one’s inherited trust.
The level of trust inherited in 1950 from most Western and Central European countries or
the United Kingdom tends to be higher than that inherited from Sweden. The probability
to trust other people is 9.2 percentage points higher for Austrian Americans and 1.2
percentage points higher for British Americans. On the other hand, inherited trust in
1950 is lower for most Eastern European and Mediterranean countries. The probability
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to trust others is 2.3 and 4.8 percentage points lower for Czech Americans and for Italian
Americans, respectively. Inherited trust in 1950 is also lower for countries in other regions
such as India, Japan, and Africa.
Column 2 reports inherited trust in 2010 relative to trust inherited by Swedish Amer-
icans in 1950. The estimates suggest substantial time variation in inherited trust for most
source countries. The pattern in the evolution of inherited trust we find here is remarkably
similar to what Algan and Cahuc (2010) document in their paper although we consider
a slightly different time period (their baseline period is 1935-2000). It provides further
evidence for the persistent nature of trust and its slow evolutionary process. Swedish
Americans have inherited higher trust in 2010 than in 1950. Similarly, trust inherited
from other Nordic countries has also increased. In contrast, inherited trust deteriorated
over time for most Continental European countries as well as Mediterranean countries
such as Italy and Greece. We report the effect of other individual characteristics on trust
in Table 1.4. Trust is positively correlated with age, education and income as documented
by previous studies (Alesina and La Ferrara 2002; Glaeser, Laibson and Sacerdote 2002).
1.4.2.2 Correlation between Inherited Trust and Contemporary Trust in the
Source Country
Having estimated inherited trust from the descendants of US immigrants, we now docu-
ment the relationship between the estimated inherited trust and the current level of trust
in the source countries. We would expect to find a strong correlation between inherited
trust and current trust back in the source country, if the channel of cultural transmission
within families is at work.
As in Algan and Cahuc (2010), we estimate the same regression that we ran above
but replace the country of origin fixed effects by the current level of average trust in
the source countries in 2010 provided by the World Value Survey and the European
Social Survey. One might be concerned about potential compatibility issues of using two
different surveys to construct a variable (although the wording of the trust question in
the two surveys is identical). Thus we try to restrict the sample to respondents whose
ancestors came from European countries and use the ESS only to calculate the current
level of trust. The results are reported in Table A.3 and qualitatively consistent with
what we find and discuss in this section.
Column 1 and 2 in Table 1.5 show the results for descendants of US immigrants
who have inherited trust from their ancestors in 2010 and 1950, respectively. Column
1 indicates that for the period 2010, the level of average trust in the source country
is a statistically significant predictor of the inherited trust of Americans who are born
and raised in the US but have ancestors who came from the same country. This provides
strong evidence for the role of cultural transmissions within families. We also find a similar
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relationship for the period 1950 (Column 2), but with larger standard errors. It indicates
that the contemporaneous trust in the source country does not predict trust inherited
much earlier (before 1925) as precisely as it predicted trust inherited more recently. This
is consistent with the time variation in inherited trust we observed in the above section.
Another possible interpretation for the weaker correlation between inherited trust
in 1950 and the contemporaneous trust in the source country in 2010 might be that
the change in inherited trust over the period of 1950-2010 is driven by the selection
of immigrants. People who migrated to America before World War 2 might have been
systematically different from those who migrated after the war and transmitted a different
set of social norms and values to their children. We attempt to investigate this possibility
by checking if the inherited trust attitudes of one cohort can predict those of the other.
If the observed time variation is driven by sample selection or if each cohort is simply
a subsample of the population that is not representative of the population back in the
source country, the attitudes of the two groups should be relatively different and not likely
to be a strong predictor of each other’s inherited trust. To investigate this, we estimate
the same regression used in Column 1 and 2 but replace the current level of average trust
in the source countries by the average inherited trust of the other cohort. In Column 3
and 4, we find that inherited trust of one cohort is a strong predictor of the inherited
trust of the other cohort, which supports the interpretation based on the evolution of
values and attitudes, rather than variation from sample selection.
Yet another alternative interpretation of time variation in inherited trust is that trust
attitudes of immigrants in cohort 1950 have converged to those of Americans as the time
spent in the host country since the transmission of the values increases. However, we
have seen in Table 1.3 that there are statistically significant differences in inherited trust
across countries of origin for immigrants in cohort 1950, which should have not been
the case had there been a convergence in attitudes. We further explore this possibility
in the Appendix and confirm that there has been little convergence by focusing on the
fourth-generation immigrants in cohort 2010. Contemporaneous trust in the source coun-
try is still a statistically significant predictor of inherited trust of the fourth-generation
immigrants in cohort 2010 (Table A.4).
Figure 1.1 and 1.2 visually show the relationship between the current trust in the
source country in 2010 and the inherited trust of US immigrants for cohort 2010 and
1950, respectively. Inherited trust is measured by the coefficients on the country of origin
fixed effects in the individual-level regression now run separately on each cohort. As we
discussed, the correlation between trust in the source country in 2010 and trust inherited
by US immigrants in 2010 is strong and positive (Figure 1.1). On the other hand, we find
that the relationship between current trust in 2010 and inherited trust in 1950 is much
weaker (Figure 1.2).
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1.4.3 The Role of Inherited Trust in Reducing CO2 Emissions
We are interested in discovering whether the culture of cooperation between trustworthy
individuals within a country affects their willingness to cooperate in a global collective
action dilemma, climate change. To shed light on this question, we investigate the effect
of inherited trust on the reduction of CO2 emissions.
1.4.3.1 Baseline Estimation
In this section we discuss the findings from our baseline estimation with country fixed
effects. The dependent variable is log per capita CO2 emissions relative to that of Sweden
in 1950 and 2010. All other variables that we subsequently introduce are also measured
relative to Sweden. Descriptive statistics for our dataset used in this section are shown in
Table 1.6.18 The explanatory variable of interest is the level of inherited trust measured
by the coefficients associated with the country of origin fixed effects in the individual
level regression based on the GSS. We run separate regressions for 1950 and 2010, using
Swedish Americans in 1950 and 2010 as the reference (thus omitted) group, respectively.
Table 1.7 presents the cross-country correlation between the change in inherited trust
and the change in the level of per capita CO2 emissions between 1950 and 2010. In our
baseline estimation, we control for three major components that can explain the level
of per capita emissions: economic development and sectoral composition of the economy
and trade patterns.19 We control for the level of economic development measured by log
per capita GDP, the share of manufacturing in the economy, and openness to trade in
an attempt to account for the influence of trade on pollution.20 The historical data on
sectoral composition of economies around the world come from Mitchell (2013). For data
on openness to trade, we rely on the Penn World Table that provides national accounts
data in US dollars from 1950. The variable is calculated by dividing the sum of exports
and imports by GDP.
The coefficient on inherited trust is negative and statistically significant in our base-
line specification that includes all the controls we mentioned above (Column 1).21 An
18More detailed discussions on the data follow in the Data Appendix.
19Technology in pollution abatement is another key component extensively studied in the literature
(Levinson, 2009). However, it is difficult to measure the level of technology across countries and we
believe the GDP per capita measure will account for this component at least to some extent.
20The pollution haven hypothesis posits that regulatory stringency in developed countries shifts pollut-
ing industries to the developing world with lax environmental regulations. The debate on the hypothesis,
regarding the complicated interaction between international trade, foreign investment and the environ-
ment, is still ongoing. Copeland and Taylor (2004) and Brunnemeir and Levinson (2004) provide careful
reviews on the literature.
21One might be concerned about the uncertainty rising from the fact that we use estimated coefficients
as a variable, although most of them are precisely estimated. We try to get a sense of this uncertainty by
randomly drawing 1000 values from the distributions of the point estimates associated with fixed effects;
in other words, we generate 1000 different versions of the inherited trust measure. Then we construct the
empirical confidence interval by running 1000 regressions using each of these measures and we find that
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alternative trust measure that controls for parents’ education (to control for the possi-
bility that inherited trust is a product of parents’ human capital) yields similar results
(Column 2). We provide further tests by excluding potential outliers. We have excluded
Africa because the whole continent is taken as a whole and it might contaminate the
result, but find the same result with significance at 5 percent level (Column 3). Exclud-
ing Nordic countries, in case these high-trust countries are driving the result, also does
not affect the findings (Column 4).22 We believe that the findings provide support for
our hypothesis that the culture of cooperation between trustworthy individuals within a
country positively affects global cooperative behavior.
1.4.3.2 Placebo Test
As mentioned earlier, the strategy of focusing on the inherited component of trust and
going far back in time to allow enough time for inherited trust to evolve comes at a cost,
in our context, of including an era when there was no awareness of man-made climate
change. However, we turn it to our advantage by running a placebo test on the period
when there is no prior to expect the relationship between trust and CO2 emissions to
exist. Data availability and the concern to proceed with enough observations lead us to
consider the period between 1920 and 1980.
The way we estimate inherited trust for 1920 and 1980 is exactly the same as the
way we proceeded in Section 1.4.2.1. Inherited trust in 1920 is that of second-generation
Americans born before 1895, of third-generation Americans born before 1920, and of
fourth-generation Americans born before 1945. Similarly, inherited trust in 1980 is that of
second-generation Americans born between 1895 and 1955, of third-generation Americans
born between 1920 and 1980, and of fourth-generation Americans born after 1945. We
only keep countries of origin with minimum 10 observations in the individual regressions
on the trust question, which leaves us 19 countries. As before, inherited trust is measured
by the coefficients associated with the country of origin fixed effects in the individual level
regressions based on the GSS, controlling for age, gender, education, employment status,
religion, and income category. We report the number of observations and descriptive
statistics for each cohort and country of origin in Table A.5 and A.6, respectively.
We report the results from this exercise in Table 1.8. When we move the time window
to 1920-1980, the effect of inherited trust on the level of CO2 emissions is now positive
and statistically insignificant (Column 1). On the other hand, per capita GDP remains
positive and statistically significant. This is intuitive since we would still expect the scale
effect to be in place, while we hypothesize that the increase in trust would not affect
it does not include zero. Further, the variable is significant at 5 percent level close to 99% of the time.
22We also tried excluding Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Russia for which the trade openness variable
in year 1950 takes the values of 1990 as this is the earliest available data for these countries (as we explain
in the Data Appendix) and still found the same results with a p-value 0.018.
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the change in the level of emissions during this early time period because the concern
for climate change had not emerged yet. Next, we try to replicate the findings in Algan
and Cahuc (2010) on the effect of inherited trust on economic growth during this time
period. Unlike the relationship between trust and CO2 emissions, the documented effect
of trust on economic growth is not contingent on specific time periods and thus we would
still expect to see a positive effect of inherited trust on per capita GDP. Column 2 and 3
confirm this intuition. Indeed, the inherited trust variable is associated with a precisely
estimated and positive coefficient and the relationship is robust to the inclusion of the
initial level of economic development and the quality of political institutions (measured
by the Polity 2 variable from the Polity IV database used in Algan and Cahuc (2010)).23
1.4.3.3 Discussion: local and global pollutants
Our baseline estimation suggests that high-trust countries reduced CO2 emissions more
substantially over the period under study than low-trust countries. As our theoretical
model depicts and the placebo test supports, we interpret the results as evidence for
higher willingness for global cooperation in high-trust societies. However, the potential
cross-effects of pollution regulation —namely, the ancillary benefits of local pollution
regulation on CO2 emissions and the local co-benefits of climate change policies —suggest
two alternative interpretations of our findings, which we discuss carefully below.
Firstly, one might argue that high-trust countries are more effective in local pollution
abatement efforts (through better collective action), which could have led to concurrent
reductions in CO2 due to spillover effects or complementarity between local and global
pollutants. Then the more substantial reductions in CO2 emissions in high-trust coun-
tries we observe may merely be a byproduct of their successful local pollution regulations
rather than their willingness to contribute to the global collective action dilemma. How-
ever, there is a dearth of empirical evidence for the ancillary benefits of local pollution
abatement on reducing global pollutants and the few existing studies report findings
against such global spillover effects of local pollution regulation. Holland (2012) studies
the effects of NOx regulation for power plants in California on CO2 emissions and shows
that all the reduction in CO2 emissions that followed the tightening of NOx regulation
was due to the reduction in outputs (which we control for by GDP per capita), rather
than a complementarity between NOx and CO2. Brunel and Johnson (2017) expands
the scope of the analysis to all manufacturing industries in the United States and find
similar results. They exploit exogenous variation made available by changes in air qual-
ity standards under the Clean Air Act and compare counties that do not meet the new
standards and therefore have to face more stringent regulation (non-attainment counties)
and counties that meet the standards and faced no more stringent regulation than the
23We use per capita GDP in 1870 and 1920 as the level of initial economic development for 1920 and
1980, respectively.
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status quo (attainment counties). They find no evidence that local and global pollutants
are complements —there was no statistically significant difference in the pattern of CO2
emissions between non-attainment and attainment counties, while local pollutants fell
substantially in non-attainment counties. Thus, we believe it is unlikely that our esti-
mated relationship between trust and CO2 emissions is driven by spillover effects of local
pollution abatement efforts on CO2 emissions.
Secondly, another alternative interpretation may be that high-trust countries face
larger local co-benefits from climate change regulations. Unlike the effects of local pol-
lution abatement on reducing global pollutants we discussed above, the effects of the
opposite direction are well-documented (see Nemet et al. (2010) for a review of the lit-
erature). In this case, the larger reductions in CO2 in those countries might reflect their
attempt to realize perceived local benefits through climate policies rather than their con-
tribution to the global collective action problem. However, it is not the case that trust
and marginal benefits from local air pollution abatement are positively correlated. We
observe the opposite in reality. Figure 1.3 shows that there is a negative correlation be-
tween the level of local air pollution and trust across countries. Given that the marginal
benefit of pollution abatement increases in the level of pollution, it is clear that high-trust
countries tend to be more cooperative in climate change mitigation efforts although they
face smaller local benefits from climate change policies.
1.4.3.4 Counterfactual Analysis
The findings discussed so far indicate that inherited trust is a significant factor in explain-
ing the change in the level of CO2 emissions across countries. We quantify the effects of
inherited trust in a counterfactual analysis where we present the change in CO2 emissions
in 2010 that countries would have had if the level of inherited trust had been the same as
that of Sweden. The analysis is based on the estimates reported in Column 1 in Table 1.7
where we control for country fixed effects, per capita GDP, the share of manufacturing,
and openness to trade. Figure 1.4 displays the results from this analysis. CO2 emissions
in 2010 would have been reduced by 45 percent in India, 41 percent in Africa and 29
percent in Mexico if the level of inherited trust had been the same as inherited trust from
Sweden. Developing countries are often characterized by low interpersonal trust and the
analysis here shows that these countries would have experienced substantial changes in
their emission levels. The estimates suggest that having a higher level of trust would have
led to a nonnegligible change in the level of emissions in more developed countries as well.
CO2 emissions would have been lower by 18 percent in France, 9 percent in Germany and
5 percent in the Netherlands if they had inherited the same level of trust as Sweden.
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1.4.4 Robustness Checks
1.4.4.1 With a 50-year Lag
In our baseline estimation, we imposed the lag of 25 years, which is assumed to be one
generation, between inherited trust and the level of emissions in order to address the
concern of time-varying omitted variable bias. By doing so, we reduce the possibility
that there exist some unobserved time-varying factors correlated with both the change
in the level of emissions and the change in inherited trust, which was transmitted at
least 25 years before the time when the emission levels are observed. As in Algan and
Cahuc (2010), we attempt to further reduce this concern by increasing the lag between
inherited trust and the level of emissions to two generations, at least 50 years. This makes
it even less likely that there are unobserved time-varying components that simultaneously
drive the change in the level of emissions and the change in inherited trust in the source
country, which is now assumed to have been transmitted at least 50 years before the
periods we study. To ensure we have enough observations, we include second-, third-, and
fourth-generation immigrants with at least one parent born in the United States.
We update the cohort decomposition described in Section 1.4.2.1 using a 50-year lag.
Now, 1950 cohort and 2010 cohort consist of descendants of US immigrants whose ances-
tors arrived in America before 1900 and between 1900 and 1960, respectively. Inherited
trust in 1950 is then that of second-generation Americans born before 1900 (i.e. those
whose parents arrived in America before 1900), of third-generation Americans born be-
fore 1925 (i.e. those whose parents were born in the US before 1900 and therefore whose
immigrant grandparents arrived in America before 1900), and of fourth-generation Amer-
icans born before 1950 (i.e. following the same logic, whose great grandparents arrived
in America before 1900). Similarly, inherited trust in 2010 is that of second-generation
Americans born between 1900 and 1960, of third-generation Americans born after 1925,
and of fourth-generation Americans born after 1950. We keep countries of origin with at
least 10 observations in the individual regression on the trust question, which leaves us
with 23 countries. Table A.9 and A.10 report the number of observations and descriptive
statistics, respectively, for each cohort and country of origin.
Again, inherited trust is measured by the coefficients associated with the country
of origin fixed effects in the individual level regressions based on the GSS, controlling
for age, gender, education, employment status, religion, and income category. We run
separate regressions for 1950 and 2010 using Swedish Americans as the reference group in
both periods. Figure 1.5 shows a strong correlation, even with the lag of two generations,
between trust in the home country in 2010 and inherited trust of US immigrants for the
period 2010. Table A.11 shows that even with a 50-year lag, there is substantial variation
across countries of origin and over time. Table A.12 reports a strong correlation between
inherited trust and current trust in the source countries even with a 50-year lag.
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Table 1.9 presents the estimated effect of the change in inherited trust on the change
in the level of CO2 emissions between 1950 and 2010 with the lag of 50 years. We include
the same set of controls used above with country fixed effects. The results are qualitatively
very similar to what we find in the baseline estimation.
1.4.4.2 Different Periods: 1970-2010
We also study different time periods to ensure that our results do not hinge on specific
characteristics of the period on which we have focused so far. Since going further back
in time may not be any more informative (because then we will be including more of
the time when there was no awareness of climate change) we instead consider a shorter
window of the period between 1970 and 2010.
We use the same cultural transmission model used so far to estimate inherited trust
for 1970 and 2010. We use the lag of 50 years that we believe is more exogenous and
at the same time allows more observations.24 Inherited trust in 1970 is that of second-
generation Americans born before 1920, of third-generation Americans born before 1945,
and of fourth-generation Americans born before 1970. Similarly, inherited trust in 2010
is that of second-generation Americans born between 1920 and 1960, of third-generation
Americans born after 1945, and of fourth-generation Americans born after 1970. 25 The
number of observation and summary statistics for each cohort are reported in Table A.14
and A.15, respectively. We are able to keep all 26 countries in our sample. Inherited
trust is measured by the coefficients associated with country of origin fixed effects in the
individual level regressions based on the GSS, controlling for age, gender, education, and
income category. As reported in Table A.16, having ancestors coming from a different
country than Sweden has a statistically significant effect on inherited trust for most
countries of origin in these periods. Also, we find a strong correlation between inherited
trust of US immigrants and current trust back in their source countries (Table A.17).
Table 1.10 presents the estimated effect of the change in inherited trust on the change
in the level of CO2 emissions between 1970 and 2010 with the lag of 50 years. We again
control for per capita GDP, the share of manufacturing sector, and openness to trade
24The 50-year lag structure allows for more observations for the 2010 cohort in particular. This is
because we have a large number of fourth-generation Americans and if we use the lag of 25 years almost
all of them end up in cohort 1970 (born before 1995) and almost none of them in cohort 2010 (born
after 1990). This is natural given the fact that the respondents are at least 18 years old at the time of
interview and the newest round was conducted in 2014 (in actual fact there are only three 18-year-old
respondents born after 1995 and interviewed in 2014).
25Although inherited trust in 2010 had been estimated earlier, it should be modified with respect to
the new starting time period because the cohort decomposition requires that there should be no overlap
in the two cohorts. For instance, in period 1950-2010 with a 50-year lag, cohort 2010 included second-
generation Americans born after 1900 and before 1960. If we were to use the inherited trust estimated
from this cohort in our alternative period 1970-2010, we would have had overlap in estimated inherited
trust caused by second-generation Americans born between 1900 and before 1920 belonging to both
cohorts.
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along with country fixed effects. The findings are qualitatively very similar to what we
find in the previous sections even when we look at different time periods. Inherited trust
seems to be a significant factor in explaining the heterogeneity of the level of emissions
across countries.
1.4.4.3 Additional Controls
We include additional controls to further check for omitted variable bias. Firstly, given the
documented interplay between formal institutions and culture (Algan and Cahuc, 2009;
Aghion et al., 2010, 2011), we control for the quality of political institutions that could
be correlated with the level of trust and also affect emissions (through environmental
policies, for example) using the Polity IV dataset. Secondly, it is plausible that other
social attitudes that may affect willingness to cooperate globally might have coevolved
with trust over the period we investigate. We deal with this possibility by explicitly
controlling for religion and education. Data on the share of religious fractionalization
comes from Barro (2003). We use the period 1970s and 2000s to explain the change in the
level of emissions between 1950 and 2010 due to limited data availability.26 For historical
data on primary school enrolment, we rely on Lee and Lee (2016). Former Yugoslavia
countries are missing in the dataset. We proceed with our baseline specification with
the lag of 25 years between inherited trust and the emissions over the period 1950-2010.
Finally, we try to control for urbanization rate and population density that are related to
energy consumption patterns in a given country. The data on urbanization and population
density comes from the World Bank.
Table 1.11 reports the results of the regressions that include these additional controls.
In addition to our baseline controls, Column 1 adds the Polity 2 variable from the Polity
IV dataset, Column 2 controls for primary school enrolment and Column 3 includes
the measure of religious fractionalization. In Column 4 and 5, we add urbanization and
population density measures, respectively. The effect of the change in inherited trust
remains robust with the inclusion of these additional controls.
1.5 Conclusion
Given the long-standing literature on local social norms and cooperation, in this paper
we have attempted to move one step forward by studying whether local social norms
could have implications for global cooperation. More specifically, we were interested in
the hypothesis that the within-country cooperative culture sustained by trust and trust-
worthiness of the population positively affects international cooperative behavior.
26The data are available only for three periods, 1900s, 1970s and 2000s.
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To motivate the link between trust and global cooperation theoretically, we incorpo-
rate the role of social norms, a form of informal institutions. Existing theoretical work
has shown that cooperation between players located far apart becomes difficult to sus-
tain as the distance grows. It thus serves to illuminate the role of institutions as the size
of the economy grows and more globalized. We build our model based on this insight
and show that local social norms shared by trustworthy individuals create incentives, via
reputation effects, for the trustworthy to cooperate with foreigners even when they are
unsure of their trustworthiness. The most important implication of the equilibrium is
that individuals face greater incentives to cooperate with foreigners when they live in a
society with a large number of trustworthy individuals.
We find empirical evidence that supports this prediction. Based on the innovative
methodology developed in Algan and Cahuc (2010), we estimate the effect of inherited
trust on the reduction in CO2 emissions and the findings suggest that countries that
have experienced a larger increase in trust have reduced CO2 emissions per capita more
substantially. To test the robustness of the results, we impose a longer lag between the
outcome and the time at which trust was transmitted (to further reduce the threat of
time-varying omitted variable bias), check if the results hold even in a different time
period and include a wide set of additional controls. Our findings appear to be stable
across this set of further specifications.
This paper provides a plausible explanation for the existence of national, regional and
local level mitigation efforts in the absence of a global agreement, which has been difficult
to reconcile with the conventional theory of collective action. We also believe that our
findings emphasize the importance of local norms that has been largely overlooked by
economists in governing the global commons.
The question of specific mechanisms behind this reduced-form macro relationship
remains open. A logical next step would be to investigate potential channels that give
rise to this cross-country relationship between trust and CO2 emissions at more micro
levels such as firms or individuals.
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Figures and Tables
Table 1.3: Inherited Trust in 1950 and 2010
Dependent variables
Inherited trust Inherited trust
in 1950 in 2010
Coefficient SD Coefficient SD
Country of Origin Reference: Swedish ancestors - 1950
Sweden 0.036 (0.007)
Africa -0.240 (0.005) -0.170 (0.016)
Austria 0.092 (0.007) -0.065 (0.007)
Belgium 0.250 (0.010) 0.044 (0.011)
Canada 0.003 (0.011) 0.074 (0.013)
Czechoslovakia -0.023 (0.008) -0.007 (0.008)
Denmark 0.073 (0.002) 0.150 (0.004)
Finland 0.009 (0.008) 0.016 (0.004)
France 0.006 (0.005) -0.054 (0.009)
Germany 0.007 (0.002) -0.007 (0.009)
Greece 0.110 (0.006) -0.180 (0.005)
Hungary 0.080 (0.006) -0.039 (0.005)
India -0.190 (0.009) -0.200 (0.015)
Ireland -0.010 (0.005) -0.003 (0.011)
Italy -0.048 (0.012) -0.091 (0.014)
Japan -0.170 (0.008) 0.061 (0.007)
Mexico 0.007 (0.012) -0.120 (0.014)
Netherlands -0.059 (0.003) 0.021 (0.007)
Norway 0.097 (0.002) 0.022 (0.005)
Poland -0.005 (0.012) -0.063 (0.011)
Portugal -0.073 (0.008) 0.017 (0.012)
Russian Federation -0.020 (0.005) -0.041 (0.005)
Spain -0.058 (0.011) 0.020 (0.011)
Switzerland 0.036 (0.004) 0.058 (0.005)
United Kingdom 0.012 (0.001) 0.052 (0.008)
Yugoslavia -0.041 (0.010) 0.037 (0.009)
Notes: The dependent variable is the level of trust inherited by US im-
migrants from the periods 1950 and 2010. Additional controls included in
the model are: age, age squared, gender, education, income, employment
status, and religion as well as year fixed effects. Standard errors are clus-
tered at the country level.
Source: General Social Survey: 1978-2014
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Table 1.4: Correlation between individual characteristics and trust
VARIABLES Inherited trust
Age 0.009***
(0.002)
Age squared -0.000***
(0.000)
Men 0.019***
(0.006)
Education 0.037***
(0.002)
Income 0.010***
(0.002)
Catholic 0.013
(0.027)
Protestant 0.001
(0.009)
Employed 0.020
(0.013)
Unemployed -0.005
(0.015)
Observations 15,730
R-squared 0.113
Notes: The dependent variable is the level of trust
inherited by US immigrants from the periods 1950
and 2010 and takes 1 if the respondent answered
“Most people can be trusted” and takes 0 if the
answer was either “Can’t be too careful” or “De-
pends.” This table reports the coefficients on the
individual-level controls included in the regression
presented in Table 1.3. Standard errors are clustered
at the country level.
Source: General Social Survey: 1978-2014
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Table 1.5: Correlation between inherited trust of US descendants
and trust in the country of origin
Dependent variables
Inherited trust Inherited trust Inherited trust Inherited trust
in 2010 in 1950 in 2010 in 1950
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Trust in source country 0.370*** 0.432**
(0.099) (0.182)
Inherited trust in 1950 0.692***
(0.080)
Inherited trust in 2010 0.753***
(0.093)
Age 0.004*** 0.003*** 0.004*** 0.003***
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
Men 0.049* 0.014** 0.052* 0.013*
(0.025) (0.007) (0.025) (0.006)
Eduation 0.029*** 0.036*** 0.028*** 0.035***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
Income 0.004 0.009*** 0.003 0.008***
(0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001)
Unemployed -0.046 0.006 -0.040 0.007
(0.031) (0.023) (0.029) (0.023)
Employed 0.021 0.029** 0.024 0.032***
(0.033) (0.011) (0.033) (0.011)
Catholic 0.004 0.070*** 0.004 0.064***
(0.030) (0.025) (0.026) (0.023)
Protestant 0.015 0.015 0.036** 0.028***
(0.022) (0.015) (0.018) (0.009)
Constant -0.397*** -0.520*** -0.548*** -0.593***
(0.050) (0.069) (0.048) (0.026)
Observations 3,468 12,262 3,468 12,262
R-squared 0.065 0.084 0.068 0.093
Notes: The dependent variables in (1) and (3) are the level of trust inherited in 2010. The dependent
variables in (2) and (4) are the level of trust inherited in 1950. Trust in source country is the average
level of trust in the country of origin of the immigrants in 2010. Inherited trust in 1950 is the average
level of trust of immigrants in cohort 1950. Inherited trust in 2010 is the average level of trust of
immigrants in cohort 2010. Standard errors are clustered at the country level.
Source: General Social Survey 1978-2014, World Values Survey and European Social Survey wave
2010.
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Figure 1.1: Correlation between inherited trust of US immigrants and
trust in their source country in 2010 - cohort 2010
Figure 1.2: Correlation between inherited trust of US immigrants and
trust in their source country in 2010 - cohort 1950
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Table 1.6: Descriptive Statistics
1950 2010
VARIABLES Mean SD Mean SD
(1) (2) (3) (4)
CO2 emissions per capita 3.56 3.05 7.67 3.17
GDP per capita 3,931 2,229 17,533 7,746
Openness to trade (%) 43.71 22.62 88.20 41.01
Share of manufacturing (%) 40.56 14.29 29.49 5.627
Notes: These are summary statistics of the original values of the
variables separately for 1950 and 2010. In the regressions, the vari-
ables are transformed relative to Sweden by subtracting Sweden’s
values. The unit for CO2 emissions per capita is metric ton of
carbon dioxide per person. The unit for GDP per capita is 1990
International Geary-Khamis dollars.
Table 1.7: Inherited Trust and CO2 Emissions Per Capita in 1950 and 2010:
with a 25-year lag
Dependent variable:
Log CO2 Emissions Per Capita in 1950 and 2010
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Inherited trust in 1950 and 2010 -2.548** -2.529** -2.403** -2.629**
(1.140) (1.168) (1.072) (1.230)
Log income per capita 1.581*** 1.542*** 1.772*** 1.535***
(0.314) (0.319) (0.310) (0.328)
Share of manufacturing 0.011 0.010 0.005 0.012
(0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010)
Trade openness -0.010** -0.010** -0.009** -0.011**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
Observations 52 52 50 46
R-squared 0.892 0.891 0.889 0.895
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The dependent variable is log CO2 emissions per capita in the source countries in
1950 and 2010, relative to Sweden. Data come from the Carbon Dioxide Information Analy-
sis Center (CDIAC). Inherited trust of US immigrants is measured relative to the inherited
trust of Swedish Americans for the periods 1950 and 2010 and estimated from the GSS. Data
on income per capita come from the Maddison database, share of manufacturing from B.R.
Mitchell (2007), and trade openness from the Penn World Table. All controls are measured
relative to Sweden.
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Table 1.8: Placebo Test: Inherited Trust and CO2 Emissions Per Capita in 1920 and
1980: with a 25-year lag
Dependent variables
Log CO2 Emissions
per capita Income Per Capita
(1) (2) (3)
Inherited trust in 1920 and 1980 1.950 12,097.023** 11,393.094**
(2.649) (5,730.379) (5,141.116)
Log income per capita 1.443*
(0.751)
Initial income per capita 3.259*** 2.436***
(0.733) (0.729)
Polity 2 258.002**
(106.746)
Observations 38 38 36
R-squared 0.676 0.859 0.893
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The dependent variable in (1) is log CO2 emissions per capita in the source countries in
1920 and 1980, relative to Sweden. Data come from the Carbon Dioxide Information Analysis
Center (CDIAC). The dependent variables in (2) and (3) are income per capita in the source
countries in 1950 and 2010, relative to Sweden. Inherited trust of US immigrants is measured
relative to the inherited trust of Swedish Americans for the periods 1920 and 1980 and es-
timated from the GSS. Data on income per capita come from the Maddison database. The
Polity 2 variable is from the Polity IV database. All controls are measured relative to Sweden.
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Figure 1.3: Correlation between inherited trust in 2010 and
outdoor air pollution measured by particulate matter (pm10)
Sources: World Health Organization (2011) for average particulate matter (PM10) from
urban centers and GSS 1978-2014 for inherited trust.
Figure 1.4: Predicted variation in CO2 emission per capita in 2010 if inherited trust had
been the same as inherited trust in Sweden
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Figure 1.5: Correlation between inherited trust of US immigrants and
trust in their source country in 2010 - cohort 2010
With a 50-year lag
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Table 1.9: Inherited Trust and CO2 Emissions Per Capita in 1950 and 2010:
with a 50-year lag
Dependent variable:
Log CO2 Emissions Per Capita in 1950 and 2010
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Inherited trust in 1950 and 2010 -3.115*** -2.726** -3.016** -2.697**
(1.093) (1.168) (1.082) (1.107)
Log income per capita 1.187** 1.298*** 1.144** 1.261***
(0.438) (0.453) (0.434) (0.442)
Share of manufacturing 0.012 0.010
(0.010) (0.010)
Trade openness -0.006
(0.005)
Observations 46 46 46 46
R-squared 0.873 0.860 0.881 0.889
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The dependent variable is log CO2 emissions per capita in the source countries in
1950 and 2010, relative to Sweden. Data come from the Carbon Dioxide Information Analy-
sis Center (CDIAC). Inherited trust of US immigrants is measured relative to the inherited
trust of Swedish Americans for the periods 1950 and 2010 and estimated from the GSS. Data
on income per capita come from the Maddison database, share of manufacturing from B.R.
Mitchell (2007), and trade openness from the Penn World Table. All controls are measured
relative to Sweden.
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Table 1.10: Inherited Trust and CO2 Emissions Per Capita in 1970 and 2010:
with a 50-year lag
Dependent variable:
Log CO2 Emissions Per Capita in 1970 and 2010
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Inherited trust in 1970 and 2010 -3.481** -3.819** -2.509* -2.200*
(1.545) (1.467) (1.417) (1.235)
Log income per capita 1.564** 1.388** 1.765*** 1.846***
(0.649) (0.647) (0.581) (0.506)
Share of manufacturing -0.022** -0.021***
(0.008) (0.007)
Trade openness -0.012***
(0.004)
Observations 52 52 52 52
R-squared 0.818 0.827 0.862 0.900
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The dependent variable is log CO2 emissions per capita in the source countries in
1970 and 2010, relative to Sweden. Data come from the Carbon Dioxide Information Analy-
sis Center (CDIAC). Inherited trust of US immigrants is measured relative to the inherited
trust of Swedish Americans for the periods 1970 and 2010 and estimated from the GSS. Data
on income per capita come from the Maddison database, share of manufacturing from B.R.
Mitchell (2007), and trade openness from the Penn World Table. All controls are measured
relative to Sweden.
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Table 1.11: Inherited Trust and CO2 Emissions Per Capita in 1950 and 2010:
with a 25-year lag
Dependent variable:
Log CO2 Emissions Per Capita in 1950 and 2010
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Inherited trust in 1950 and 2010 -2.192** -1.865* -2.293** -2.659*** -2.704**
(0.963) (0.967) (0.911) (0.874) (1.162)
Log income per capita 1.263*** 1.487*** 1.597*** 1.298*** 1.406***
(0.281) (0.258) (0.251) (0.250) (0.321)
Share of manufacturing 0.023** 0.002 0.018** 0.007 0.008
(0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.007) (0.009)
Trade openness -0.008** -0.006 -0.006* -0.004 -0.008*
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Political institution 0.045***
(0.014)
Primary school enrolment 0.019***
(0.006)
Religious fractionalisation 5.776***
(1.532)
Urbanization rate 0.051***
(0.012)
Population density 0.004*
(0.002)
Observations 52 50 52 52 50
R-squared 0.927 0.932 0.934 0.939 0.907
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The dependent variable is log CO2 emissions per capita in the source countries in 1950
and 2010, relative to Sweden. Data come from the Carbon Dioxide Information Analysis Center
(CDIAC). Inherited trust of US immigrants is measured relative to the inherited trust of Swedish
Americans for the periods 1950 and 2010 and estimated from the GSS. Data on income per
capita come from the Maddison database, share of manufacturing from B.R. Mitchell (2007),
trade openness from the Penn World Table, the quality of political institutions from the Polity
IV database, and urbanization and population density from the World Bank. Data on preschool
enrolment and religion come from Lee and Lee (2016) and Robert Barro (2003), respectively. All
controls are measured relative to Sweden.
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Table 1.12: Inherited Trust and CO2 Emissions Per Capita in 1950 and 2010:
with a 25-year lag
Robustness checks for the trust measures
Dependent variable:
Log CO2 Emissions Per Capita in 1950 and 2010
(1) (2) (3)
Inherited trust in 1950 and 2010 -2.749** -3.380** -1.530**
(1.221) (1.247) (0.615)
Observations 52 52 52
R-squared 0.892 0.900 0.896
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The dependent variable in (1) drops those who answered “Depends”. The depen-
dent variable in (2) groups together those who answered “Most people can be trusted” or
“Depends” and gives them one, while those who answered “Can’t be too careful” are as-
signed zero. The dependent variable in (3) takes 3 for those who chose “Most people can be
trusted”, 2 for those who chose “Depends” and 1 for those who chose “Can’t be too careful”.
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Chapter 2
Trust, Compliance and International
Regulation
2.1 Introduction
The importance of generalized trust – the expectation that a random member of society is
trustworthy – in economic outcomes has gained recognition in the literature. In particular,
a number of papers have studied the influence of trust in the design of formal institutions
and demonstrated that the stringency of a wide range of state regulations can be explained
by average trust in a cross-section of countries. They have emphasized a strong negative
relationship between trust and government regulation in the context of business entry
and labor market regulations (Algan and Cahuc, 2009; Aghion et al., 2010, 2011).
With climate change legislation, however, we observe the opposite: there is a positive
correlation between the stringency of regulatory policies addressing climate change and
the average level of trust. Countries associated with high trust (northern European coun-
tries, for instance) tend to have higher CO2 emissions reduction targets, require larger
shares of energy consumption to come from renewable sources, and were the first to intro-
duce carbon tax schemes.1 Indices that measure the stringency of climate change policies
across countries provide further support for this relationship.
In this article, I attempt to reconcile these two conflicting observations by focusing on
the role of trust in compliance at the micro level. Trust or trustworthiness may positively
affect compliance decisions through strong internalized norms or strong social punish-
ment for non-cooperative behavior in high-trust societies. It is then plausible that higher
compliance in high-trust countries might have induced their governments to implement
1For example, Norway and Sweden have climate change legislation that requires themselves to achieve
carbon neutrality by 2030 and by 2045, respectively. This is markedly stringent given the collective goal
of 80 percent reduction in CO2 emissions in the European Union by 2050. In contrast, related policies in
several countries fall short in their ambition and stringency to contribute to this collective target. France
and Greece (relatively low-trust countries) aim to reduce their emissions 75 percent and 60 to 70 percent
by 2050, respectively (Nachmany et al., 2016).
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more stringent regulations that address global externalities such as climate change, par-
ticularly when there is a binding international goal to be reached as in the case of the
European Union. Indeed, the potential differences in enforcement costs across countries
are starting to be recognized. A recent policy report published by the European Commis-
sion documents that there is substantial variation in the cost of implementing EU-wide
environmental laws across member states, some of which are directly measured and also
others that are “difficult to quantify, but nevertheless real (Farmer et al., 2015).” My
analysis in this paper adds support to their conclusion by providing empirical evidence
on a potential source of different enforcement costs across countries associated with the
differences in trust and civicness of their population.
I study how trust affects compliance decisions in the context of the European Union
Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS): the world’s largest carbon trading market oper-
ating in 31 countries (all 28 EU countries plus Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway). This
setting offers a number of advantages. First, it provides an ideal environment in which
the same legislation is implemented in multiple countries, thus allowing me to investigate
the systematic differences in compliance behavior caused by cultural traits such as trust,
which largely varies at the country level.2 Relatedly, the penalty for noncompliance is set
at the EU level. This feature substantially reduces the problem of differential levels of
stringency in formal enforcement. Finally, the European Union Transaction Log (EUTL),
a system harmonized at the EU level, provides detailed installation level compliance data
comparable across countries. Existing papers that studied compliance decisions of firms
have used data on a single industry or several industries in a single country (e.g. Gray
and Deily, 1996; Shimshack and Ward, 2005, 2008; Dasgupta et al., 2000; Nyborg and
Telle, 2006; Duflo et al., 2014; Evans, 2016). I address this lacuna by taking advantage
of this unique international dataset that contains over 16,000 installations operating in
31 different countries.
Identifying the role of trust in compliance is confounded by the task of having to
disentangle the effect of legal enforcement from the role of trust. Although the stringency
of formal enforcement is harmonized at the EU level, it is likely that country-specific
regulatory environment or institutional capacity is correlated with how the rules are
enforced in each country. Given that previous studies have documented a strong influence
of trust on the design of institutions and regulations (Algan and Cahuc, 2009; Aghion
et al., 2010, 2011), it is then likely that trust picks up the effect of formal institutions
on compliance, rather than trust per se. It is also possible that there exist unobservable
national features correlated with trust and compliance in the EU ETS simultaneously
such as geography or past efforts to reduce emissions.
2Some papers have also exploited within-country variation in trust. For instance, Guiso et al. (2004)
study the effect of trust on financial development in Italy, a country known for its substantial cultural
variation across regions. Tabellini (2010) also exploit regional variation in trust across 8 large European
countries.
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I attempt to circumvent this difficulty with two approaches. First, I instrument the av-
erage level of trust in each country with trust inherited by second-generation immigrants
whose parents came from these countries. Given the evidence that trust is highly per-
sistent across generations (Rice and Feldman, 1997; Putnam, 2000; Guiso et al., 2006),
inherited trust observed in second-generation immigrants is expected to be correlated
with the level of trust in their countries of origin where their parents came from, and yet
unlikely to directly affect compliance behavior of firms operating in their source coun-
tries since they are born and reside in their adopted countries. This measure of inherited
trust helps isolate the role of trust from other country-specific factors that may affect
compliance. Second, I look within countries and exploit the fact that a large share of the
installations are operated by multinational subsidiaries. A number of papers have doc-
umented the influence of the source-country characteristics in MNEs’ operation abroad
(Bloom and Van Reenen, 2007; Burstein et al., 2009; Bloom et al., 2012b). Based on
this insight, I investigate if trust in the country where the multinational is headquartered
has influence on compliance decision in the affiliate’s foreign location. This specification
allows me to include country of operation fixed effects, which removes any bias associated
with unobservable national characteristics that may be spuriously correlated with trust
and compliance. I then investigate whether MNEs operating in the same country, thus
exposed to the same external environment, differ in their compliance behavior due to the
level of trust prevalent in their source countries.
Consistent with the main prediction of the conceptual framework, I find that trust
prevalent in the country where the installation is located has a strong positive influence on
its compliance decision. This finding is robust to including a full set of year and industry
dummies, country-level controls and also firm-level characteristics that may affect com-
pliance decisions. Second, exploiting the differences in the location of global headquarters
of MNEs reveals that installations owned by firms headquartered in high-trust countries
are more likely to comply with the regulation than installations owned by firms based
in low-trust countries, even when they operate in the same geographic area (country as
well as region): for example, in Germany, an installation operated by a multinational firm
headquartered in Norway (a high-trust country) would be more likely to be in compliance
with the EU ETS than an installation owned by another firm whose global headquarters
are located in Greece (a low-trust country). The magnitude of the estimated effect is
economically meaningful: a change in ownership from a multinational firm based in the
lowest-trust country in my sample (Philippines) to another MNE headquartered in the
highest-trust country (Norway) would be associated with a 1.5 percentage point decrease
in the probability of noncompliance when the average noncompliance rate is 3.2 percent.
This effect is comparable to the previous estimates for the effectiveness of traditional
formal enforcement measures.
These findings have two interesting implications. First, the results imply that local
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norms, such as trust, could play a significant role in global cooperation problems such as
climate change. In this article, I argue that trust may affect the design of climate change
legislation through its positive influence on compliance. Second, despite the growing ev-
idence on the effect of culture on economic outcomes, understanding the mechanisms at
the micro level has not been straightforward. As a remedy, Guiso et al. (2015a) argue that
corporations and corporate culture offer economists a chance to develop a deeper insight
into the specific workings of culture and how it relates to formal institutions. The strong
firm-level empirical evidence regarding the effect of trust on compliance behavior docu-
mented in this paper adds support to this insight of using corporations as a laboratory
in which to study the role of culture.
This paper contributes to several distinct strands of literature. First, it is related
to the well-established literature on the effect of trust, or social capital at large, on
various economic outcomes. Previous studies have documented that trust affects economic
growth (Knack and Keefer, 1997; La Porta et al., 1997; Zak and Knack, 2001; Tabellini,
2010; Algan and Cahuc, 2010), financial development (Guiso et al., 2004), patterns of
trade (Guiso et al., 2009) and global cooperative behavior (Carattini and Jo, 2017).
Furthermore, trust has been shown to have a strong influence on the design of institutions
and regulations (Tabellini, 2008a; Algan and Cahuc, 2009; Aghion et al., 2010, 2011).
Despite the growing evidence for the importance of trust at the macro level, mechanisms
that drive the observed cross-country relationships are not fully understood. I contribute
to this literature by providing the first microevidence on the effect of trust on compliance
behavior at the firm level.
Also related is the literature that investigates enforcement and compliance of envi-
ronmental regulations. A number of papers have documented strong deterrent effects of
formal enforcement actions (Gray and Deily, 1996; Deily and Gray, 2007; Shimshack and
Ward, 2005, 2008; Dasgupta et al., 2000; Nyborg and Telle, 2006; Telle, 2013; Duflo et al.,
2014).3 Reecently, Evans (2016) has also shown the effectiveness of information-based en-
forcement tools on compliance using the Clean Air Act (CAA) watch list. On the other
hand, Decker and Pope (2005) and Arguedas and Rousseau (2012) provide evidence for
strategic complementarities between firms’ compliance decisions whereby increased com-
pliance by one firm diverts the regulator’s attention to its rivals, which in turn increases
the rival firms’ compliance. My paper differs from the existing literature as I study com-
pliance behavior in an international environmental regulation – the EU ETS – and show
that the culture of generalized trust could also play a significant role in compliance de-
cisions by exploiting country-level variation in trust in two ways: first, the variation in
the location of installations and second, the variation in the location of the firm (that
3While focusing on the impact of formal enforcement measures on compliance, Gray and Deily (1996)
and Deily and Gray (2007) also point out the influence of corporate culture or firms’ ‘unobserved propen-
sity to comply’ on compliance behavior.
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operates the installation)’ global headquarters.
Finally, this paper is related to the literature on the transmission of culture by indi-
viduals across countries. This literature provides evidence that a wide range of economic
decisions such as fertility, labor market participation (Ferna´ndez and Fogli, 2006, 2009)
or living arrangements (Giuliano, 2007) of second-generation immigrants living in the
US are strongly predicted by the practice in their source countries. Another interesting
example is provided by Fisman and Miguel (2007). They show that corruptive behavior
of diplomats (measured by unpaid parking fines) stationed in the same city is predicted
by the level of corruption in their home countries. Closely related to my analysis here
is Bloom et al. (2012b) where they provide empirical evidence that supports this line
of argument at the firm level. They find that trust in the country where multinational
firms are headquartered has a strong positive correlation with decentralization in the
affiliate’s foreign plants, even when the managers in the plants are hired locally. I add
to this literature by providing firm-level evidence that trust in the country where firms
are headquartered has a strong positive influence on the compliance decisions of their
installations even when they operate in a foreign country.
The article is organized as follows. In Section 2.2, I provide some motivating evidence
on the correlation between trust and compliance behavior. Section 2.3 presents a simple
conceptual framework. Section 2.4 provides background information for the setting and
Section 2.5 describes data used for the analysis in detail. Section 2.6 presents the empirical
analysis and Section 2.7 concludes.
2.2 Motivating evidence
In this section, I provide motivating evidence that gives rise to the hypothesis put forward
in this paper. I begin by documenting a positive cross-country relationship between trust
and the stringency of climate change regulation, which stands in contrast to the hitherto
documented negative relationship between trust and other regulations. As a potential
explanation, I focus on the role of trust in compliance and show that compliance is
substantially higher in high-trust countries from micro-level regressions.
2.2.1 Data
I build trust measures using the European Social Survey (ESS). I pool data from the
seven waves collected so far (from 2002 to 2014), which includes all European countries
that participate in the EU ETS. The ESS measures generalized trust – the expectation
that a random member of the society is trustworthy – by asking the classical question,
“Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you can’t be
too careful in dealing with people?”. Respondents’ answers are given on a scale of 0 to 10,
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where 0 implies “You can’t be too careful” and 10 means “Most people can be trusted”.
The variable that I use in the econometric regression is the average of this answer within
the country where the installation is located.
To compare different patterns of correlation between trust and regulation depending
on the type of regulation, I use the stringency of regulation of product and labor markets
commonly studied in the literature (Algan and Cahuc, 2009; Aghion et al., 2010; Alesina
et al., 2015) and that of climate change regulations. The OECD indicator of the strin-
gency of job protection over temporary and regular contract provides a measure for the
stringency of labor market regulation that is comparable across countries.
The nationally determined, legally binding target share of renewable energy in gross
final energy consumption by 2020 is used to reflect the stringency of climate change
policies in EU countries. These targets, which are part of the National Renewable Energy
Action Plan, are voluntarily chosen (not assigned) under the Renewable Energy Directive
(2009/28/EC) that constitutes an important part of climate change legislation at the EU
level. I also use the Climate Laws, Institutions and Measures (CLIM) Index, a globally
comparative index that measures the stringency of climate change legislation developed
by the European Bank of Reconstruction and Development (EBRD, 2011).
To look at the relationship between trust and compliance, I turn to the European
Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS). Data on compliance in this international
regulation between 2005 and 2015 comes from the European Union Transaction Log
(EUTL), a system harmonized at the EU level that publishes information on compliance
status, permit allocation, verified emissions and surrendered allowances at the installation
level. I will save detailed descriptions of this key data for a later section.
2.2.2 Evidence
Figure 2.1 depicts what has been documented in the literature – a negative cross-country
relationship between trust and domestic regulation of labor markets (measured by the
stringency of employment protection legislation). High-trust countries such as Nordic
countries as well as the United Kingdom tend to impose fewer restrictions on employers’
hiring and firing decisions, whereas relatively low-trust countries such as Eastern Eu-
ropean and Mediterranean countries tend to impose strict regulations. The correlation
holds for a wide range of standard indicators for other regulations such as product market
regulations as shown in Figure B.1.4
[Figure 2.1]
On the other hand, Figure 2.2 shows a positive correlation between trust and the
stringency of climate change legislation measured by the percentage of renewable energy
4The data of Djankov et al. (2002) on the number of steps that an entrepreneur must complete before
opening a business proxies the stringency of regulation of product market entry.
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in gross final energy consumption by 2020. High-trust countries (again such as Nordic
countries and Switzerland in this graph) tend to require larger shares of their energy
consumption to come from renewable sources than other countries. The stringency of
this regulation in these countries (for instance, 67.5 percent in Norway and 50 percent
in Sweden and Switzerland) is noteworthy especially given that the EU wide collective
target is set at 20 percent. The correlation is statistically significant at the 1 percent
level even after controlling for the log per capita GDP and the share of population with
tertiary education (EBRD, 2011).5 Similarly, composite indices such as the Climate Laws,
Institutions and Measures (CLIM) Index in Figure 2.3 and the Environmental Policy
Stringency (EPS) Index in Figure B.2 are also positively correlated with trust across
countries.
[Figure 2.2, 2.3]
How can we explain this puzzle? To begin, I note that regulations previously stud-
ied in the literature are domestic regulations whose impact lies within the boundary of
their nations and primarily deal with local (or within counties) demand. Their negative
relationships with trust arise since trust tends to be associated with low public demand
for state regulation. Regarding the stringency of labor market regulations, for example,
Algan and Cahuc (2009) argue that governments in high-trust countries tend to insure
their workers against unemployment through more generous unemployment benefits due
to lower threats of moral hazard (i.e. workers are less likely to cheat on government bene-
fits). It then leads to lower public demand for employment protection regulation in those
countries. Similarly, Aghion et al. (2010) show that distrust creates public demand for
business regulations since individuals prefer government regulation to unbridled economic
activity by corrupt and uncivic entrepreneurs.6 However, climate change regulation ad-
dresses global externalities and as such, there exists demand that applies to all relevant
countries at the international level. This is particularly true when there is a collective goal
to be reached through cooperation of multiple countries as in the case of the European
5It is reassuring that the correlation remains strong even when I control for a measure of national
wealth because richer economies tend to be significantly more active in climate change mitigation and
also given the documented relationship between trust and wealth across countries (e.g. Algan and Cahuc,
2010). To further support my argument that trust could matter (independently or in addition to the
country’s wealth) via lower enforcement costs when countries are voluntarily choosing their own policies
to contribute to joint objectives, I contrast this correlation with another case using an assigned policy
measure in Section B.1 in Appendix B. As expected, the correlation between trust and this involuntary
measure of climate policy disappears once I control for wealth (Table B.6).
6Additional evidence for the importance of demand in explaining the stringency of regulation is
provided by Alesina et al. (2015) where they demonstrate that strong family ties and the resulting
immobility of workers give rise to stronger public demand for more stringent labor market regulations so
that firms are less able to extract rents from their workers’ immobility. They find empirical evidence that
individuals with strong family ties are more likely to demand labor regulation and accordingly, there
exists a strong positive relationship between family ties and labor market regulations across countries.
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Union.7
It is then plausible that trust may affect the way governments deal with this interna-
tional pressure through its positive influence on compliance. Governments that anticipate
higher compliance due to trust and civic virtue shared among their citizens and there-
fore face lower enforcement costs may implement more stringent regulations in order to
ensure that the collective goal is reached.8 Despite the seemingly contradictory macro-
level correlation, this conjecture suggests that the mechanism is in fact consistent with
the previous studies in that trust affects institutional outcomes through how law-abiding
people are (Tabellini, 2008a).
To investigate the effect of trust on compliance as a potential channel, I check if there
is any pattern in the relationship between trust and compliance in the EU ETS. This
unique international regulation allows comparing compliance behavior across countries
with respect to the same regulation. Figure 2.4 illustrates that there is indeed a negative
correlation between trust and noncompliance rates across countries. While some countries
are close to full compliance, other countries such as Bulgaria, Italy and Slovakia (relatively
low-trust countries according to several international social surveys) display very high
noncompliance, over or close to 10 percent.
[Figure 2.4]
Micro-level regressions in Table 2.1 confirm the negative correlation between trust
and noncompliance. I begin by regressing the binary noncompliance variable that takes
1 if the installation is noncompliant and 0 otherwise against the trust measure of the
country where the installation is located, without any controls (column (1) of Table 2.1).
Standard errors are clustered at the country level. The correlation between noncompliance
and trust is negative and highly significant – a 1 standard deviation increase in trust (0.95)
from the mean is associated with a 1.6 percentage point decrease in the probability of
noncompliance. Column (2) shows that the inclusion of year dummies and a full set of
industry dummies hardly affects the correlation. To deal with the concern that trust
might simply reflect higher levels of economic development (Algan and Cahuc, 2010;
7Unlike demand for regulation that deals with business markets and wages, public demand for envi-
ronmental regulation does not appear to be correlated with trust across countries, which also explains
why the public demand channel emphasized in the previous papers is not at play in my context. I use the
International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) data to document the weak association between demand
for environmental regulation and trust in Section B.2 in Appendix B. This aspect, together with the
presence of international demand, points to the supply side dynamics of climate change regulations such
as enforcement costs.
8One might argue that high-trust countries should also have more stringent regulations for other
domestic economic activities if they face lower enforcement costs. However, as explained before, previous
studies tend to emphasize the importance of demand in explaining the heterogeneity in the stringency of
regulations rather than supply costs with domestic regulations. Furthermore, Aghion et al. (2011, 2010)
show that formal regulations may disrupt the formation of civic virtues such as trust and cooperativeness
(i.e. crowding out), which suggests another reason why governments in high-trust countries may be
cautious about implementing more regulations than demanded.
50
Tabellini, 2010; Zak and Knack, 2001; Knack and Keefer, 1997) or educational attainment
(Tabellini, 2010; Alesina and La Ferrara, 2002), column (3) includes log gross domestic
product (GDP) per capita, percentage of population with tertiary education, and log
population.
[Table 2.1]
In column (4), I also include governance indicators developed by the World Bank in
an attempt to control for the effect of formal law enforcement or institutional capacity on
compliance. These are country-wide ‘rule of law’ and the perceived regulatory quality.9
The correlation between trust and noncompliance, however, seems to exist independently
over and above these institutional factors.
In column (5), I include firm-level controls in order to isolate the role of trust in
the country where the installation operates, from firm-specific characteristics that could
affect compliance decisions. I control for the number of installations each firm operates
as well as several key financial variables such as the number of employees, operating
revenue and total assets. The financial data comes from Bureau Van Dijk’s Orbis Database
(which I will discuss more in Section 2.5.3) and the descriptive statistics of firms in each
country is reported in Table B.1 in Appendix B. The coefficient in column (5) shows that
the correlation between trust and noncompliance remains strong even when firm-specific
variables are controlled for. In column (6) I try a logit model and find similar results.
Overall, this casual inspection provides suggestive evidence for the role of trust in
compliance behavior of regulated firms, which warrants a more rigorous investigation.
2.3 Conceptual framework
In this section I discuss two main mechanisms for the association between trust and
compliance based on the existing literature. I then focus on the common prediction of
both theories that higher levels of generalized trust positively affect compliance.
2.3.1 Internalized norms
Sociologists have documented that individuals in high-trust societies tend to have strong
internalized norms: they donate to charity, obey traffic rules, and pay taxes because they
9The precise definitions of these indicators are given in Kaufmann et al. (2011). Rule of law captures
“perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and
in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well
as the likelihood of crime and violence”. Regulatory quality measures “perceptions of the ability of the
government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private
sector development”.
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feel obligated to do so (Portes, 1998). In a similar spirit, trust shared in an area may
positively affect compliance in environmental regulation.
The growing literature on corporate culture suggests such internalized norms are also
present at the firm level. Most firms have clearly defined corporate culture – principles
and values that should inform the behavior of all the firm’s employees (Guiso et al.,
2015b).10 It is then likely that these self-declared values are influenced by internalized
norms of the individuals who form the organizations and those of the region where they
operate.
In parallel to the literature on the transmission of culture by immigrants that empha-
sizes the strength and persistence of internalized norms (Ferna´ndez and Fogli, 2006, 2009;
Giuliano, 2007), there is a growing interest in the influence of source-country characteris-
tics in multinational firms’ operation abroad. For instance, Bloom et al. (2012b) provide
empirical evidence that firms in high-trust areas tend to be more decentralized since trust
facilitates delegation of decision making power from the CEO to managers. More inter-
estingly, they find that trust in the country where multinational firms are headquartered
has a strong positive correlation with decentralization in the affiliate’s foreign plants,
even when the managers in the plants are hired locally. This finding suggests that firms
also take some of their home country culture abroad and emphasizes the strong presence
of internalized corporate culture within firms. Thus, I expect trust in the country where
firms operate to be positively correlated with their compliance behavior and to potentially
affect their foreign subsidiaries’ compliance decisions through shared corporate culture.
2.3.2 Social punishment for noncompliance
Alternatively, assuming that social sanctions for noncompliance are stronger when com-
pliance rate is higher, trust may affect compliance decisions of firms through a high
expected compliance rate in society. In reality, the ‘name-and-shame’ sanction in the EU
ETS whereby member states “ensure publication of the names of operators and aircraft
operators who are in breach of requirements to surrender sufficient allowances” (Article
16(2) of the Directive 2003/87/EC, henceforth the Directive), clearly embodies the threat
of social punishment for noncompliance.11
I provide a simple analytical model of firms’ pollution behavior in the presence of
regulation to formalize this reasoning.12 Let firm i with emission intensity (or simply
type) θi ∈ [0, 1] choose an action bi ∈ [0, 1] when there is a regulation L ∈ [0, 1] that
10Guiso et al. (2015b) report that when they looked at companies’ web pages, they found that 85% of
the Standard and Poor’s 500 (S&P 500) companies had a section dedicated to corporate culture.
11Several papers have already noted social motivations behind compliance decisions such as reputation,
shame and guilt arising from not being in line with the behavior of other firms (Posner and Rasmusen,
1999; Banerjee and Shogren, 2010; Qin and Shogren, 2015).
12The set-up is adopted from Acemoglu and Jackson (2017) where they study the role of social norms
in the enforcement of laws.
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imposes an upper bound on firms’ actions.13 The payoff is represented by:
ui(bi, θi) = −a(bi − θi)2 − (1− a)(bi −Bj)2 − γ
∑
i∈N
bi − µI{bi>L}φ (2.1)
where the element of trust shared in society j is introduced by Bj as the expected action of
other firms. I assume that higher trust leads to a lower expected polluting action of other
firms. The parameter a ∈ (0, 1) is an (inverse) measure of social sensitivity that governs
the relative importance of matching one’s own type versus matching the expected average
action of other firms as shown in the first two terms.14 γ captures negative externalities
from the total emissions in society. It justifies interpreting lower Bj as higher trust because
given this society-wide externality, trust or perceived trustworthiness of other firms leads
to the expectation that other firms will choose lower actions for the common good. The
last term subtracts the fine φ imposed on noncompliant firms, those choosing bi > L,
conditional on there being a formal inspection by the authority with probability µ.
Given the set-up, there is a threshold type θ∗ = f(Bj, L, µ, φ), beyond which all types
violate the regulation and below which all types comply with the regulation.15 It is then
straightforward to show that fewer firms violate the regulation (i.e., θ∗ increases) when
trust is higher (Bj is lower), the regulation is less stringent (the upper bound L is higher),
and formal enforcement rules are stricter (µ and φ higher).16
The two potential channels discussed so far share the prediction that higher levels of
trust lead to more compliance, which I bring to the data in the following sections. It is
challenging to distinguish these two potential channels empirically. Later I attempt to
provide suggestive evidence for the presence of internalized corporate culture by looking
at multinational firms’ compliance behavior when they operate abroad.
2.4 Institutional background
In this section I provide a brief background on the European Union Emissions Trad-
ing Scheme (EU ETS) and its compliance cycle. Launched in 2005, the EU ETS is the
world’s largest carbon trading market operating in 31 countries (all 28 EU countries plus
Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway). It limits emissions from heavy energy-using instal-
lations (including power stations and industrial plants) and airlines operating between
13Firm i’ type θi ∈ [0, 1] is distributed according to a cumulative distribution function F . For simplicity,
F is assumed to be strictly increasing and continuous on [0,1] with F (0) = 0 and F (1) = 1.
14Note that deviation in both directions is equally costly. For deviation from the prevailing action in
the opposite direction (complying when others violate), Fehr and Ga¨chter (2000a) provide experimental
evidence that there is a strong aversion against being the “sucker” who cooperates when others do not.
15The existence of a threshold type follows from the monotonicity of the first order conditions. I provide
a formal proof of this statement in Section B.3 in Appendix B.
16Similarly, I formally show ∂θ
∗
∂Bj
< 0 in Appendix B.
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these countries covering around 45% of the EU’s greenhouse gas emissions. Its geographic
coverage, as large as all of Europe, offers a unique setting to investigate the extent to
which compliance behavior with respect to the same regulation may differ across countries
due to the differences in trust and civicness of the population.
The EU ETS is currently in its third phase that runs from 2013 to 2020, having gone
through the first two phases. Phase 1 ran from 2005 to 2007 and was considered a pilot
phase. The second phase ran from 2008 and 2012, the same period as the first commitment
period under the Kyoto Protocol. In the first two phases, most allowances were allocated
for free (i.e., grandfathered) to regulated installations based on historical emissions and
the amount of allowances was decided via National Allocation Plans (NAPs) in each
participating country. In phase 3, however, around 50% of total allowances are auctioned
(with full auctioning for the power sector), with the share set to rise over the course of
the trading period. Also, allocation is determined through common rules agreed at the
EU level to improve transparency and harmonization of the permit allocation process
across countries.
Integral to the scheme’s successful implementation is the Monitoring, Reporting and
Verification (MRV) system, known as the ETS compliance cycle. As a primary actor in all
related procedures, operators of industrial installations and aircraft operators (henceforth
called installations) are required to monitor and report their annual emissions to the
Competent Authority (CA), one or more institutions within each country designated to
ensure smooth running of the compliance cycle of the EU ETS.17
Specifically, installations report their emissions of the previous year verified by third-
party accredited verifiers by 31 March of each year. Installations are then required to
surrender a quantity of allowances equal to the volume of their verified greenhouse gas
emissions of the previous year by 30 April of that year. An installation is considered
out of compliance if the number of allowances surrendered by 30 April is lower than
its verified emissions.18 Noncompliant installations are subject to the EU level penalty
for the amount of emissions for which the installation failed to surrender allowances (40
euro per tCO2 in phase 1 and 100 euro per tCO2 in phase 2 and 3) and the shortfall in
compliance is then added to the compliance target of the following year (i.e. paying a fine
does not exempt noncompliant installations from their obligations to surrender sufficient
allowances).
I focus on noncompliance in the form of not surrendering enough permits, for which all
regulated installations face the same penalty and which I observe in the data. However,
there are other forms of noncompliance such as failing to report changes in the installa-
1715 out of 31 participating countries have one centralised CA that deals with all aspects of the ETS
including permit allocation and compliance, whereas the rest has multiple CAs.
18In addition to EU allowances (EUAs), firms can use international credits such as Certified Emission
Reductions (CERs) and Emission Reduction Units (ERUs) from the Clean Development Mechanism
(CDM) and Joint Implementation (JI) from phase 2 with qualitative and quantitative restrictions.
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tion’s capacity or monitoring plans. With regard to these, each national government is
required to lay down penalties that are “effective, proportionate, and dissuasive” (Arti-
cle 16(1) of the Directive). The presence of these country-specific enforcement rules for
other forms of noncompliance may have impacts on overall compliance behavior. This fea-
ture introduces difficulties in identifying the role of trust in regulatory compliance across
countries (i.e. it would be problematic if high-trust countries also have more stringent en-
forcement rules and more frequent inspections). In later sections, I propose identification
strategies that overcome this obstacle.
2.5 Data description
2.5.1 Compliance in the EU ETS
Data on compliance in the EU ETS is provided by the European Union Transaction Log
(EUTL), a system harmonized at the EU level that publishes information on compliance
status, permit allocation, verified emissions, and surrendered allowances at the installation
level. Existing papers that have studied compliance behavior of firms have focused on
a single industry or several industries in a single country.19 While providing valuable
insights into various motivations behind compliance decisions, these studies are unable to
shed light on the systematic differences in compliance behavior caused by cultural traits
such as trust, which largely varies at the country level. I address this lacuna by taking
advantage of this unique international dataset that contains installations operating in
multiple industries and multiple countries.20
I use information on compliance status from 2005 to 2015 that includes all three
phases so far. There are five possible compliance codes installations can be given: (1) A,
when the number of allowances and permits surrendered by the deadline (30 April) is
greater than or equal to verified emissions, (2) B, when the number of allowances and
permits surrendered by the deadline is lower than verified emissions, (3) C, when verified
emissions were not entered until the deadline, (4) D, when competent authority corrected
verified emissions after the deadline and decided that the installation is not in compliance,
and (5) E, when competent authority corrected verified emissions after the deadline and
decided that the installation is in compliance. The distribution is reported in Table 2.2.
19For single industry studies, see, for example, Gray and Deily (1996) for the US steel industry,
Shimshack and Ward (2005, 2008) for the US pulp industry. Multi-industry studies include Dasgupta
et al. (2000) for Mexico, Decker and Pope (2005) and Evans (2016) for the US, Nyborg and Telle (2006)
for Norway, and more recently Duflo et al. (2014) for India.
20I drop Cyprus, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Malta, and Luxembourg since there are too few installations
(less then 50) operating in these countries, thus may not represent the culture of the environment in
which they operate. Due to the small number of regulated installations, in some cases, technical aspects
of monitoring, reporting and verification procedures were delayed (for instance, Malta), which could
affect the compatibility of the data. I also drop Croatia that joined the ETS in 2013.
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Based on this categorization, I construct a binary noncompliance variable that takes 1 if
an installation is given either B or D and 0 if an installation is given either A or E. In
my preferred specification, I treat compliance status of code C as missing in order to be
conservative.21 Alternative specifications such as considering A and B only or treating C
differently yield similar results.
The cross-country compliance rates depicted in Figure 2.5 reveals startling variation
across countries. It is noteworthy that the distribution (Figure B.3) is highly right-skewed
with a majority of countries close to full compliance and several countries with very
high noncompliance. Some countries such as Bulgaria, Italy, and Slovakia, have close
to or over 10 percent noncompliant installation-year observations. However, the mean
noncompliance rate is very low – 3.2 percent – and half the countries countries show less
then 1 percent noncompliant observations during the sample period.
Figure 2.6 shows noncompliance rates by year. The occurrence of noncompliance was
very high in 2005 (59% of all noncompliance occurring in the first year) and the rate was
substantially lower in 2006 onwards. In case the cross-country pattern observed in 2005
is an outlier I exclude 2005 and calculate noncompliance rates across countries. A similar
cross-country pattern continues to exist, albeit with lower magnitudes, as shown in Figure
B.4 with Bulgaria, Italy and France appearing high in the ranking. Even without 2005,
noncompliance tends to be less frequent in phase 2 and phase 3. One possible reason is
that the EU level fine for the amount of emissions for which the installation failed to
surrender allowances increased by 2.5 times starting from phase 2 (40 euro per tCO2 in
phase 1 to 100 euro per tCO2 in phase 2 and 3).
[Figure 2.5, 2.6]
2.5.2 Measuring trust
As briefly explained in Section 2.2, the ESS measures generalized trust – the expectation
that a random member of the society is trustworthy – by asking the classical question,
“Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you can’t be
too careful in dealing with people?”.22 Respondents’ answers are given on a scale of 0 to
21Although failing to report verified emissions is strictly speaking noncompliance, two observations call
for a more cautious approach. First, among observations with compliance status C, around 80 percent
have incomplete information on permit allocation, either missing or zero even in the first two phases
when most permits are given for free based on their historical emissions. Second, these installations
tend to have missing verified emissions for multiple periods followed by missing compliance status in
the following periods. Taken together, it is possible that these installations were no longer regulated (or
active) and therefore did not have reporting obligations.
22The ESS also measures trust that respondents have in parliament, legal system, the police, politicians
and political parties. These measures can also explain compliance patterns and are highly correlated with
the measure of generalized trust (the smallest pairwise correlation coefficient being 0.84 between trust
in parliament and generalized trust). However, they are likely to reflect the quality of the corresponding
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10, where 0 implies “You can’t be too careful” and 10 means “Most people can be trusted”.
The variable that I use in the econometric regression is the average of this answer within
the country where the installation is located. For identification purposes, I later also
explore the importance of trust prevalent in the location of the firm’s headquarters (that
owns the installation) when the firm’s headquarters are located in a different country and
therefore likely to be exposed to a different set of values and corporate culture.
This trust question appears in several other surveys including the World Value Sur-
vey (WVS) with the same wording and has been the most widely used tool to measure
trust across countries in the literature.23 A number of papers have confirmed that it is
indeed correlated with trusting behavior. Fehr et al. (2003) show that survey questions
of this type do capture trust by running a series of experiments, and Fehr (2009) further
demonstrates that the survey measure of trust is strongly correlated with the behavioral
measure of trust derived from trust games. On the contrary, Glaeser et al. (2000) provide
experimental evidence that the survey question captures the trustworthiness of respon-
dents rather than trust; but, this conflicting finding has been reconciled by Sapienza et al.
(2013) who show that subjects in a homogeneous sample (such as Harvard undergradu-
ates as in Glaeser et al. (2000)) tend to extrapolate the trustworthiness of others based
on their own trustworthiness. However, in a large anonymous sample (such as random
individuals in Germany as in Fehr et al. (2003)) in which respondents are not extrapolat-
ing expected trustworthiness of others based own their own trustworthiness, the survey
question does seem to capture trust. Thus, I believe the trust measure from the ESS is
appropriate for the purpose of my analysis that investigates the role of trust in compliance
decisions by firms.
[Figure 2.7]
Figure 2.7 plots the average level of trust by country. Two points are noteworthy.
First, as shown in previous studies, there exists substantial variation in trust across
countries. The average level of trust ranges from a minimum of 3.8 observed in Portu-
gal to a maximum of 6.9 in Denmark. Second, it is readily observable that there are
differences across regions of Europe; for instance, Nordic countries (Denmark, Norway,
Finland, and Sweden) display highest levels of trust in the sample. On the other hand,
Mediterranean countries such as Greece, Italy, and Portugal appear to have lower levels
of trust. Continental European countries tend to be in the middle of the trust ranking.24
institutions, whose effect on compliance I try to remove in order to focus on the effect of trust as culture.
Thus I believe it is appropriate to focus on this measure of generalized trust in my analysis.
23Another popular approach is to measure trust in a trust game in experiments. See Johnson and
Mislin (2011) for a meta-analysis of an extensive number of trust games in the literature. However,
a clear limitation of this approach to measure trust is that it is difficult to derive a measure that is
compatible across countries. There are multi-country experiments (e.g. Akai and Netzer (2012)), but still
the sample tends to be not large enough to allow a rigorous cross-country econometric analysis.
24It is beyond the scope of this paper to explain the sources of variation in trust across countries.
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2.5.3 Firm-level controls
Data on firm characteristics comes from Bureau Van Dijk’s Orbis Database. The account
holders’ information in the EU ETS (i.e., regulated installations) was matched to the
corporations in the Orbis Database in Calel and Dechezlepreˆtre (2016). Only less than
3 percent of installations are left unmatched. I obtain key financial variables that may
affect compliance decisions (i.e., firms may be too financially constrained to buy enough
permits) including the number of employees, operating revenue and total assets for the
sample period as well as firms’ ownership structure in 2015 and the number of installa-
tions run by each firm. These controls will also account for firm-level heterogeneity more
generally. Table B.1 in Appendix B reports the descriptive statistics of these variables for
firms in each country.
2.6 Trust and compliance
The discussions in the conceptual framework in Section 2.3 predict that greater trust leads
to higher compliance, or fewer firms violating the regulation. In this section, I subject
this prediction to rigorous econometric investigation.
2.6.1 Using inherited trust as instruments
The negative correlation between trust and noncompliance documented in Section 2.2 is
consistent with the theoretical prediction. However, it is possible that trust picks up the
effect of country-specific regulatory environment or institutional capacity that might be
correlated with trust, given the documented influence of trust in shaping institutions and
regulations (Algan and Cahuc, 2009; Aghion et al., 2010, 2011). Relatedly, Cohen (1998)
and Brehm and Hamilton (1996) have argued that the presence and characteristics of
other environmental regulations may affect compliance behavior of firms through higher
degrees of familiarity and knowledge with compliance procedures. I included a measure
that controls for rule of law and the perceived quality of regulation in Section 2.2.2, but
it may not be perfect.
It is also plausible that the correlation could also be explained by some unobserv-
able factors that affect regulatory compliance of firms and the level of trust within the
country simultaneously.25 For instance, Carattini and Jo (2017) document that high-trust
There is a related literature devoted to this question. For historical determinants of differences in cultural
norms of behavior, see Tabellini (2008a); Durante (2010); Nunn and Wantchekon (2011). Guiso et al.
(2009) explore several long-term determinants of bilateral trust between two countries. For studies that
emphasize short-run determinants of trust, see Glaeser et al. (2000), and Alesina and La Ferrara (2002),
and Jo (2017).
25I believe the threat of reverse causality is minimal given the extensive evidence on the importance of
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countries have reduced their per capita CO2 emissions more substantially than low-trust
countries between 1950 and 2010. Then, one might argue that it might be easier for in-
stallations in high-trust countries to comply with the EU ETS since they already operate
in an environment more conducive to reducing emissions. Thus, what I need is a measure
that can predict the average level of trust in a country, but uncorrelated with country-
specific formal institutions and other unobservable features that may affect compliance
behavior of firms.
One such measure is the inherited component of trust observed in second-generation
immigrants. This epidemiological approach has gained recognition in the literature (Fer-
nandez, 2007) and been adopted by several papers that attempt to isolate the causal ef-
fects of trust on economic outcomes (Algan and Cahuc, 2010; Butler et al., 2016; Carattini
and Jo, 2017). The insight is based on the evidence that trust is highly persistent across
generations through the transmission of values within families (Rice and Feldman, 1997;
Putnam, 2000; Guiso et al., 2009). Then, inherited trust observed in second-generation
immigrants is expected to be correlated with the level of trust in their countries of origin
where their parents came from, and yet unlikely to directly affect compliance behavior of
firms operating in their source country since they are born and reside in their adopted
countries.
[Figure 2.8]
I apply this idea to my analysis by using, for example, the average level of trust
among second-generation British immigrants born and raised in any of the other ESS
countries to predict the level of trust in Britain. The exclusion restriction is then trust of
second-generation British immigrants born and living in Spain, for instance, should not
directly affect compliance decisions of regulated firms operating in Britain between 2005
and 2015. The number of second-generation immigrants from each country from which I
estimate this measure of inherited trust is reported in Table B.2 in Appendix B. Figure
2.8 clearly depicts a strong positive correlation between the inherited trust of immigrants
and the level of trust observed in their source county, which ensures a strong first stage.
I estimate regression equations of the following form:
Noncomplianceijct = α + βTrustc + φCct + ρFijct + δY eart + ξIndustryj + ijct (2.2)
where Noncomplianceijct is a binary variable that takes 1 if firm i in industry j in country
c is out of compliance in year t. Trustc is the average trust of country c where installations
are located. It is reasonable to suppose that the variable does not vary over time during
the 11-year period I study, given the persistent nature of trust across generations.26 Most
historical determinants of trust (Guiso et al., 2009; Durante, 2010; Tabellini, 2010; Nunn and Wantchekon,
2011).
26To formally test if there is time variation over the study period I check whether there is overlap in
59
empirical analyses in the trust literature follow this approach by taking the average of
trust in surveys conducted since the 80s (e.g. Tabellini, 2010; Bloom et al., 2012b).27
Therefore, I run a pooled regression despite the panel nature of the dependent variable.
To avoid understating the standard errors due to repeated observations, the errors are
clustered at the country level over all years. Cct and Fijct represent country-level controls
and firm-level controls. I further include year dummies and industry dummies.
[Table 2.3]
Table 2.3 reports IV probit estimates. Column (1) first shows the IV estimates from
the regression that does not include any controls to begin with. The coefficient on trust
is negative and statistically significant (with P-value 0.018). The instrument is strong
with F -statistics over 40. Column (2) includes year dummies and industry dummies,
which will capture industry-specific characteristics that may affect compliance such as
available abatement technology or market situations. In column (3), I include country-
level controls such as log GDP per capita, log population, educational attainment and
two governance indicators that measure country-wide rule of law and perceived regulatory
quality (summary statistics of these variables are reported in Appendix B). In column
(4), I further include firm-level variables such as the number of installations each firm
owns (to control for economies of scale in compliance) and operating revenue, total assets
and number of employees to control for the possibility that firms were too financially
constrained to buy permits. Due to the large number of missing values in these firm-level
financial variables, the sample size falls substantially, and yet the negative relationship
between trust and noncompliance remains robust.28 Column (5) shows the reduced form
relationship between inherited trust and noncompliance. The 2SLS estimate from a linear
probability model is qualitatively similar with a coefficient (standard error) of -0.049
(0.028).
The magnitude of the association between trust and compliance is substantial. The
estimate from column (4) that includes the full set of controls implies a 1 standard devi-
ation increase in trust (roughly from trust in Italy to trust in Netherlands) is associated
the 90% confidence intervals of the trust variable for the start and end year using 2000 and 2014 wave,
respectively. Only two out of 25 countries in my sample have non-overlapping confidence intervals over
this period.
27Few studies exploit time variation in trust with a notable exception being Algan and Cahuc (2010).
They suggest a methodology to recover long intertemporal variation in trust by comparing immigrants
who moved to America from different countries at different points in time and generate a trust measure
for 25 countries with time variation over 60 years, which arguably covers multiple generations. Their
trust variable measures trust in two points far apart in time, 1935 and 2000, to allow sufficient time for
the evolution of trust. Algan and Cahuc (2009) also exploit time variation in trust over 20 years in one
of the specifications, using only the end points of their data (1980 and 2000) to get enough variation.
28To make sure the presence of missing values does not alter the distribution of compliance, I check if
the compliance rate differs with and without observations with missing firm-level controls and find that
the distribution of the dependent variable (noncompliance) is not statistically different across the two
groups (with P -value of the test statistics 0.64).
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with a 2.4 percentage point decrease in the probability of noncompliance.
Some papers have exploited within-country regional variation in trust for identification
purposes (Guiso et al., 2004; Tabellini, 2010; Bloom et al., 2012b). I also try a trust
measure at the region level in column (6) and find consistent results. The most prominent
benefit of exploiting regional variation in trust is that it allows including country fixed
effects and the studies mentioned above successfully combine country fixed effects with
region-level instruments to estimate the causal effects of trust. However, the difficulty of
adopting this approach in my context is that country fixed effects will make it impossible
to use my instrument, which is at the country level (the region of origin of immigrants is
not asked in the ESS).29 In the next section, I suggest an alternative design that allows
both using the instrument and country fixed effects.
2.6.2 Exploiting differences in the location of headquarters
About 80 percent of installations (10,692 in total) for which I have ownership data are
owned by multinational firms (MNEs) and 4,310 of them are owned by foreign MNEs
whose central headquarters are located in a different country from the country where the
installations operate. This subsample offers a chance to further probe the causality of the
relationship that I attempted to estimate so far by allowing country of operation fixed
effects. Country fixed effects remove any bias associated with unobservable national char-
acteristics that may be spuriously correlated with trust and compliance. I then compare
compliance behavior of installations that are exposed to the exact same external envi-
ronment (e.g. legal enforcement, stringency of other related regulations, etc.) but have
different levels of trust coming from the country of origin.
The importance of country of origin characteristics in MNEs’ management and or-
ganizational structure has long been recognized in the relevant literature. A study most
relevant to my analysis is Bloom et al. (2012b) where they provide evidence that the
level of trust prevalent in the country where the multinational is headquartered has a
strong positive effect on the degree of decentralization in the affiliate’s foreign location
(for instance, a Swedish affiliate operating in the US is typically more decentralized than
a French affiliate in the US). Furthermore, Bloom et al. (2012a) show that US multi-
nationals operating in Europe displayed higher productivity in the use of information
technologies (IT) than non-US multinationals in Europe during the period when the US
experienced a rapid productivity growth in sectors that intensively use IT. Burstein et al.
(2009) and Bloom and Van Reenen (2007) also document the transmission of knowledge
29Another concern is that there might not be enough regional variation in trust once country dummies
are included, given that my sample includes 25 European countries, many of which are culturally homo-
geneous. Previous studies that exploited regional variation in trust focused on large countries known for
substantial within-country variation in trust including Italy (Guiso et al., 2004; Tabellini, 2010) or on
the entire world Bloom et al. (2012b).
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and management practices across countries in MNEs. Given this ample evidence on the
influence of source-country characteristics over MNEs’ operation abroad, it seems legit-
imate to investigate whether there might be different patterns in compliance behavior
across multinationals based in different countries.
It is possible, however, that some firms might have experienced changes in ownership
through mergers and acquisitions (M&As) just before or while being subject to the EU
ETS. In particular, if firms are recently bought out by foreign enterprises that may
have substantially different source-country characteristics, the level of trust prevalent
in the country where the new headquarters are located might not precisely predict the
compliance behavior of their installations.30 To reduce the potential measurement error
arising from this scenario, I identify firms that were bought out by foreign companies
(i.e., target firms in foreign M&A deals) since 2000, five years prior to the start of the
ETS, using rich M&A data from Bureau Van Dijk’s Zephyr Database. There are only a
small number of such firms in my sample (264 out of 8,156 firms). I drop 573 installations
owned by these firms from the regression.
The results of this analysis are reported in Table 2.4. For this exercise, I construct
another trust measure from the World Value Survey (WVS) since there are a number of
non-European countries in which MNEs in my sample are headquartered and thus not
included in the ESS.31 As before, I pool together individual responses from all six waves
conducted so far (1984, 1993, 1999, 2004, 2009, and 2014), and compute the average level
of trust in the country where the global headquarters of the installation is located.32 I
later also check for the independent role of trust in the installation’s location.
[Table 2.4]
Column (1) shows the relationship between compliance and the level of trust in the
country where the central headquarters are located without any controls. Standard errors
are clustered at the country level. The coefficient is negative and significant at 1 percent
level, which suggests that trust prevalent in source countries is positively correlated with
the affiliates’ compliance decisions. The influence of trust in the country of headquarters
remains strong even when I control for individual firm-level characteristics in column (2).
Next, I include country of operation fixed effects as well as year and industry fixed effects.
The magnitude of the coefficient falls sharply with an extensive set of fixed effects, but the
coefficient in column (3) is still negative and significant. This implies that installations
30The case of firms in my sample buying other firms, as opposed to being bought out, is not likely
to introduce measurement error in the trust variable because it does not bring about changes in the
relationship between pre-existing subsidiaries and their global owners that I exploit here.
31There are 44 source countries in my sample and the median (mean) number of firms headquartered
in each source country is 28 (103).
32The only difference in the trust question in these two surveys is the scale used for the answer. While
the ESS uses the scale of 10, the WVS provides a binary choice between 0 and 1 where 0 implies “You
can’t be too careful” and 10 means “Most people can be trusted”.
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owned by firms based in high-trust countries are less likely to violate the regulation than
those owned by firms in low-trust countries, even when they operate in the same country.
In column (4), I add the level of trust in the location where the installation operates
(at the region level, since the country-level measure will be omitted due to country fixed
effects). The coefficient on trust in the region of installation is insignificant, while the role
of trust in the country of headquarters remains negative and statistically significant with
a similar magnitude as in column (3).
It is still possible that an endogeneity bias is affecting the coefficient of trust even with
country fixed effects. For instance, Bloom et al. (2012b) show that MNEs with headquar-
ters in high-trust countries are larger in firm size and more productive than those with
headquarters in low-trust countries. If compliance behavior is correlated with these firm
characteristics related to trust that I cannot directly control for (although I control for the
number of employees), the estimate might be biased. Thus I apply the same instrument
developed in the section above to further probe the role of trust in compliance behavior.
The measure of inherited trust observed in second-generation immigrants is still valid
in this context, since it predicts the level of trust in their source countries but unlikely
to be correlated with the organization and performance (such as size and productivity)
of MNEs headquartered in those countries. Column (5) reports the IV estimates. The
coefficient is more negative when instrumented and still statistically significant. Column
(6) shows the presence of a negative and significant relationship between noncompliance
and the measure of inherited trust in the reduced form. In column (7), I further include
time-varying country-level controls in addition to the country of operation fixed effects.
The negative relationship between trust and noncompliance remains robust. Column (8)
includes region fixed effects, comparing compliance decisions of MNE’s based in differ-
ent countries operating within the same region. Even in this demanding specification,
the influence of trust in the MNE’s source country continues to exist. Repeating this
specification in a linear probability model yields similar results (unreported).33
Not only is the estimated effect of trust on compliance statistically significant, it is also
economically meaningful. The estimate in column (5) implies that a change in ownership
from a multinational firm based in Philippines (the lowest-trust country in my sample) to
another MNE headquartered in Norway (the highest-trust country) would be associated
with a 1.5 percentage point decrease in the probability of noncompliance. How large
is this effect relative to that of formal enforcement on compliance? To provide a sense
of magnitude, I compare this effect with other existing estimates for the effectiveness
of formal enforcement actions reported in previous papers. Estimates for the effect of
traditional regulatory measures (e.g. inspections and fines) range between 42 and 52
percent treatment effects (Gray and Shimshack, 2011).34 Also, Evans (2016) documents
33It yields a coefficient (standard error) on the trust measure of -0.023 (0.010).
34Deily and Gray (2007) studied the deterrent effects of regulatory measures on compliance in the
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that an information-based enforcement tool such as the “watch list” in the Clean Air Act
is associated with a 21 percentage point decrease in the probability of noncompliance,
indicating a 29 percent treatment effect given the average noncompliance rate 72 percent.
Compared with these previous estimates, the effect of trust still seems large: given the
average compliance rate of 3.2 percent in my sample, the predicted fall in the probability
of noncompliance by 1.5 percentage point caused by the change in ownership from a
Filipino firm to a Norwegian firm implies a 47 percent treatment effect.
2.6.3 Robustness checks
In this section I report the results from a number of robustness checks. Table B.3 re-
ports robustness checks for the cross-country analysis using all firms (as in Section 2.6.1)
where I try to (1) drop late joiners in the EU ETS, (2) use alternative specifications for
noncompliance, (3) use alternative measures of trust, (4) use an alternative specification
for the measure of inherited trust, and (5) check if installations’ compliance behavior is
different also at the intensive margin, i.e., if the amount by which installations are non-
compliant can also be explained by the level of trust. Here I focus on the main results
from the specification using MNEs that includes country of operation fixed effects. First,
I add region-level economic controls (log GDP per capita, log population and the per-
centage of population with tertiary education) in addition to country of operation fixed
effects (column (1) in Table 2.5). Also, I exclude Bulgaria and Romania that joined the
EU ETS later, in case there might have been technical difficulties arising from immature
infrastructure. Bulgaria and Romania started to participate in the ETS in 2007 when
they joined the European Union in the same year.35 Excluding these late joiners does not
affect the relationship between trust and compliance (column (2)).
[Table 2.5]
Next, I try alternative specifications for the binary noncompliance variable. In my
preferred specification, I dropped installations with compliance status C that did not
report their verified emissions (the step before they surrender corresponding amount
of permits) in order to be conservative because there is suggestive evidence that these
installations are no longer regulated or active (see footnote 21). Alternatively, I treat
these installations as noncompliant when they can be reasonably presumed to be active
Clean Air Act using compliance data on large steel mills in the Unites States. They found that being
subject to an enforcement activity in the prior two years decreased the probability of noncompliance
by 32 percentage point. Given the overall noncompliance rate 62 percent, the estimate suggets a 52
percent treatment effect. In a similar context, using compliance data on pulp and paper mills Gray and
Shadbegian (2005) found that a typical regulatory action decreased the probability of violation by 10
percentage point, implying a 42 percent treatment effect (with the average violation rate 24 percent in
the sample).
35Croatia also joined the ETS in 2013 and is already dropped from my sample along with five small
countries with less then 50 installations.
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by two standards: first, when they have non-missing information on permit allocation in
the current period and second, when they have non-missing compliance status other than
C in the following period. The regression in column (3) uses this alternative measure of
noncompliance. The magnitude of the coefficient on the trust measure falls but it remains
significant at 10 percent level. I also try to drop installations whose verified emissions were
corrected later by the competent authority (i.e. those with code D and E) and find similar
results (column (4)).
In column (5) and (6) I try alternative measures of trust to get a sense of potential
measurement error in the trust variable. First, I construct a measure that takes into
account year-specific shocks since I pool multiple waves conducted in different years to
calculate the average level of trust in each country. Following Bertrand et al. (2004) and
Guiso et al. (2009), I regress trust on year dummies, form residuals, and then compute
the means of these residuals by country. Column (5) shows that the coefficient on this
alternative measure of trust is still negative and significant at 1 percent level. Next, I
try a potentially more demanding approach that further takes into account individual
respondents’ characteristics such as gender, age, education and income as well as year
dummies. To proceed, I follow Algan and Cahuc (2010) by regressing trust on a set of
individual characteristics, year fixed effects and country fixed effects. The coefficients on
the country fixed effects then measure the average level of trust relative to the omitted
reference country (Germany, in this case). The results from the individual-level regres-
sion are reported in Table B.5 in Appendix B. The fact that coefficients on the country
dummies are significant (with standard errors clustered at the country level) even after
controlling for a set of individual characteristics and year dummies confirm the substan-
tial cross-country variation in trust documented in the literature. Column (6) reports the
IV probit estimate from the specification using this alternative trust measure and shows
the results consistent with previous findings. The effect of trust on compliance remains
robust across different measures of trust.
Finally, I try an alternative specification of the instrument that imposes a minimum of
25-year lag between the launch of the EU ETS and the year of immigration of the second-
generation immigrants’ parents as in Algan and Cahuc (2010) . This is to further ensure
that the exogeneity assumption is satisfied, since I only use second-generation immigrants
born before 1980 and therefore whose parents must have left their source countries before
1980, at least 25 years (one generation) prior to the start of the ETS in 2005. Then it is
even less likely that the level of trust transmitted by those who left the country at least
25 years ago still affects compliance behavior of firms in that country. Column (7) shows
that the result with this instrument is very similar and the modified instrument still has
a strong predictive power (F -stat is 18.6 and Figure B.5 graphically shows the positive
correlation). Column (8) shows the presence of a negative and significant relationship
between noncompliance and the alternative instrument in the reduced-form regression.
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2.6.4 Extension: bilateral trust
Several papers have looked at the influence of bilateral trust between two countries in
economic activities (Guiso et al., 2009; Bloom et al., 2012b). The measure of bilateral trust
used in the literature comes from the following question in a series of surveys conducted
for the European Commission: “I would like to ask you a question about how much trust
you have in people from various countries. For each, please tell me whether you have a lot
of trust, some trust, not very much trust, or no trust at all.” This question allows me to
explore the role of trust between the host and the source country in MNEs’ compliance
decisions controlling for country of operation and country of origin fixed effects at the
same time and thus solely exploit the pairwise variation in trust. In other words, it will
reveal, for instance, if a French affiliate is more likely to comply with the regulation in
Belgium (that the French tend to trust) than in the United Kingdom (that the French
tend to distrust).
[Table 2.6]
Column (1) in Table 2.6 shows that bilateral trust does not play a significant role in
multinationals’ compliance behavior when I include a full set of country of location and
origin dummies (therefore this specification only includes foreign MNEs). The result is
similar when I add firm-level controls in column (2). In case the bilateral trust variable
is affected by endogeneity (for instance, better compliance behavior in the country of
operation might engender trust towards the source country or there might be omitted
bilateral factors affecting trust and compliance behavior at the same time), I use a measure
of religious similarity between two countries developed in Guiso et al. (2009) to instrument
for bilateral trust.36 This measure is positively correlated with bilateral trust due to long-
standing cultural affinities, but unlikely to affect regulatory compliance exhibited by
firms. It yields a strong first stage (with F statistics of 22) as in previous studies, but the
bilateral trust variable is still insignificant as shown in column (3). I add an additional
instrument in column (4) that measures somatic distances, based on the average frequency
of specific traits (hair color, height, etc.) present in two populations developed in Guiso
et al. (2009) since people tend to trust other people who look like them more. The first
stage F statistics continues to be strong (around 15). However, the coefficient on bilateral
trust remains qualitatively similar with no meaningful impact.37
The result seems to suggest that firms do not comply selectively depending on the
location of their operation: French subsidiaries are no more likely to be in compliance with
36This variable measures the probability that two randomely chosen individuals in two countries will
share the same religion and is calculated by taking the product of the share of people in country i and in
country j who have religion k and then sum across all religions k (where k includes Catholic, Protestant,
Jewish, Muslim, Hindu, Orthodox, other affiliation, and no religion) based on the World Value Survey.
37When I only include the measure of somatic distances as an instrument (the first stage F -statistics
is 9.7), the result is qualitatively similar (unreported).
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the regulation in Belgium than in the United Kingdom. The finding is perhaps intuitive
when we consider that the outcomes which bilateral trust has been shown to affect –
for instance, trade flows between two countries in Guiso et al. (2009) and delegation of
decision-making power from the CEO to the plant manager in Bloom et al. (2012b) –
are indeed bilateral or relational. On the other hand, the nature of compliance decision
resonates more closely with the concept of generalized trust that I focused on in this
paper in a similar spirit that the use of checks rather than cash in Guiso et al. (2004) and
more demand for business regulation against corrupt businessmen in Aghion et al. (2010)
are related to generalized trust. Further, the finding here is consistent with Fisman and
Miguel (2007) that provide evidence on the strong effect of source-country culture, rather
than culture in the country of residence, on law-breaking behavior at the individual level.
2.7 Conclusion
In this article I have provided evidence on the positive role of trust in compliance as a
potential factor that can explain the heterogeneity in the stringency of climate change
regulations across countries. Trust or trustworthiness may positively affect compliance de-
cisions through strong internalized norms or strong social punishment for non-cooperative
behavior in high-trust societies.
The EU ETS and the data on compliance under this international regulation has pro-
vided a unique opportunity to investigate if countries differ in their compliance patterns
with respect to the same international regulation due to the differences in trust and civic-
ness. Using this data, I find strong empirical evidence that trust in the country where the
installation is located has a positive influence on its compliance decision. Interestingly,
the pattern continues to exist when I look within countries and compare compliance be-
havior of multinational subsidiaries whose central headquarters are located in different
countries: installations owned by firms based in high-trust countries were more likely to
be in compliance than those owned by firms located in low-trust countries, even when
they operate in the same country thus exposed to the same formal enforcement environ-
ment. These results underpin the findings from the existing literature that emphasizes
the influence of source country characteristics in MNEs’ operation abroad.
One notable implication of my findings is that local norms, such as trust, could play
a significant role in global cooperation problems such as climate change. In this article,
I have shown that trust could affect the design of climate change legislation through its
positive influence on compliance: higher compliance in high-trust countries may induce
their governments to implement more stringent regulations that address global external-
ities than some of their neighbors, particularly when there is a binding international goal
to be reached as in the case of the European Union. The argument is consistent with
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the previous studies that suggest trust can affect institutional outcomes through how
law-abiding people are.
Another interesting implication is related to the idea of using corporations as a lab
in which to study the role of culture. Although the role of culture in economic activ-
ities has long been recognized, economists’ attempts to develop a deeper insight into
specific workings of culture have not been straightforward because (1) it is difficult to
know where culture comes from, (2) it is sticky with rare drastic changes, and (3) even
when these cultural changes occur they take place over a long period with many other
things happening at the same time. Guiso et al. (2015a) note this problem and suggest
corporations as an alternative environment to study the role of culture. This is indeed
promising since with corporate culture, we know (1) when, how, and based on what values
corporations are founded, (2) corporate culture is subject to more frequent changes (e.g.,
through hiring, firing and M&As), and (3) performance is more easily measured (Guiso
et al., 2015a). There is an increasing interest in this line of reasoning that sheds light on
specific mechanisms behind the documented effect of culture at the macro-level. For in-
stance, Bloom et al. (2012b) provides evidence on the influence of trust in firms’ decision
to decentralize, which allows more efficient resource allocation within and across firms
that leads to higher firm productivity and economic growth. This serves as microevidence
for the long-held belief that trust facilitates economic growth through lower transactions
costs (Arrow, 1972). Similarly, this current article provides a plausible mechanism for the
relationship between trust and climate change regulation by providing microevidence on
the role of trust in compliance at the firm level. I concur with Guiso et al. (2015a) that
these approaches substantially enhance our understanding of how cultural norms affect
economic behavior and relate to formal institutions.
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Figures and Tables
Figure 2.1: Correlation between Trust and Employment Protection Regulation
Note: the graph plots the relationship between trust and the stringency of labor market regulation. Data
on the stringency of employment regulation comes from the OECD. The trust measure is constructed
based on the European Social Survey (2000-2014).
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Figure 2.2: Correlation between Trust and Renewable Energy Regulation
Note: the graph plots the positive correlation between trust and the stringency of climate change regu-
lations across countries measured by the target share of renewable energy in total energy consumption
by 2020. The trust measure is constructed based on the European Social Survey (2000-2014).
Figure 2.3: Correlation between Trust and the Climate Laws, Institutions and Measures
(CLIM) Index
Note: the graph plots the relationship between the level of average trust and the the Climate Laws,
Institutions and Measures (CLIM) Index. The CLIM Index comes from EBRD (2011). The level of
average trust measure is constructed based on the the European Social Survey (2000-2014).
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Figure 2.4: Correlation between Trust and Noncompliance Rate in the EU ETS
Note: the plot shows a correlation between the level of average trust and compliance rates in the ETS
across countries. The level of average trust measure is constructed based on the European Social Survey
(2002-2014).
Table 2.1: Probit Estimation: Trust and Noncompliance in the EU ETS
between 2005 and 2015
Dependent variable:
Indicator for noncompliance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Trust measured -0.358*** -0.444*** -0.482** -0.372* -0.490* -1.381**
in country of operation (0.111) (0.150) (0.217) (0.222) (0.270) (0.680)
Observations 119,701 119,163 119,163 119,163 73,498 73,498
Firm-level controls (4) No No No No Yes Yes
Country-level controls (5) No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies (10) No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry dummies (35) No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustering Country Country Country Country Country Country
Number of clusters 25 25 25 25 25 25
Notes: The dependent variable in all columns is the binary noncompliance measure that takes 1 if
the installation is out of compliance and 0 otherwise. All estimation is by Probit except for column
(6) where I try a logit model. Standard errors are clustered at the country of installations’ location.
“Industry dummies” are based on the main activity type information provided in the European Trans-
action Log. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.
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Table 2.2: Distribution of Compliance Code, installation by year observations
Code Frequency Percent
A 122,647 93.93
B 4,010 3.07
C 3,273 2.51
D 86 0.07
E 563 0.43
Total 130,579 100.0
Source: European Union Transaction Log
(EUTL).
Figure 2.5: Average Noncompliance Rate between 2005 and 2015
Note: the plot shows variation in noncompliance rates across countries. The data on compliance in the
ETS is provided by the European Union Transaction Log (EUTL) at the installations level and I collapse
the data over time across countries to calculate average compliance rates.
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Figure 2.6: Noncompliance Rate by Year
Note: the plot shows variation in noncompliance rates across years. The data on compliance in the ETS
is provided by the European Union Transaction Log (EUTL) at the installations level and I collapse the
data over countries to calculate average yearly compliance rates.
Figure 2.7: Average Trust
Note: the plot shows variation the level of average trust across countries. The level of average trust
measure is constructed based on the following survey question “Generally speaking, would you say that
most people can be trusted, or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people?” in the European
Social Survey (2002-2014).
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Figure 2.8: Correlation between Trust in Source Country and Inherited Trust
Note: the plot shows a correlation between inhered trust of second-generation immigrants and the level of
trust in their countries of origin. These measures are constructed based on the following survey question
“Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you can’t be too careful in
dealing with people?” in the European Social Survey (2002-2014).
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Table 2.3: IV Probit Estimation: Trust and Noncompliance in the EU ETS
between 2005 and 2015
Dependent variable: Indicator for noncompliance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Estimation method IV Probit IV Probit IV Probit IV Probit Probit IV Probit
Trust measured -0.459*** -0.575*** -0.750* -0.865* -0.892***
in country of operation (0.118) (0.153) (0.427) (0.461) (0.258)
Inherited Trust -0.494*
(0.292)
Observations 119,701 119,163 119,163 73,498 73,498 71,356
Firm-level controls (4) No No No Yes Yes Yes
Country-level controls (5) No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies (10) No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry dummies (35) No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustering Country Country Country Country Country Region
Number of clusters 25 25 25 25 25 165
First stage F stat 40.4 45.0 32.1 60.2 57.7
Notes: The dependent variable in all columns is the binary noncompliance measure that takes 1 if the installation is out of compliance
and 0 otherwise. Standard errors are clustered at the level shown in each column. “Industry dummies” are based on the main activity
type information provided in the European Transaction Log. Column (1) shows an IV probit estimate without any controls. Column
(2) includes year and industry dummies. Column (3) includes a set of country level controls (GDP per capita, education, population
and two governance indicators). Column (4) further includes several firm-level controls (number of installations each firm owns, total
assets, operating revenue, and number of employees). Column (5) shows the reduced form relationship between noncompliance and the
instrument. Column (6) uses a measure of trust that varies at the region level. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant
at 1%.
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Table 2.4: Trust and Noncompliance in the EU ETS between 2005 and 2015:
Exploiting the Differences in the Location of Headquarters
Dependent variable: Indicator for noncompliance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Estimation method Probit Probit Probit Probit IV Probit Probit IV Probit Probit
Trust measured -1.596*** -1.616*** -0.390* -0.417** -0.591*** -0.559** -0.425*
in country of central headquarter (0.380) (0.343) (0.204) (0.207) (0.222) (0.224) (0.234)
Trust measured 0.217
in region of operation (0.167)
Inherited Trust -0.111***
(0.042)
Observations 69,912 51,070 49,174 47,692 49,160 49,160 49,160 41,976
Firm-level controls (4) No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-level controls (5) No No No No No No Yes No
Year dummies (10) No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry dummies (35) No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country of operation dummies (24) No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Region of operation dummies (103) No No No No No No No Yes
Clustering Country Country Country Country Country Country Country Region
Number of clusters 25 20 20 20 20 20 20 93
Notes: The dependent variable in all columns is the binary noncompliance measure that takes 1 if the installation is out of compliance and 0
otherwise. The sample in this table includes multinational firms only. Standard errors are clustered at the level shown in each column. “Indus-
try dummies” are based on the main activity type information provided in the European Transaction Log. Column (1) does not include any
controls and column (2) adds firm-level controls (number of installations each firm owns, total assets, operating revenue, and number of employ-
ees). Column (3) includes year, industry and country of operation fixed effects. Column (4) separately checks the influence of trust in the region
where the installation is located. Column (5) instruments the trust variable with a measure of inherited trust and column (6) shows the reduced
form relationship between noncompliance and the instrument. Column (7) further includes time-varying country-level controls and column (8)
includes region fixed effects. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.
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Table 2.5: Trust and Noncompliance in the EU ETS between 2005 and 2015:
Robustness Checks
Dependent variable: Indicator for noncompliance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Estimation method IV Probit IV Probit IV Probit IV Probit IV Probit IV Probit IV Probit Probit
Trust measured -0.598*** -0.609** -0.398* -0.602*** -0.615*** -0.599** -1.064*
in country of central headquarter (0.223) (0.249) (0.219) (0.222) (0.230) (0.241) (0.562)
Inherited Trust -0.113***
(0.044)
Observations 46,257 47,570 49,204 48,921 49,160 49,160 49,160 49,160
Firm-level controls (4) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region-level controls (3) Yes No No No No No No No
Country of operation dummies (24) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies (10) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry dummies (35) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustering Country Country Country Country Country Country Country Country
Number of clusters 20 18 20 20 20 20 20 20
First stage F stat 172.7 191.9 179.8 187.1 194.0 218.7 21.2
Notes: The dependent variable in each column is a binary noncompliance measure that takes 1 if the installation is out of compliance and 0
otherwise. Standard errors are clustered at the level shown in each column. “Industry dummies” are based on the main activity type informa-
tion provided in the European Transaction Log. Column (1) includes region-level controls and column (2) drops ETS late joiners in my sample
(Bulgaria and Romania). In column (3) and (4) I use alternative specifications for the binary compliance variable. In column (5) and (6) I try
alternative measures of trust to check for potential measurement error (detailed explanations in the main text). In column (7) I try an alter-
native instrument and column (8) shows the reduced-form relationship between noncompliance and the alternative instrument. * significant at
10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.
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Table 2.6: Bilateral Trust and Noncompliance in the EU ETS
between 2005 and 2015
Dependent variable:
Indicator for noncompliance
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Estimation method Probit Probit IV Probit IV Probit
Bilateral trust -0.007 -0.059 1.717 0.623
(0.254) (0.260) (1.536) (0.804)
Observations 12,292 9,199 7,696 7,696
Firm-level controls (4) No Yes Yes Yes
Country of operation FE (24) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country of HQ FE (43) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies (10) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry dummies (35) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustering Country pair Country pair Country pair Country pair
Number of clusters 125 111 77 77
First stage F stat 22.0 15.5
Notes: The dependent variable in all columns is the binary noncompliance measure that takes 1 if
the installation is out of compliance and 0 otherwise. The sample in this table includes foreign MNEs
only. Standard errors are clustered at the country of headquarter by country of operation (country
pair) level. “Industry dummies” are based on the main activity type information provided in the
European Transaction Log. I use religious similarity as an instrument in column (3) and somatic dis-
tances as well as religious similarity in column (4). * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, ***
significant at 1%.
78
Chapter 3
The Effect of Internal Migration on
Trust in Communities of Origin
3.1 Introduction
The literature on the consequences of migration in communities of origin has grown
substantially in recent years. Migration has been shown to enhance human capital ac-
cumulation and entrepreneurship in origin households (Yang, 2008), lead to changes in
intrahousehold resource allocation and increase educational expenditures on girls relative
to boys (Antman, 2011). Further, labor migration also appears to have long run effects on
origin communities by raising the level of educational attainment of the next generation
(Dinkelman and Mariotti, 2016), although there is evidence for its short-run negative ef-
fects on labor supply, income and durable assets (Gibson et al., 2011). However, existing
research has a particular focus on the effects of migration on human and physical capital
investment mostly through remittances and has paid relatively little attention to the so-
cial aspects of migration in communities of origin. In this paper, I turn my attention to
this largely underexplored dimension of the dynamics of migration and provide evidence
that there exists a social cost associated with migration in origin communities: reduced
trust among the remaining population.
It is plausible that migration may affect how much neighbors trust each other since
out-migration simply reduces the pool of local residents whom one trusts. Or indirectly,
it is also likely that in-migration may lead to lower levels of trust through increased
population density and urbanisation, which is typically associated with greater anonymity
(Miguel et al., 2005). However, a rational-choice account of trust developed by Hardin
(2002) that requires two essential elements, knowledge to allow the truster to trust and
incentives of the trusted to fulfil the trust, suggests a more nuanced channel for the
potential impact of migration on trust among neighbors, namely, the incentives to invest
in social capital, which is the focus of the current paper.
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To explain, one can hypothesize that high migration rates in a neighborhood lowers
the incentive to get to know each other (which is a basic form of social capital invest-
ment), which will allow residents to learn the trustworthiness of their neighbors, due to
the short expected time period over which they would interact. This corresponds to the
first element in the rational choice account of trust that concerns the truster’s incentives.
Similarly, concerning the second element, the expected short-term nature of the relation-
ship may also reduce the incentives to be trustworthy when trusted by weakening the
threat of punishment or of developing bad reputations because such threats are based on
the expectation of on-going relationships. This incentive problem is critically described
by Hardin (2002):
The biggest and most pervasive problem for us in trusting others is not the
malign problem of dealing with cheaters but the relatively neutral problem of
often having to deal with people with whom I cannot expect to have ongoing
relationships in which to ground incentives for trustworthiness.
Moreover, there exists a strategic complementarity between the two elements. Individ-
uals may not attempt to get to know their neighbors and form opinions on their trustwor-
thiness in response to the low anticipated incentives of their neighbors to be trustworthy
in areas characterised by high out-migration (Sobel, 2002; Miguel et al., 2005). This in-
centive problem is based on the expected short-term nature of the relationship with one’s
neighbors, which arises primarily from out-migration than from in-migration. Therefore,
I mainly focus on the effects of out-migration in this paper.1
Trust shared among neighbors plays two key roles in developing countries. Firstly, it
has been shown that trust facilitates collective action in the absence of external enforce-
ment. Ostrom (1990) documents a wide range of empirical evidence that contrary to the
conventional collective action theory, individuals often cooperate to sustainably manage
local natural resources under some circumstances. One of the central characteristics of
the cases of successful cooperation is trust between involved parties, or the capability of
group members to gain a reputation for being trustworthy (Ostrom, 2000; Milinski et al.,
2002; Poteete et al., 2010). It is then likely that high out-migration may have negative
impacts on a community’s capacity for collective action by disrupting the formation of
trust among residents.
1The incentive problem may also arise in the context of high in-migration if migrants are ethnically
and linguistically distinct and therefore existing residents feel less inclined to socialise with the newcomers
(Alesina and La Ferrara, 2000; Miguel and Gugerty, 2005), thus affecting the first element of the rational
choice account of trust. However, I am not able to explicitly investigate the dynamic arising from racial
or linguistic diversity in my analysis as Mexico is relatively ethnically homogeneous with over 60 percent
of the population being Mestizo, around 30 percent indigenous. International migrants coming to Mexico
are also small in numbers under strict immigration laws in Mexico (Gonzalez-Murphy and Koslowski,
2011).
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Secondly, several studies document that local social capital provides access to credit
or informal risk-sharing mechanisms in the absence of formal insurance markets. For
example, Fafchamps and Lund (2003) provide evidence in the context of rural Philippines
that informal credit allows households to share risk within their social networks that
are formed and sustained by social capital. Udry (1990) shows that poor villagers in
Nigeria experience a dense network of loan exchanges with almost all of these loans
taking place between neighbors and relatives. Munshi and Rosenzweig (2009) argue that
the same process happens in India through the jati or subcaste networks. Therefore, it
is imperative that we understand what affects the level of trust or social capital shared
among neighbors, given its prominent effects on the welfare of households in developing
countries.
To estimate the causal effects of migration on trust, I combine the household level
trust measures from the Mexican Family Life Survey (MXFLS) with the aggregate mi-
gration rate at the municipality level in Mexico. Internal migration in Mexico has been a
common phenomenon since the mid-20th century and contributed to the rapid growth of
urban centers while bringing substantial changes in social and demographic composition
of both destination and source areas (Cohen et al., 2003). Thus it provides an ideal setting
to investigate the changes in trust with respect to internal migration flows. The panel
nature of the MXFLS makes it possible to control for time-invariant omitted variable
bias, thus overcoming some of the econometric limitations of the few existing studies on
the determinants of trust that include migration.2 However, even when unobserved house-
hold heterogeneity is effectively controlled for by the first-difference specification, there
still remain major identification concerns, namely, time-varying omitted variable bias and
reverse causality. To deal with these issues I use a set of ‘pull’ factors to destination mu-
nicipalities such as the revenue from the outsourcing industry known as Maquiladora and
extreme weather conditions, to predict migration inflows. Next, I assign these predicted
migration flows to likely source areas based on historical settlement patterns within the
country, which then becomes an instrument for out-migration flows. The process of con-
structing instruments is explained at length in Section 3.4.2. This empirical approach
allows me to address the core econometric concerns.
Based on the empirical strategy summarized above I find that residents in municipal-
ities with high out-migration rates were more likely to experience statistically significant
and negative changes in trust on their neighbors —people were more likely to adjust
their trust downward —if they lived in an area with high out-migration rates in the past
five years. The findings from exploring heterogeneity suggest the importance of social
networks in the way migration affects trust between individuals. The adverse impact of
2For instance, Alesina and La Ferrara (2002) and Glaeser et al. (2002) include mobility in their studies
on the determinants of trust or local social capital investment, however, they rely on cross-sectional
analysis.
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out-migration on trust appears to be mitigated in rural areas where pre-existing social
networks are dense. I further investigate other aspects of social capital apart from trust
(willingness to help and value sharing) in order to demonstrate that internal migration
significantly affects local social capital at large including trust among residents.
I strive to contribute to two different strands of literature. Firstly, the paper links to
the vast literature on the development implications of migration in source communities.
Existing research has investigated a wide range of outcomes including income, health,
human capital investment, and entrepreneurship. In terms of income and poverty, stud-
ies have shown mostly positive effects of migration through remittances on households
in sending communities (see Page and Adams (2003) for a review). A large number of
papers have also studied the effects of migration on human capital investment and found
ambiguous results. Some document that remittances relax credit constraints, thereby di-
rectly reducing barriers to schooling (Yang, 2008; Page and Adams, 2003). On the other
hand, higher expected wages of migrant jobs may undermine human capital accumulation
by encouraging early school drop-out (De Brauw and Giles, 2016; Gibson et al., 2011;
McKenzie and Rapoport, 2011). With regard to health outcomes, studies have found
largely positive effects of migration in origin areas such as lower infant mortality (Hilde-
brandt et al., 2005) or higher weight- and height-for age (Acosta et al., 2007). Surprisingly,
however, there has been a lack of attention to the social dimension of this dynamic phe-
nomenon.3 This paper complements the literature by focusing on this hitherto neglected
area of interest by providing empirical evidence that migration could entail a social cost
in origin communities in the form of reduced trust shared by neighbors.
Secondly, given the mounting evidence of the importance of trust among individuals,
my contribution here is in helping to understand what forms and affects trust.4 There
are studies that emphasize historical determinants of differences in trust such as religion,
and genetic and somatic similarities in the indigeneous population (Guiso et al., 2009),
climate variability (Durante, 2010) and historic events (Nunn and Wantchekon, 2011).
However, this paper directly complements studies that focus on non-historic and more
3A remotely related literature to the current paper may be the growing literature on the social
ramifications of international migration, namely, the transmission of values and norms across borders.
Bertoli and Marchetta (2016) find that Egyptian households where the husband is a returnee from a high-
fertility country (such as Arabic countries) tend to have a larger number of children than households
where the husband had no such cultural exposure. Lodigiani and Salomone (2012) provide evidence
that international migration increases female parliamentary representation in source countries when
migration is directed toward countries with a higher female political empowerment. Spilimbergo (2009)
shows that student migration toward democratic countries promotes democracy at home. Adding to this
growing literature, I find evidence that internal migration could also bring about social changes in origin
communities in the form of reduced trust shared by neighbors.
4Recent studies document the importance of trust; for economic development (Knack and Keefer,
1997; Fafchamps, 2006; Tabellini, 2010; Algan and Cahuc, 2010); for international trade (Greif, 1989;
Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales, 2007a); for political institutions (Putnam, 2000); for firm management
practices (Bloom, Sadun, and Van Reenen, 2008); for informal risk-sharing (Fafchamps and Lund, 2003,
Attanasio et al. 2012); for collective action (Bouma et al., 2008, Ostrom, 1990); for cooperative behavior
in the international arena (Carattini and Jo, 2018); and for firms’ complicance decisions (Jo, 2018).
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local determinants of interpersonal trust. Karlan et al. (2009), Binzel and Fehr (2013)
and Feigenberg et al. (2013) show the importance of dense social networks and frequent
interactions in fostering trust between individuals. Bellows and Miguel (2009) show that
violent experience such as war is negatively correlated with local social capital. At the
individual level, Alesina and La Ferrara (2002) and Glaeser et al. (2002) document a
set of factors that explain individuals’ social capital including income, education and
experience of discrimination.
The remaining part of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 3.2, I explain
the conceptual framework behind the analysis in more detail. Section 3.3 provides data
descriptions and Section 3.4 explains the empirical strategy with an emphasis on how
to construct the predicted migration flows for instruments. In section 3.5, I report the
estimates, discuss the findings, and explore heterogeneity. Secion 3.6 concludes.
3.2 Conceptual framework
The notion of trust that I investigate in this paper is taken from Hardin (2002)’s rational-
choice account of trust, which is the result of cognitive assessments of the trustworthiness
of the (potential) trusted and of the returns to being trustworthy when trusted. This is
different from the concept of generalized trust —the expectation that a random member of
an identifiable group is trustworthy (Guiso et al., 2009) —to which most of the economics
literature relates. Generalized trust constitutes a culture or norm in the sense that it
goes beyond one’s knowledge or incentives to be trustworthy (Guiso et al., 2015a). To
say one has high generalized trust or one lives in a society with high generalized trust
is to say that she is likely to trust someone with whom she is not necessarily familiar or
of whom she might not possess much prior knowledge. Thus what I investigate here is
trust that is relational in that it involves two parties, truster and trusted, and cognitive
as opposed to dispositional. Within this conceptual framework, the hypothesis I test is
whether migration adversely affects the assessment of trustworthiness of individuals (who
could be potentially trusted) in one’s community and lowers the incentive to fulfil the
trust once trusted.
Migration could negatively affect trust between individuals through lower investment
incentives in social capital. For example, if we plan to migrate or we anticipate that our
neighbors will move out of our neighborhood in the near future, we might not invest too
much time getting to know them, which will not allow us to assess their trustworthiness.
A study on the impact of homeownership on social capital investment by DiPasquale and
Glaeser (1999) illustrates this point. They find that renters, compared to homeowners,
tend not to invest in social capital since they will not stay long enough to gather the
returns from the investment. Renters are associated with fewer local organizations, less
likely to be involved in local politics and less likely to put effort in gardening, which
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is a local public good. They find evidence that a sizeable share of the estimated effect
of homeownership comes from their lower mobility rates. Glaeser et al. (2002) report
similar findings that an individual’s predicted mobility (based on age, marital status and
the number of children) is negatively associated with social capital investment.
It is also plausible that high out-migration rates in a neighborhood lowers the incentive
to be trustworthy when trusted by weakening the threat of punishment or of developing
bad reputations because such threats are based on the expectation of on-going relation-
ships. This conjecture is consistent with the insight from the repeated games literature
that asserts a cooperative equilibrium is sustainable in an uncooperative game when the
game is infinitely repeated and players discount the future sufficiently little (Maskin and
Fudenberg, 1986). Dal Bo´ (2005) specifically provides experimental evidence that the
prospect of future interactions significantly reduces opportunistic behavior and supports
cooperation. The fear of retaliation is also relatively low in an environment characterised
by high migration rates. A relevant example is provided by studies that investigate the
functioning of rotating savings and credit groups (known as Rosca). These informal fi-
nancial institutions are formed and administered on the basis of mutual trust, since those
who contribute money to the common fund today must have sufficiently high confidence
that other members will also contribute to the fund and they will be repaid in the fu-
ture.5 However, when the probability of migration is high among group members, the
informal social sanctioning mechanisms and trust that sustain the credit groups become
less effective and cooperation could easily unravel (Besley et al., 1993; Routledge and
Von Amsberg, 2003).
One important observation to make is that the two elements discussed above, knowl-
edge of the truster and the incentive of the trusted to be trustworthy, are complements.
Residents may not attempt get to know their neighbors and form opinions on their trust-
worthiness in anticipation of their neighbors’ low incentives to be trustworthy given the
expected short-term nature of their relationship. Or having no knowledge at all about
neighbors and consequently very weak interpersonal relationships in the neighborhood
do not allow the opportunity to assess whether it is profitable to be trustworthy since
it is likely that there is no trust placed on them in the first place. A similar observation
has been made by Sobel (2002) with regard to local organization memberships (which is
often a proxy for individuals’ social capital) who said, there needs to be clubs in order
for an individual to join one.
My analysis aims to subject this socioeconomic view on trust as a rational choice to
rigorous econometric investigation and to estimate the causal effects of migration on trust
among neighbors. I then further investigate the more detailed workings of the incentive
channel explained above by exploring potential mechanisms and heterogeneity of the
estimated effects.
5See Phillipe Callier (1990) for an economic interpretation of Roscas.
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3.3 Data description
To investigate the effects of migration on how much individuals trust each other, I combine
aggregate data on migration rates at the municipality level from the 2010 census with
household level trust beliefs data from the Mexican Family Life Survey.
3.3.1 Internal migration in Mexico between 2005 and 2010
The 2010 Mexican Population and Housing Census collected by the Mexican National
Statistics Institute (INEGI) contains rich information for 2.9 million households (10 per-
cent of the total population) on household assets, employment, food security, education
and health care among many other variables. Most importantly, it asked respondents to
report both their place of residence in 2005 and their current location in 2010. I use this
information to construct 5-year internal migration flows at the municipality level. That
is, I calculate the number of migrants leaving (arriving in) a municipality between 2005
and 2010 as a share of the existing population to obtain the out (in-) migration rate of
the municipality. Table 3.1 presents summary statistics for migration rates at the munic-
ipality level for 2404 municipalities for which both in- and out-migration rates could be
constructed.6 The mean out-migration is slightly lower than 4 percent whereas the mean
in-migration rate is around 4.5 percent. In my main analysis I do not consider interna-
tional migrants and focus on internal migration because the novelty of my identification
strategy is to exploit economic fluctuations in a domestic industry (the maquiladora sec-
tor in Mexico) as a main pull factor for internal migration flows as will be explained in
detail later. The analysis in this paper then provides a lower bound, given the preva-
lence of Mexican migration to the United States, for the effects of out-migration on trust
beliefs. However, when I include international migrants in the out-migration rate as a
sensitivity check the results are qualitatively similar.
[Figure 3.1]
Internal migration in Mexico has been a common phenomenon since the mid-20th
century and contributed to the rapid growth of urban centres while bringing substantial
changes in demographic composition of both destination and source areas (Cohen et al.,
2003). Thus it serves as an ideal setting to investigate the changes in trust with respect
to internal migration flows. Panel A and Panel B in Figure 3.1 graphically show the
6There are 2456 municipalities and 32 states in Mexico, however, the number of municipalities within
states varies substantially across states. For instance, the state of Oaxaca has 570 municipalities while
states such as Baja California and Baja California Sur has five municipalities. Thus, for some very small
municipalities, even census data does not provide reliable migration rates. Dropping those 52 municipal-
ities with either missing migration data or unreliable measures of migration rates yields population flows
for 2404 municipalities.
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internal in- and out-migration rates, respectively, at the municipality level. It is readily
observed from Panel A that municipalities along the northern border with the United
States have higher in-migration rates. On the other hand, out-migration rates seem to
be more evenly distributed across the country, but some urban centres or municipali-
ties with high in-migration rates also display high out-migration rates, which indicates
the popular pattern of urban-urban migration in Mexico (Villarreal and Hamilton, 2012).
[Table 3.1]
3.3.2 Trust
For trust data I turn to the last two waves of the Mexican Family Life Survey (MXFLS)
conducted in 2005 and 2009.7 The survey is a collaborative project managed by researchers
in Mexico and the United States and is designed to be nationally representative. Most
importantly for the purpose of the current study, the survey includes a set of questions,
trust being the main variable of interest, that reflect various aspects of social capital
at the community level. These questions are answered by household heads or someone
older than 18 who are knowledgeable about their own households (enough to answer
questions related to household economy).8 There are 7,483 households interviewed in both
waves but dropping 246 households that moved all together to a different municipality
yields 7,237 panel households in 165 municipalities. Additional 1,079 observations are
lost because of missing information on trust and other household characteristics. My
final reference sample for the baseline specification thus consists of 6,158 households in
152 municipalities. Table 3.1 shows summary statistics for trust and other household
characteristics for this sample.
The MXFLS elicits trust by asking the respondent to answer how much they agree
with the following statement “People from this locality/community are trustworthy”, for
which they can choose between “Completely Agree”, “Agree”, “Disagree” or “Completely
Disagree”. This question is slightly different from the classical trust question in several
popular surveys such as the World Values Survey and the European Social Survey that
has been extensively used to study the effects of trust. However, I argue that this dif-
7The survey started in 2001 and so far three waves have been conducted. However, only the last two
waves include questions related to neighborhood social capital including trust. The dataset is publicly
available at http://www.ennvih-mxfls.org/.
8The question being asked at the household level raises the concern of measurement error for it is then
possible that different respondents answered this question across the two waves and consequently the
change in trust simply reflects the change in respondents within the family. To the extent that the identity
of the respondents differed across years due to migration of the previous respondent, this measurement
error might be positively correlated with the municipality-level migration rate – the explanatory variable
of interest – which makes it endogenous. I explain my identification strategy that relies on instrumental
variables to deal with endogeneity concerns in Section 4.
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ference makes the question in the MXFLS more suitable for the purpose of the current
paper due to its wording and location. To explain, the classical question is the following:
“Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you can’t
be too careful in dealing with people?” While this question asks respondents how much
they trust most people, which could mean anyone from their family members to com-
plete strangers, the question in the MXFLS restricts the pool of people to those in their
neighborhoods, which arguably better reflects the component of local social capital. Fur-
thermore, the location of the trust question in the MXFLS is among a set of questions on
their neighborhoods, whereas the classical trust question in other surveys is asked along
with personal questions such as subjective well-being and happiness. Consequently, the
MXFLS provides a relatively clear measure for trust held by individuals as an aspect of
local social capital, rather than individual characteristics. This is an advantage of using
this dataset to study trust between individuals with respect to aggregate characteristics
(migration rates at the municipality level in this study) and to the best of my knowledge
the question on the impact of migration on trust has not yet been rigorously investigated.9
The MXFLS provides a valuable tool for investigating this question.
A number of papers have confirmed that survey-based trust measures are indeed cor-
related with trusting behavior. Fehr et al. (2003) show that survey questions of this type
do capture trust by running a series of experiments, and Fehr (2009) further demonstrates
that the survey measure of trust is strongly correlated with the behavioral measure of
trust derived from trust games.10 On the contrary, Glaeser et al. (2000) provide exper-
imental evidence that the survey question captures the trustworthiness of respondents
rather than trust; but, this conflicting finding has been reconciled by Sapienza et al.
(2013) who show that subjects in a homogeneous sample (such as Harvard undergradu-
ates as in Glaeser et al. (2000)) tend to extrapolate the trustworthiness of others based
on their own trustworthiness. However, in a large anonymous sample (such as random
individuals in Germany as in Fehr et al. (2003)) in which respondents are not extrapolat-
ing expected trustworthniess of others based own their own trustworthiness, the survey
question does seem to capture trust. Thus I believe the trust measure from the MXFLS is
appropriate for the purpose of my analysis that strives to investigate whether migration
9Individual mobility has been shown to be negatively associated with investment in social capital
(Glaeser, Laibson and Sacerdote, 2002 and DiPasquale and Glaeser, 1999). Alesina and La Ferrara
(2002) investigate various individual and community characteristics that influence trust beliefs in a
cross-sectional analysis and find a weak association between migration inflows and trust beliefs held by
existing residents.
10In a typical trust game used in the literature, subjects are paired and one member of the pair (the
sender) has the opportunity to send some amount of money to his or her partner (the recipient). The
experimenter doubles the amount that is sent. After the second player receives the transfer (i.e., twice
the amount sent), he or she may return money back to the first player. Here, the amount sent by the
“sender” becomes a natural measure of trust as the sender trusts the “recipient” to return a fair share
of the amount the recipient receives. Similarly, controlling for the amount sent, the amount returned is
a measure of trustworthiness.
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affects trusting behavior of individuals in origin areas.11
[Figure 3.2]
Figure 3.2 shows a negative correlation between trust in neighbors and out-migration
rate at the municipality level in 2009. Municipalities with high out-migration rates tend
to display lower levels of trust, which is consistent with the argument presented in Section
3.2. The correlation is statistically significant at 1 percent level. This casual inspection
provides suggestive evidence for the effect of out-migration on trust among neighbors,
which warrants a more rigorous investigation.
3.4 Identification strategy
3.4.1 First-difference specification
In this section I attempt to identify the effect of out-migration at the municipality level
on how much residents trust each other. The baseline specification is in first-differences
in order to account for unobservable household heterogeneity correlated with trust and
to exploit the panel nature of the dataset. Let ∆Trustijs be the change in trust beliefs
between 2005 and 2010 of a family i in municipality j, state s. Then I posit that ∆Trustijs
will be a function of the migration rates at the municipality j over the same time period
along with a vector of the changes in several household characteristics between 2005 and
2010, ∆Xijs and state-specific time trends Ks:
∆Trustijs = α + Γ
′∆Xijs + βOMjs,05−10 + δKs + ijs (3.1)
where OMjs,05−10 represents the out-migration rate from municipality j. In the Appendix
I also investigate the effects of the net- and in-migration rate, Njs,05−10, IMjs,05−10, to
investigate the differential impacts of population inflows and outflows. The first-difference
specification is particularly relevant when we consider that trust held by individuals at
one point is an equilibrium level reached by past experience, thus should be interpreted
as a stock variable. Thus the migration flows between 2005 and 2010 should affect the
change in the residents’ trust that took place over the same time period rather than
an equilibrium outcome observed at one point in time. This specification also accounts
for time-invariant municipality characteristics as the respondents were interviewed in the
same residence in both waves. I later also include time-varying municipality-level controls
11Studies that investigate the effect of trust on a variety of economic outcomes (cited in Footnote 4)
also typically rely on this kind of survey-based trust measures.
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as sensitivity checks.12
The vector of relevant households characteristics that can explain trust, ∆Xijs, include
the age and education of household head, household income, the presence of children
younger than 10 years old, household size and homeownership. Income and education
have been shown to positively affect trust in the literature (Alesina and La Ferrara,
2002). The children variable captures the idea that having to look after young children
significantly reduces the parents’ opportunities for social interaction and also that the
presence of children at home might make one feel more cautious about the security of
one’s neighborhood. Both scenarios may lead to lower trust beliefs towards people in the
neighborhoods. The homeownership variable is also included as it has been documented
to have strong effects on individuals’ social capital investment (DiPasquale and Glaeser,
1999).
Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level to correct for potential corre-
lation in shocks faced by households in the same municipality.13
3.4.2 Developing an instrument for migration rates
Two main threats to the above specification are potential time-varying omitted variable
bias and reverse causality. There might be time-varying factors that simultaneously affect
aggregate migration rates and trust held by residents such as improvements in infrastruc-
ture including road, bridges and telephone lines. This could render social interactions
more convenient and migration less costly through information flows and network build-
ing (e.g. Munshi 2003; Mckenzie and Rapoport 2007). In this case the estimates would be
driven upward. At the same time, it might be the changes in trust held by residents that
drove people out of their municipalities and thus explain migration flows, not the other
way around, if people choose to move to a different municipality based on how trusting
their neighbors are (for instance, people might be motivated to migrate when they sense
that people in their neighborhood do not trust each other). In this case the estimates are
downward biased. Thus the sign of the potential bias is uncertain. In order to deal with
these identification issues, I use an instrumental variable approach largely based on the
idea developed in Boustan et al. (2010).14
To develop instruments for out-migration, the standard economic model of migration
12I do not include these municipality-level controls in my baseline specifications as they reduce the
sample size substantially. However, as will be shown in robustness checks, my findings are robust to the
inclusion of these controls and the subsequent change in the sample size.
13Boustan, Fishback and Kantor (2010) weights their regression in such a way that each area con-
tributes equally to the estimation since they attempt to estimate the impact of mobility on a local labor
market. On the other hand, the goal of my analysis in this paper is to estimate the impact of mobility
on households’ incentive to invest in social capital and as such it is primarily disaggregate-level analysis,
thus I do not weight the regression.
14This idea of using predicted migration rates to instrument actual migration rates has been exploited
by several papers including Strobl and Valfort (2015) and Maystadt, Mueller and Sebastian (2015).
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with push and pull factors is employed. Prospective migrants from a source area j compare
the expected benefits of moving to new locations k with the costs of migration (Sjaastad,
1962). While negative economic shocks driving migrants out of source area j are clearly
endogenous with respect to the level of trust or social capital at large in that area,
positive economic conditions pulling migrants to destination area k (out of j ) are arguably
exogenous to trust beliefs held by residents in j. Therefore, local economic conditions in
areas that typically pull migrants out of source area j are natural instruments for out-
migration out of that city.
For local economic conditions, I use revenue from the outsourcing industry known as
Maquiladora in Mexico. A maquiladora is a manufacturing plant that imports certain
materials and equipment on a duty-free and tariff-free basis for assembly, processing, or
manufacturing and then exports the assembled, processed and/or manufactured products.
The demand for low-skilled labor in maquiladora operations has been a notable pull
factor for internal migration within Mexico in the past several decades (Villarreal and
Hamilton, 2012; Portes and Roberts, 2005). A strength of this approach is that the revenue
in the maquiladora sector provides a potentially more exogenous variation for internal
migration flows than other measures commonly used in the literature such as overall GDP
or employment growth rates in destination areas because the fluctuations in this industry
are determined outside of Mexico by foreign markets that these assembly plants serve
(Bergin et al., 2009). This feature makes it less likely that the labor demand shocks in
this sector were correlated with local social capital in Mexican communities. I rely on the
Economic Census 2004 and 2009 published by the Mexican National Statistics Institute
(INEGI) for municipality-level revenue data from the maquiladora sector use the change
in revenue between 2004 and 2009 to predict migration flows between 2005 and 2010.
Along with economic conditions, I also use extreme weather conditions and an indica-
tor for rural areas to further predict the migrant inflows (outflows) to destination areas
(from source areas) as in Boustan et al. (2010). Previous papers have also used temper-
ature variations to instrument migration flows in Mexico (e.g. Munshi, 2003) as well as
in other contexts (Feng et al., 2012; Gray and Mueller, 2012) and it is expected that
people are attracted to areas with favorable weather conditions and driven out of areas
with negative weather shocks. The weather data come from Cohen and Dechezlepreˆtre
(2015) where they match the centroid of each municipality with the nearest land-based
weather station. Extreme weather conditions are defined as the deviation (measured in
days) from the average number of days with temperature over 32 or below 10 degrees.15
The dummy variable for rural areas is meant to capture the idea of differential patterns
of migration between urban and rural areas.
The predicted migrant inflows for each destination area are then distributed over pos-
15The climate data is provided by the National Climatological Database of Mexico which is based on
around 5,500 operating and formerly operating land-based stations in Mexico.
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sible source areas using settlement patterns observed between 1995 and 2000 constructed
based on the 2000 Mexican Population and Housing Census. By using settlement patterns
observed 10 years ago I assume that they are a reasonable predictor of future settlement
patterns (Theoharides, 2017; Munshi, 2003).16 I avoid using the actual settlement pat-
terns between 2005 and 2010 as it may be correlated with time-varying unmeasured
municipality characteristics (Boustan et al., 2010).
The maintained identifying assumption is that the variables used to predict in-migration
to destination areas are uncorrelated with unobserved characteristics related to trust be-
liefs held by residents in source areas. The main threat comes from the possibility of
spatial correlation. In this regard, I argue that the revenue in the maquiladora industry
in destination areas provides a plausibly exogenous variation (with respect to the level
of trust shared in communities of origin) given the geographical disconnect that involves
international borders between where the variation is generated (outside of Mexico) and
where the outcome of interest is observed (local Mexican communities). Still, the above
identifying assumption can be violated, given that weather fluctuations are likely to af-
fect neighboring municiaplities simultanesouly and many internal migrants relocate over
short distances. 48.3 percent of cross-municipality moves between 2005 and 2010 in my
sample took place within the same state. Therefore, following Boustan et al. (2010) I
construct my instrument using predicted migrant inflows from source areas outside of the
destination area’s own state in order to minimize the possibility of spatially correlated
shocks. Later I also try to exclude migrants who moved out of one’s own state but moved
to municipalities within 100km or 200km from the borders as sensitivity checks.
3.4.3 Constructing the instruments
The procedure to create the instruments for out-migration rates is as follows. For the
instrument for out-migration rates, I predict in-migration rates to destination municipal-
ities indexed by j, using local economic conditions along with weather shocks and a rural
indicator. These rates are used to calculate a predicted inflow into each destination area
j, out of source area k’s state. Then I use internal migration patterns observed between
1995 and 2000 to estimate the probability that migrants arriving in destination area j
16An alternative to using historical settlement patterns is to use geographical proximity between mu-
nicipalities to predict migrants’ destination choices and possible source areas as in Strobl and Valfort
(2015) and Boustan, Fishback and Kantor (2010). However, geographical proximity does not produce
strong predictions for actual settlement pattern in my data probably because of the substantially larger
sample size. Strobl and Valfort (2015) with 56 districts and Boustan et al. (2010) with 117 cities, find that
the distance between these areas strongly predict the actual settlement pattern (migrants are likely to
relocate to an area closer to their original area); however, the 2401 municipalities in Mexico are relatively
closer to one another than those districts or cities are in the aforementioned papers. Consequently, it is
likely to be much more difficult to predict settlement pattern solely based on the distance. This is also
consistent with Villarreal and Hamilton (2012) where the authors document the increasingly popular
urban-urban migration and migrants originating from urban areas tend to travel longer distances. In
other words, these migrants do not choose their destinations based on physical distance.
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come from source area k. The total predicted migrant outflow from each source munic-
ipality k is then the sum of these pair-wise predictions across all possible destination
areas. This predicted migrant flow becomes my instrument for the actual out-migration
rate.17
To explain in detail, the in-migration rate IMj,05−10 to destination area j is a function
of a vector of the changes in local economic and weather conditions (∆Zj):
IMj,05−10 = α + Φ′∆Zj + µj (3.2)
where Zj includes the change in revenues from the maquiladora industry between 2005
and 2010 and the number of days between 2005 and 2010 with extreme temperatures
(over 32 and below 10 degrees Celsius) and a rural indicator. I estimate the parameters of
equation (2) from a single equation where each observation is a destination municipality.
The predicted flow of migrants coming to municipality j is the product of the predicted
in-migration rate for j and the population of the area in 2005:
IMj = IMj,05−10 × Populationj,05 (3.3)
Then I use the settlement pattern observed between 1995 and 2000 to predict the
source municipalities of the migrants who come to municipality j, where Pjk is the prob-
ability that migrants coming to j have come from source municipality k. The instrument
for out-migration from municipality k is then the sum over all areas (j 6= k) of the
predicted number of migrants who are assumed to originate from municipality k (6= j).
Migrants who are expected to come from municipalities in the destination j’s own state
are excluded in order to minimise the concern for spatial correlation.
Mk =
∑
j 6=k
IMj × Pjk (3.4)
Finally, the instrument for out-migration rate in municipality k divides the predicted
outflow by the population of that area in 2005.18
[Table 3.2]
17It has been shown (Wooldridge 2002) that standard two-stage least squares inference is valid when
instruments are functions of estimated parameters. The idea is that estimated instruments simply add
noice to the first-stage regression, which should not affect the inference in the second stage.
18The instrument for the in-migration rate to municipality j is constructed in a similar way. First, I
estimate the out-migration from each source municipality as a function of local push factors including
economic and weather conditions. Then the predicted rate is converted to a predicted migration outflow
by multiplying by the population in 2005. Again, using the settlement pattern observed ten years ago I
distribute out-migrants over possible destination municipalities in order to have the predicted number of
out-migrants moving from area k to area j. Finally, summing these predicted inflows across all possible
source municipalities yields the predicted migration inflows, which are then converted into a predicted
in-migration rate for destination area j by dividing by the population of the area. I use this instrument
in the Appendix where I explore the effects of in-migration on trust among neighbors.
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Table 3.2 presents the results from the regressions that predict in and out-migration
rates based on local push and pull factors. As expected, an increase in the revenue from
the maquiladora sector appears to be a strong pull factor for migrants, increasing the in-
migration rate by 0.06 percentage points for every one billion peso increase in the revenue.
Rural areas experienced substantially lower in- and out-migration, which emphasizes
the popular urban-urban migration pattern. Extreme weather conditions, both cold and
hot days, do not have a significant impact on in-migrations, whereas they appear to be
strong push factors that lead to higher out-migration flows. This finding is consistent
with existing empirical evidence for the weather-induced migration (Feng et al., 2012;
Gray and Mueller, 2012). One surprising finding is that an increase in the revenue from
the maquiladora industry, a local pull factor, also induces more out-migration, although
the magnitude is much smaller (0.03 percentage points for every one billion peso increase
in the revenue). This could be the case if the boom in the maquiladora industry brings
about overall economic liveliness, which often times accompanies inflation. This may lead
to more out-migration of less well-to-do families in particular because of rising housing
prices and other living costs. Alternatively, better economic conditions brought about
by the maquiladora industry might have induced individuals to migrate by relaxing the
liquidity constraints faced by households and consequently allowing them to finance the
initial cost that migration often entails (Angelucci, 2015). Overall, I find that the revenue
increase in the maquiladora industry and extreme weather conditions are strong pull and
push factors, respectively, for internal migration.
3.5 Trust and migration
3.5.1 The impact of migration on trust
Having developed instruments, I then attempt to investigate the causal effects of out-
migration on trust among residents. Table 3.3 presents the coefficients from the baseline
first-difference specification, equation (1), and the corresponding IV specification.19 The
baseline results in column 1 indicate that out-migration is negatively correlated with the
changes in trust. This finding is consistent with the hypothesis that out-migration reduces
the incentives for social capital investment that leads to trust among residents since out-
migration of their neighbors (both actual and anticipated based on the municipality-level
migration rate) effectively lowers the expected returns from mutual trust over future time
periods.
19Throughout the paper, the goodness of fit of the models is small as a substantial amount of variation
is already differenced out according to the first-difference specification.
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[Table 3.3]
Column 2 reports IV estimates controlling for household level variables along with
state fixed effects. The first-stage result of the IV estimation is presented in column 3.
The first-stage regression contains the full set of state dummies and exogenous variables
included in the second stage. My preferred instrument excludes migrants who are expected
to relocate within the same state in order to minimize spatial correlations of unmeasured
socioeconomic shocks. The predicted migration rate is a strong predictor of the actual
migration rate with the F -statistics around 34. The results from the IV specification
remain qualitatively the same, highlighting the detrimental impact of out-migration on
trust beliefs held by remaining residents. I also find a strong and negative relationship
between the instrument and the change in trust beliefs in the reduced-form regression.
This correlation (column 4) is consistent with the first and second stage IV estimation and
provides further evidence for the social cost of internal migration in terms of diminished
trust among remaining residents.
I find the IV coefficient is more negative than OLS, suggesting that the time-varying
unobserved bias that simultaneously affects migration and trust dominates the concern
of reverse causality. Given the direction of the bias (upward) I infer that the source
of omitted variable bias affects both trust and migration positively. In section 3.4.2, I
discussed that improvements in infrastructure including road, bridges and telephone lines
could be one such source because they could render social interactions more convenient
and migration less costly through information flows and network building (e.g. Munshi
2003; Mckenzie and Rapoport 2007). From the community-level survey included in the
MXFLS, I do find some evidence for this line of reasoning. The 2009 survey shows that
out of 126 municipalities, 81 municipalities have experienced improvements in highways
and roads and 46 communities had telephone line constructions in the past four years.
Not only are the negative coefficient estimates of Table 3.3 statistically significant, but
they are also economically meaningful. I assess the magnitude of the out-migration rate
coefficient by comparing its explanatory power against other variables in the regression.
To do this, I compare the out-migration rate variable with all other explanatory variables
in the estimating equation (Nunn and Wantchekon, 2011). Using the estimates from col-
umn 1 of Table 3.3, and performing a standard decomposition of goodness of fit exercise,
I find that out-migration accounts for around 7.8 percent of the variation explained by
the set of included covariate where the variation is what remains after controlling for
household fixed effects (by the first-difference specification).
It is constructive to think about how to interpret the IV estimates of the local average
treatment effects in this context. The IV estimates capture the effects of migration of
individuals who respond to low-skilled labor demand shocks along with extreme weather
conditions. These predicted migrants may be different from the average migrants in terms
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of education or job-related skills and it is plausible to think that they are likely to be
low-skilled and less educated based on the shock to which they respond. Thus the IV
estimates suggest the local average treatment effect of migration of less-educated and
low-skilled migrants on how much residents trust each other.
3.5.2 Robustness checks
As robustness checks, I exclude migrants who moved to municipalities out of their own
states but within 100km or 200km from the state border to further reduce the concern
of spatially correlated shocks. Column 1 and 2 in Table 3.4 present the results with
100km cut-off and with 200km cut-off, respectively. The instruments are still strong and
the results remain qualitatively similar, although with the 200km cut-off the coefficient
on out-migration becomes marginally insignificant (with p-value 0.1). Column 3 and 4
reports the reduced-form coefficients of these instruments.
I further test the sensitivity of my results by including a number of observable
municipality-level controls that may affect the level of trust shared by neighbors. The
data comes from the State and Municipality Database System (SIMBAD) by the Mexican
National Statistics Institute (INEGI). I control for the change in educational attainment
of the population measured by the average completed grade, criminal activities measured
by the number of registered and sentenced offences, and public expenditure of the munic-
ipality government. The specification reduces the number of municipalities to 129 since
not all variables are available for all municipalities, but the coefficient on out-migration
remains robust to the inclusion of these controls (column 5). I further include the number
of water supply sources and of electric power services as proxies for urbanization in case
it may affect the way people interact at a more substantial loss of observations, but find
similar results (column 6).
So far, international migrants have been excluded in my analysis for I rely on the fluc-
tuations in the revenue from a domestic industry (maquiladora) as the main economic
pull factor for internal migration. The instrument then fails to provide meaningful varia-
tion for international out-migration flows. However, given the prominence of international
migration in Mexico (the out-migration rate that accounts for international migrants in-
creases to 4.9 percent compared to 3.8 percent of that without international migrants),
I account for international migrants as another robustness check. Column 7 reports the
first-difference specification with the out-migration rate variable that now incorporates
international out-migrants. The results are qualitatively similar to the findings in the
main analysis. To address endogeneity, I construct an alternative instrument, namely,
historical migration rates at the municipality level between 1995 and 2000 that can also
predict international migration flows as in several previous studies (e.g. McKenzie and
Rapoport, 2011; Woodruff and Zenteno, 2007). The identifying assumption is then that
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municipality-level migration rates observed 10 years ago do not affect how much people
trust one another over a 10-year period, apart from their influence through migration
rates between 2005 and 2010. A common concern associated with this approach is that
municipalities with historically high out-migration rates are systematically different from
those with low out-migration rates (Theoharides, 2017). However, such time-invariant
municipality unobservables are already controlled for in the baseline first-difference spec-
ification, mitigating this concern to some extent in my context.20 Column 8 reports the
IV estimate from the regression that uses this historical migration rate instrument. The
first stage is strong with F -statistics well above conventional thresholds and the results
remain consistent with the findings in the main analysis. In case time-varying factors
are biasing the estimate, I also try to include six municipality-level controls added in
column 6 and find that the estimate is robust to these additional time-varying factors (a
coefficient (standard error) of -5.48 (2.168)).
[Table 3.4]
3.5.3 Social relations and interactions as a mechanism
The conceptual framework discussed in Section 3.2 suggests that migration may nega-
tively affect trust shared by the remaining population by lowering one’s incentive to invest
in social capital. This encompasses both elements of trust: knowledge to allow the truster
to trust and incentives to be trustworthy when trusted. I investigate this mechanism by
explicitly exploring the changes in social relations or interactions with respect to the rate
of out-migration in communities of origin.
The MXFLS provides measures that reflect the strength (or frequency) of social re-
lations and interactions at the community level by asking the following questions: “How
often do people from your community do favors to each other?”, “When a neighbor is
away, how often do you or your neighbors watch his/her house?”, “How often do you and
other people from your community ask for advice to each other about things like raising
your children or getting a new job?”, “How often do people from your community have
parties in which you invite other people from the community?”, and “How often do you
20This raises the question of whether it would be simpler to use this historical migration rate instrument
in the main analysis. However, the 10-year gap between the historical and current migration rates here
is much shorter than 70- and 90-year gap imposed in McKenzie and Rapoport (2011) and Woodruff
and Zenteno (2007), respectively, and thus likely to be more vulnerable to the concern of time-varying
factors affecting migration patterns in 2000 and trust in 2009 simultaneously. Unfortunately, 2000 was
the first year in which the Mexican Population and Housing Census asked residents of their origin
municipalities (only the question of their origin states was asked before then), so it is not possible to
construct municipality-level migration rates before 2000. Thus I do not rely on this instrument in my main
analysis and in this additional specification I tried including a large set of time-varying municipality-level
controls to address this concern to some extent.
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and other people from your community gather in each other’s houses or on the street?”.
Respondents answer the questions by choosing from “Never”, “Rarely”, “Frequently” or
“Always”. I include the same set of exogenous controls and instruments used in the main
specification.
In the data, I find evidence for the mechanism put forward so far. People who live
in municipalities with high out-migration rates in the past five years appear to be less
favorable to each other (column 2) and spend less time socializing (column 5). Although
not always significant, the coefficients on the migration rate are negative across all the
dependent variables. This result provides suggestive evidence for the investment channel
behind the estimated relationship between trust and migration in communities of origin.
[Table 3.5]
3.5.4 Exploring heterogeneity
Up to this point, I have argued and presented evidence that migration affects trust
through lower investment incentives in social capital. Another possibility is that the
negative impact of out-migration on trust is simply driven by the loss of direct contact;
in other words, people might reduce their trust on neighbors simply because people whom
they used to trust have migrated. This effect is supposed to be stronger in rural areas
as people have denser social networks than in urban areas (Angelucci et al., 2009) and
subsequently the probability that high out-migration rates mean a loss of friends and
neighbors is higher. Thus it is of interest whether the effects of migration were larger in
rural areas since the difference would be indicative of the extent to which the negative
impact is driven by the loss of contact.
In column 1 of Table 3.6, I show the same first-difference estimate from the entire sam-
ple reported in Table 3.3 for ease of comparison. When I restrict my sample to households
in urban areas I still find a statistically significant impact of out-migration on trust (col-
umn 2). The IV estimate corroborates the result from the baseline specification (column
3). On the other hand, the effect disappears once the sample is restricted to households
in rural areas (column 4). When instrumented with the predicted out-migration rate in
column 5, the estimate becomes negative, but is still noisy with large standard errors.
One potential reason is that there might not be enough variation in out-migration rates
across rural areas, given the substantially lower out-migration rates in rural Mexico (0.036
percent in rural as opposed to 0.062 percent in urban areas). I have observed this pattern
in Table 3.2 that shows a negative and statistically significant coefficient on the rural
indicator for both out- and in-migration rate. Also, the weak first stage (with F -statistics
just over 4) raises the question of the validity of my instrument for rural areas. It is pos-
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sible that the instrument does not work well for rural areas since the instrument excludes
migrants who move within their own states and that rural migrants tend to migrate over
shorter distances than urban migrants do (Villarreal and Hamilton, 2012). I have tried an
alternative specification of the instrument that does not exclude within-state migrants,
but the first-stage F -statistics improves only slightly with no significant change in the
estimated coefficient (not reported). Alternatively, I also try the historical migration rate
instrument used in one of the robustness checks in Section 3.5.2 (in column 8 in Table
3.4). The first stage improves to around 10, but the estimate yields a qualitatively similar
interpretation that the effect of out-migration on trust is larger for urban households,
which provides evidence against the alternative hypothesis that the estimated effects
hinge on losing direct contact.
It is noteworthy that the estimated effects of migration on trust appear to be missing
in rural areas suggesting that the investment channel is also weaker. One explanation
is that the threat of social sanctions for not fulfilling the trust is stronger when social
networks are dense (Miguel and Gugerty, 2005; Hoff et al., 2011; Zak and Knack, 2001;
Granovetter, 1985). Reputations also spread quickly within tight-knit groups, allowing
for more effective sanctions against those who break norms. Consequently, the likelihood
of opportunism (of not returning the trust of someone when given it) in anticipation of
a short-term relationship is likely to be lower in rural areas, due to the strong threat
of punishment from the common social network that remains even in the event of the
truster’s migration (Lyon, 2000; Granovetter, 1985). Thus the embeddedness of residents
might serve to weaken the incentive channel put forward so far that appears to drive the
findings. Descriptive statistics on social relations and interactions (explored in Section
3.5.3) in urban and rural areas in Table C.1 supports this line of reasoning. Households in
rural areas tend to do each other favors more often, provide support/advice more often,
and spend more time socializing with their neighbors, which suggests a deeper level of
social embeddedness in those areas than in urban areas (with the difference in means
across the two groups significant at 1 percent level in all five variables).
[Table 3.6]
3.5.5 Other aspects of local social capital
I further investigate whether migration had similarly affected other measures of social
capital apart from trust. The MXFLS allows this further investigation as it asked respon-
dents additional questions regarding their neighborhoods, namely, whether people around
here are willing to help their neighbors and whether people from this neighborhood share
the same values. Again, respondents chose between “Completely Agree”, “Agree”, “Dis-
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agree” or “Completely Disagree” for the above questions.21 Table 3.7 reports the results
from the preferred IV specification with predicted out-of-state migration flows as instru-
ments for each of these additional measures of local social capital. The regressions include
baseline household level controls and the full set of state dummies.
[Table 3.7]
The out-migration variable is negative in all specifications and the negative effects
are strongly significant on people’s willingness to help neighbors and on the extent to
which neighbors share the same values. Moreover, I create an all-encompassing measure
of local social capital to find further evidence for the effects of migration on social capital
(part of which is trust belief) by using the principal component analysis (PCA) to create
an index based on the three questions used so far (trust, willingness to help and value
sharing). The approach is meant to extract the primary components that underlie all the
variables included in the analysis. The estimate suggests qualitatively identical results
compared to the previous specifications that suggests negative and strongly significant
effects of out-migration on social capital among the remaining population (column 3).
Again, reduced-form equations (panel 2) provide further evidence for strong causal effects
of mobility on local social capital. Table C.2 reports the results from split samples on
rural and urban households for each of the outcome variables. The exercise also reveals
that the estimated negative effects are much more pronounced in urban areas and adds
support to the investment incentive channel.
3.6 Conclusion
This paper contributes to the growing literature that attempts to understand the de-
terminants of trust by investigating the impact of internal migration on trust between
individuals. By doing so, I provide rigorous empirical evidence for the potential social
cost of migration —diminished trust among residents as a result of high out-migration
—although migration has been commonly associated with mostly positive economic con-
sequences in the relevant literature.
To establish causality, I exploit the panel nature of the data by using a first-difference
specification and employ the instrumental variable strategy based on the classic economic
model of migration with push and pull factors. While migration flows in an area might
be correlated with the level of trust in that area, the destinations of migrants or more
21One might wonder to what extent respondents always provide the same answer to these related
questions in the same section of the survey. As expected, these measures of social capital are positively
correlated; however, the correlation coefficients between these measures fall in the range of 0.40-0.59,
which is characterized as “moderate” (Evans, 1996).
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specifically, attractions of the potential destinations that pull migrants out of the area
are arguably exogenous to the changes in trust in the origin area. Based on this insight, I
use revenues from the foreign markets and extreme weather conditions as push and pull
factors to instrument for actual migration flows in the IV estimation. The IV estimates
confirm the findings from the first-difference specification and suggest a significant and
negative impact of migration outflows on trust among residents.
I then explore potential mechanisms by explicitly exploring the changes in social
relations or interactions with respect to the rate of out-migration in communities of origin.
If migration affects trust shared by the remaining population by lowering investment
incentives in social capital, I would expect to find negative impacts of migration on social
relations and interactions. I do find support for this channel in the data.
The exercise on the heterogeneity across urban and rural areas provides more detailed
understandings on the mechanism through which migration affects trust in communities
of origin. Another potential channel apart from investment incentives in social capital
is through the out-migration of friends and relatives whom one used to trust when the
migration rate is high in one’s community. The estimated relationship is then expected to
be higher in rural areas with dense social networks. However, I do not find support for this
alternative hypothesis. Instead, I find that the adverse impact of out-migration on trust
appears to be mitigated in rural areas. I believe that the likelihood of opportunism (of not
returning the trust of someone when given it) in anticipation of a short-term relationship
is lower in rural areas when the pre-existing social networks are dense and remain even in
the event of some members’ migration. Further, the information of cheating or abusing
trust spreads more quickly within dense social networks.
This paper focuses on establishing the causal link between internal migration and how
much individuals trust each other. Given the findings, I believe it would be imperative to
understand the multifaceted consequences of migration flows at origin areas and therefore
in promoting sustainable development supported by strong social capital in developing
countries.
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Figures and Tables
Figure 3.1: Migration rate at the municipality level, 2005-2010
Note: Panel A and B visually show in- and out-migration rate over 2005-2010, respectively. The rates
represent the number of migrants arriving in or leaving a municipality between 2005 and 2010 as a share
of existing population in that municipality and are constructed based on the Mexican Population and
Housing Census 2010.
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Figure 3.2: Correlation between trust and out-migration rate at the municipality level
Note: the graph plots the relationship between trust and out-migration rate at the municipality level
in 2009. Data on trust in neighbors comes from the MXFLS. Out-migration rate over 2005-2010 is
constructed based on the Mexican Population and Housing Census 2010.
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Table 3.1: Summary statistics
Mean SD
Household level variables:
2005
Age of household head 49.5 15.8
Education of household head 3.6 2.03
Children below age 10 0.5 0.5
Household income (unit: $ 10,000 US ) 0.42 0.50
Household size 4.676 2.315
Homeownership 0.831 0.375
Trust 2.9 0.6
Willingness to help 2.8 0.6
Value sharing 2.6 0.7
2009
Age of household head 52.6 15.5
Education of household head 3.6 2.1
Children below age 10 0.5 0.5
Household income 0.38 0.52
Household size 5.242 2.696
Homeownership 0.827 0.378
Trust 2.9 0.7
Willingness to help 2.8 0.8
Value sharing 2.7 0.8
Municipality level variables (2005-2010):
Key covariates:
Out-migration rate 0.038 0.029
In-migration rate 0.045 0.043
Instruments (predicted rates):
Out-migration, all 0.017 0.020
In-migration, all 0.035 0.044
Out-migration, out of state 0.005 0.011
In-migration, out of state 0.015 0.028
NOTE: Trust is the answer to the following statement: “People from
this locality/community are trustworthy.” Unity is the answer to the
following statement: “the neighborhood is united and really close”.
Willingess to Help is the answer to the following statement: “people
around here are willing to help their neighbors”.Value Sharing is the
answer to the following statement: “people from this neighborhood
share the same values”
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Table 3.2: Determinants of in- and out migration at the municipality level, 2005-2010
Dependent Variable
Determinants In-migration rate Out-migration rate
Change in the revenue 0.0577** 0.0316**
from the maquiladora industry (0.0239) (0.0154)
Rural areas -0.0109*** -0.00763***
(0.00202) (0.00132)
Days over 32 degrees 0.000006 0.00008*
(0.000006) (0.000004)
Days below 10 degrees 0.00003 0.00009**
(0.000006) (0.000004)
Observations 2,142 2,110
NOTE: In- and out-migration rates are migration inflows and outflows over the
period 2005 and 2010 divided by the population in 2005, respectively and are
based on the Mexican Population and Housing Census 2010. The data on the
change in the revenue from the Maquila industry come from the Economic Cen-
sus 2004 and 2009. Days over 32 degrees and below 10 degrees are deviation from
the historical mean number of those days. Standard errors are in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 3.3: The effect of out-migration on trust: Mexico, 2005-2010
(1) (2) (3) (4)
FD FD-IV First Stage Reduced-form
Out-migration rate -1.117** -1.882**
(0.487) (0.914)
Predicted out-migration rate 1.169*** -2.200**
(0.199) (0.912)
Exogenous controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
State fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of municipalities 152 152 152 152
First-stage F -statistics 34.43
Observations 6,158 6,158 6,158 6,158
R-squared 0.011 0.010 0.486 0.011
NOTE: Each regression includes state fixed effects. Regression in (1) is run in first-
difference specification shown in equation (1) while regression (2) is in the corresponding
IV specification. The dependent variable Trust is the answer to the following statement:
“People from this locality/community are trustworthy.” The regression in (4) is in the
reduced-form. (3) reports the first stage of the IV estimation shown in (2). Standard er-
rors are in parentheses and clustered at the municipality level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1
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Table 3.4: Robustness checks: the effect of out-migration on trust
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
FD-IV FD-IV FD FD FD-IV FD-IV FD FD-IV
Out-migration rate -1.329* -1.205 -3.918** -5.350* -0.965* -2.277***
(0.759) (0.736) (1.999) (3.238) (0.563) (0.876)
Out-migration rate, instrument -1.913* -1.906*
(1.018) (1.094)
Exogenous controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
First-stage F -statistics 53.60 47.80 12.52 11.18 67.83
Number of municipalities 152 152 152 152 129 82
Observations 6,158 6,158 6,158 6,158 5,646 3,270 6,158 5,974
R-squared 0.011 0.011 0.010 0.010 0.012 0.009 0.010 0.011
NOTE: Each regression includes state fixed effects. Trust is the answer to the following statement: “People from this lo-
cality/community are trustworthy.” The instrument used in column 1 excludes migrants who are expected to relocate out
of their own states but within 100 km from the state border. Similarly, the instrument used in column 2 excludes migrants
who are expected to relocate out of their own states but within 200 km from the state border. Column 3 and 4 report
reduced form regressions that correspond to specification in column 1 and 2, respectively. Column 5 includes the follow-
ing municipality-level controls: the average completed grade of the population, criminal activities, public expenditure of
the municipal government. Column 6 further includes proxies for urbanisation: the number of water supply sources and
of electric power services. The regression in column 7 includes international migrants in out-migration rates. Column 8
reports the IV estimate of the effect of out-migration including international migrants using the historical migration rate
instrument. Standard errors are in parentheses and clustered at the municipality level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3.5: Mechanism: the effect of out-migration on social relations and interactions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
FD-IV FD-IV FD-IV FD-IV FD-IV
Out-migration rate -1.799 -2.499** -1.285 -1.934** -1.068
(1.186) (1.170) (0.893) (0.938) (1.091)
Exogenous controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
First-stage F -statistics 34.89 34.79 35.26 34.89 35.20
Number of municipalities 154 154 154 154 154
Observations 6,285 6,305 6,269 6,304 6,320
R-squared 0.009 0.016 0.009 0.006 0.007
NOTE: Each regression includes state fixed effects. The dependent variable in re-
gression (1): “How often do people from your community do favors to each other?”,
(2): “When a neighbor is away, how often do you or your neighbors watch his/her
house?”, (3): “How often do you and other people from your community ask for ad-
vice to each other about things like raising your children or getting a new job?”, (4):
“How often do people from your community have parties in which you invite other
people from the community?”, and (5): “How often do you and other people from
your community gather in each other’s houses or on the street?”. Respondents an-
swer the questions by choosing from “Never”, “Rarely”, “Frequently” or “Always”.
Higher values correspond to higher frequency. Standard errors are in parentheses
and clustered at the municipality level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3.6: Heterogeneity: the effect of migration on trust
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All sample Urban areas Rural areas
FD FD FD-IV FD FD-IV FD-IV
Out-migration rate -1.117** -1.496** -2.298** 0.620 -2.117 -1.179
(0.487) (0.648) (1.118) (1.300) (4.711) (3.020)
Exogenous controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
First-stage F -statistics 52.99 4.17 10.52
Number of municipalities 152 101 101 73 73 69
Observations 6,158 3,265 3,265 2,893 2,893 2,761
R-squared 0.011 0.014 0.013 0.026 0.023 0.028
NOTE: Each regression includes state fixed effects. The dependent variable Trust is the answer
to the following statement: “People from this locality/community are trustworthy.” Column 3
and 5 use the predicted out-migration rate as an instrument. Column 6 uses the historical migra-
tion rate between 1995 and 2000 as an alternative instrument. Standard errors are in parentheses
and clustered at the municipality level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 3.7: The effect of out-migration on other measures of social capital
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent Variable Willingness Value
Index
to Help Sharing
Panel 1 First-difference IV
Out-migration rate -2.502*** -2.793*** -4.929**
(0.872) (1.062) (1.965)
Panel 2 Reduced-form
Predicted out-migration rate -2.948*** -3.277*** -5.753***
(0.924) (1.139) (1.964)
Exogenous controls Yes Yes Yes
State fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
First-stage F -statistics 34.76 34.50 33.41
Number of municipalities 154 153 151
Observations 6,204 5,837 5,681
NOTE: Willingess to Help is the answer to the following statement: “peo-
ple around here are willing to help their neighbors”.Value Sharing is the
answer to the following statement: “people from this neighborhood share
the same values”. Index is created based on the four social capital mea-
sures, trust, unity, willingness to help and value sharing. Standard errors
are in parentheses and clustered at the municipality level. *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Appendix A
Appendix to Chapter 1
A.1 Alternative trust measures
The General Social Survey (GSS) provides data on immigrants’ trust by the following
question: “Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that
you need to be very careful in dealing with people?” and respondents answer the question
by choosing one of the following options, “Most people can be trusted”, “Can’t be too
careful,” and “Depends.” In the main text, we worked with a binary trust variable we
constructed based on the answers, which takes 1 if the respondent answered that most
people can be trusted and takes 0 if the answer was either of the other two options.
In this section we try alternative specifications to demonstrate that our results are not
driven by our specification of the trust measure. We try three different approaches. First,
we drop those who answered “Depends”. Second, we group together those who answered
“Most people can be trusted” or “Depends” and give them one, while those who answered
“Can’t be too careful” are assigned zero. Third, we try an ordinal measure that takes 3
for those who chose “Most people can be trusted”, 2 for those who chose “Depends” and
1 for those who chose “Can’t be too careful”.
Table 1.12 reports the effects of inherited trust on the level of CO2 emissions per
capita when we use these alternative trust measures. For all specifications, the estimated
effect of inherited trust is statistically significant. The magnitude of the coefficients are
highly comparable with the one reported in the main section.
A.2 Correlation between inherited trust and contem-
poraneous trust: alternative interpretations
In section 2.4.2.2 in the main text, we discussed the possibility of convergence in trust
attitudes of US immigrants as an alternative interpretation of time variation in inherited
trust we observe. Table 1.3 provides evidence against this interpretation by showing that
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there are statistically significant differences in inherited trust across countries of origin
for immigrants in cohort 1950, which should have not been the case had there been a
convergence in attitudes. Here we provide further evidence against this interpretation by
decomposing each cohort by generations of immigrants. If there had been strong con-
vergence, it should have been most pronounced among the fourth-generation immigrants
given the time they spent in the host country.
We run the same regression that we estimate for Table 1.5 but on decomposed samples.
Table A.4 report the results. The dependent variables in (1) and (2) are the level of trust
inherited by second-, third-generation immigrants in cohort 2010 and fourth-generation
immigrants in cohort 2010, respectively. The dependent variables in (3) and (4) are the
level of trust inherited by second-, third-generation immigrants in cohort 1950 and fourth-
generation immigrants in cohort 1950, respectively. Trust in source country is the average
level of trust in the country of origin of the immigrants in 2010 provided by the WVS and
the ESS. In Column 2, we find that the contemporaneous trust in the country of origin
is a statistically significant predictor of the trust inherited in 2010 by fourth-generation
immigrants.
Column 3 and 4 decomposes cohort 1950 into second-, third-generation immigrants
and fourth-generation immigrants, respectively. We find a strong correlation between in-
herited trust and current trust in the country of origin for second- and third-generation
immigrants, while the correlation becomes weak in fourth-generation immigrants. We re-
port the results from the same decomposition exercise for the specification with a 50-year
lag and with different time periods, 1970-2010. The results are qualitatively consistent,
providing evidence for the evolution of trust attitudes, rather than strong convergence
(Table A.13, A.18).
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Figure A.1: CO2 Emissions in OECD countries: 1950-2010
Sources: Carbon Dioxide Information Analysis Center (CDIAC)
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Table A.1: Observations for Inherited Trust 1950 and 2010: GSS 1978-2014
County of origin Inherited trust Inherited trust
in 1950 in 2010
Africa 2,505 433
Austria 88 43
Belgium 36 16
Canada 216 119
Czechoslovakia 222 142
Denmark 175 37
Finland 86 37
France 491 109
Germany 4,385 921
Greece 29 81
Hungary 66 78
India 26 14
Ireland 3,216 731
Italy 809 869
Japan 20 38
Mexico 231 527
Netherlands 357 96
Norway 411 131
Poland 475 344
Portugal 44 44
Russian Federation 213 153
Spain 153 83
Sweden 376 128
Switzerland 108 22
United Kingdom 4,575 572
Yugoslavia 58 49
Table A.2: Descriptive Statistics: GSS 1978-2014
Cohort 1950 Cohort 2010
Variables Mean SD Mean SD
Age 49.87 17.07 35.84 13.84
Men 0.45 0.50 0.46 0.50
Education 13.31 2.91 13.86 2.59
Income 10.53 2.46 10.84 2.33
Employed 0.61 0.49 0.72 0.45
Unemployed 0.04 0.21 0.07 0.25
Protestant 0.65 0.48 0.35 0.48
Catholic 0.22 0.41 0.37 0.48
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Table A.3: European Countries Only: Correlation between inherited trust
of US descendants and trust in the country of origin
Dependent variables
Inherited trust Inherited trust
in 2010 in 1950
(1) (2)
Trust in source country 0.167*** 0.082
(0.058) (0.066)
Age 0.004*** 0.003***
(0.001) (0.000)
Men 0.058* 0.009
(0.028) (0.007)
Eduation 0.027*** 0.037***
(0.002) (0.002)
Income 0.002 0.008***
(0.004) (0.001)
Unemployed -0.021 0.009
(0.030) (0.027)
Employed 0.037 0.034**
(0.037) (0.012)
Catholic 0.001 0.047
(0.035) (0.028)
Protestant 0.036* 0.030***
(0.019) (0.009)
Constant -0.271*** -0.353***
(0.048) (0.036)
Observations 2,898 10,577
R-squared 0.039 0.056
Notes: The sample is restricted to European countries in these
regressions. The dependent variables in (1) and (2) are the level
of trust inherited in 2010 and in 1950, respectively. Trust in
source country is the average level of trust in the country of
origin of the immigrants in 2010.
Source: General Social Survey 1978-2014, European Social Sur-
vey wave 2010.
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Table A.4: Correlation between inherited trust of US descendants and trust in the
country of origin: Sample decomposition by generation
Dependent variables
Inherited trust Inherited trust Inherited trust Inherited trust
in 2010 in 2010 in 1950 in 1950
2nd 3rd generation 4th generation 2nd 3rd generation 4th generation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Trust 0.379*** 0.515** 0.380*** 0.424
in source country (0.109) (0.209) (0.117) (0.287)
Observations 2,359 1,109 2,139 10,123
R-squared 0.051 0.064 0.058 0.082
Notes: The dependent variables in (1) and (2) are the level of trust inherited by second-, third-
generation immigrants in cohort 2010 and fourth-generation immigrants in cohort 2010, respectively.
The dependent variables in (3) and (4) are the level of trust inherited by second-, third-generation im-
migrants in cohort 1950 and fourth-generation immigrants in cohort 1950, respectively. Trust in source
country is the average level of trust in the country of origin of the immigrants in 2010. Standard errors
are clustered at the country level.
Source: GSS 1978-2014, WVS 2010, ESS 2010.
Table A.5: Observations for Inherited Trust in 1920 and 1980
With 25 Years: GSS 1978-2014
Inherited trust Inherited trust
in 1920 in 1980
County of origin with a 25-year lag with a 25-year lag
Africa 716 2,237
Austria 14 131
Canada 67 310
Czechoslovakia 28 350
Denmark 38 187
Finland 12 116
France 153 468
Germany 1,339 4,100
Ireland 1,063 2,954
Italy 53 1,637
Mexico 27 633
Netherlands 137 341
Norway 89 484
Poland 45 806
Russian Federation 13 364
Spain 41 193
Sweden 70 454
Switzerland 42 99
United Kingdom 2,046 3,265
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Table A.6: Descriptive Statistics: GSS 1978-2014
Cohort 1920 Cohort 1980
Variables with a 25-year lag with a 25-year lag
Mean SD Mean SD
Age 64.96 12.38 41.65 15.01
Men 0.42 0.49 0.46 0.50
Education 12.45 3.23 13.71 2.67
Income 10.03 2.66 10.76 2.33
Employed 0.38 0.48 0.71 0.45
Unemployed 0.02 0.15 0.06 0.23
Protestant 0.79 0.41 0.52 0.50
Catholic 0.15 0.36 0.29 0.45
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Table A.7: Inherited Trust in 1920 and 1980: with a 25-year lag
Dependent variables
Inherited trust Inherited trust
in 1920 in 1980
Coefficient SD Coefficient SD
Country of Origin Reference: Swedish ancestors - 1920
Sweden 0.087 (0.047)
Africa -0.200 (0.049) -0.160 (0.045)
Austria -0.260 (0.049) 0.120 (0.049)
Canada 0.050 (0.050) 0.054 (0.051)
Czechoslovakia -0.021 (0.051) 0.053 (0.051)
Denmark -0.160 (0.052) 0.180 (0.047)
Finland -0.160 (0.040) 0.080 (0.047)
France 0.073 (0.051) 0.040 (0.048)
Germany 0.032 (0.051) 0.064 (0.047)
Ireland 0.011 (0.051) 0.061 (0.048)
Italy 0.036 (0.047) -0.014 (0.052)
Mexico 0.110 (0.060) -0.014 (0.051)
Netherlands -0.046 (0.049) 0.032 (0.046)
Norway 0.200 (0.044) 0.140 (0.046)
Poland 0.016 (0.047) 0.016 (0.051)
Russia -0.110 (0.046) 0.034 (0.046)
Spain -0.005 (0.054) 0.049 (0.050)
Switzerland 0.120 (0.050) 0.074 (0.046)
United Kingdom 0.057 (0.050) 0.077 (0.046)
Notes: The dependent variable is the level of trust inherited by US im-
migrants from the periods 1920 and 1980 and measured by the following
question, “Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be
trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people?” We
construct a binary trust variable that takes 1 if the respondent answered
“Most people can be trusted” and takes 0 if the answer was either
“Can’t be too careful” or “Depends.” Additional controls included in
the model are: age, age square, gender, education, income, employment
status, and religion as well as year fixed effects. Standard errors are
clustered at the country level.
Source: General Social Survey: 1978-2014
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Table A.8: Correlation between inherited trust of US descendants
and trust in the country of origin: with a 25-year lag, 1920-1980
Dependent variables
Inherited trust Inherited trust
in 1980 in 1920
Trust in source country 0.423** 0.459**
(0.152) (0.201)
Age 0.004*** 0.001
(0.000) (0.001)
Men 0.022** 0.032**
(0.008) (0.014)
Education 0.035*** 0.035***
(0.003) (0.003)
Income 0.006*** 0.009***
(0.002) (0.003)
Unemployed 0.001 -0.041
(0.021) (0.039)
Employed 0.033** 0.010
(0.013) (0.025)
Catholic 0.040 0.164***
(0.028) (0.034)
Protestant 0.012 0.076**
(0.016) (0.031)
Constant -0.508*** -0.417***
(0.059) (0.086)
Observations 11,948 3,786
R-squared 0.078 0.094
Notes: The dependent variables in (1) and (2) are the level of
trust inherited by all immigrants (2nd, 3rd and 4th) in 1980
and in 1920, respectively. Trust in source country is the average
level of trust in the country of origin of the immigrants in 2010.
Standard errors are clustered at the country level.
Source: General Social Survey 1978-2014, World Values Survey
and European Social Survey wave 2010.
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Table A.9: Observations for Inherited Trust in 1950 and 2010 with Lag 50 Years: GSS
1978-2014
Inherited trust Inherited trust
in 1950 in 2010
County of origin with a lag of 50 years with a lag of 50 years
Africa 981 1,980
Austria 21 128
Belgium 13 44
Canada 91 291
Czechoslovakia 51 335
Denmark 56 172
Finland 19 110
France 210 412
Germany 1,793 3,688
Greece 10 101
Hungary 11 139
India 12 25
Ireland 1,437 2,607
Italy 96 1,653
Mexico 51 671
Netherlands 174 311
Norway 151 430
Poland 77 786
Russia 24 363
Spain 51 189
Sweden 100 431
Switzerland 54 54
United Kingdom 2,572 2,756
Table A.10: Descriptive Statistics: GSS 1978-2014
Cohort 1950 Cohort 2010
Variables with a 50-year lag with a 50-year lag
Mean SD Mean SD
Age 61.55 13.7 40.39 14.93
Men 0.43 0.49 0.46 0.50
Education 12.74 3.19 13.73 2.65
Income 10.25 2.549 10.74 2.374
Employed 0.45 0.50 0.72 0.45
Unemployed 0.03 0.17 0.06 0.24
Protestant 0.76 0.43 0.50 0.50
Catholic 0.16 0.37 0.30 0.46
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Table A.11: Inherited Trust in 1950 and 2010: with a 50-year lag
Dependent variables
Inherited trust Inherited trust
in 1950 in 2010
Coefficient SD Coefficient SD
Country of Origin Reference: Swedish ancestors - 1950
Sweden 0.059 (0.015)
Africa -0.200 (0.02) -0.190 (0.015)
Austria -0.047 (0.017) 0.083 (0.016)
Belgium 0.200 (0.022) 0.130 (0.016)
Canada 0.022 (0.020) 0.039 (0.002)
Czechoslovakia -0.068 (0.017) 0.046 (0.018)
Denmark -0.094 (0.018) 0.160 (0.014)
Finland -0.090 (0.019) 0.053 (0.017)
France 0.089 (0.018) -0.011 (0.015)
Germany 0.039 (0.019) 0.028 (0.015)
Greece 0.300 (0.024) -0.110 (0.013)
Hungary 0.140 (0.018) 0.061 (0.015)
India -0.110 (0.021) -0.250 (0.017)
Ireland 0.022 (0.019) 0.025 (0.016)
Italy -0.006 (0.018) -0.041 (0.019)
Mexico 0.130 (0.026) -0.049 (0.019)
Netherlands -0.055 (0.021) 0.010 (0.015)
Norway 0.170 (0.018) 0.098 (0.014)
Poland 0.019 (0.02) -0.009 (0.018)
Russia -0.077 (0.015) 0.012 (0.013)
Spain 0.032 (0.022) -0.002 (0.019)
Switzerland 0.120 (0.018) 0.030 (0.014)
United Kingdom 0.052 (0.019) 0.042 (0.014)
Notes: The dependent variable is the level of trust inherited by US im-
migrants from the periods 1950 and 2010 and measured by the following
question, “Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be
trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people?” We
construct a binary trust variable that takes 1 if the respondent answered
“Most people can be trusted” and takes 0 if the answer was either
“Can’t be too careful” or “Depends.” Additional controls included in
the model are: age, age square, gender, education, income, employment
status, and religion as well as year fixed effects. Standard errors are
clustered at the country level.
Source: General Social Survey: 1978-2014
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Table A.12: Correlation between inherited trust of US descendants
and trust in the country of origin: with a 50-year lag
Dependent variables
Inherited trust Inherited trust
in 2010 in 1950
Trust in source country 0.417*** 0.433**
(0.144) (0.203)
Age 0.004*** 0.001
(0.000) (0.000)
Men 0.027*** 0.021*
(0.008) (0.012)
Education 0.034*** 0.035***
(0.003) (0.003)
Income 0.006*** 0.009***
(0.002) (0.003)
Unemployed -0.011 -0.019
(0.016) (0.023)
Employed 0.025* 0.020
(0.014) (0.019)
Catholic 0.033 0.124***
(0.028) (0.030)
Protestant 0.010 0.035
(0.017) (0.028)
Constant -0.493*** -0.355***
(0.059) (0.081)
Observations 11,160 5,102
R-squared 0.075 0.090
Notes: The dependent variables in (1) and (2) are the level of
trust inherited by all immigrants (2nd, 3rd and 4th) in 2010
and in 1950, respectively. Trust in source country is the average
level of trust in the country of origin of the immigrants in 2010.
Standard errors are clustered at the country level.
Source: General Social Survey 1978-2014, World Values Survey
and European Social Survey wave 2010.
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Table A.13: Correlation between inherited trust of US descendants and trust in the
country of origin: Sample decomposition by generation
with a 50-year lag
Dependent variables
Inherited trust Inherited trust Inherited trust Inherited trust
in 2010 in 2010 in 1950 in 1950
2nd 3rd generation 4th generation 2nd 3rd generation 4th generation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Trust 0.411*** 0.440* 0.204 0.413
in source country (0.058) (0.252) (0.207) (0.320)
Observations 4,383 6,777 566 4,536
R-squared 0.058 0.074 0.056 0.094
Notes: The dependent variables in (1) and (2) are the level of trust inherited by second-, third-
generation immigrants in cohort 2010 and fourth-generation immigrants in cohort 2010, respectively.
The dependent variables in (3) and (4) are the level of trust inherited by second-, third-generation im-
migrants in cohort 1950 and fourth-generation immigrants in cohort 1950, respectively. Trust in source
country is the average level of trust in the country of origin of the immigrants in 2010. Standard errors
are clustered at the country level.
Source: GSS 1978-2014, WVS 2010, ESS 2010.
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Table A.14: Observations for Inherited Trust in 1970 and 2010
With Lag 50 Years: GSS 1978-2014
Inherited trust Inherited trust
in 1970 in 2010
County of origin with a 50-year lag with a 50-year lag
Africa 2,315 647
Austria 71 75
Belgium 34 23
Canada 222 166
Czechoslovakia 200 198
Denmark 173 56
Finland 77 51
France 468 157
Germany 4,059 1,421
Greece 36 80
Hungary 58 92
India 26 11
Ireland 3,002 1,042
Italy 665 1,133
Japan 15 58
Mexico 208 523
Netherlands 345 140
Norway 392 184
Poland 410 466
Portugal 38 53
Russia 173 229
Spain 143 99
Sweden 351 179
Switzerland 104 37
United Kingdom 4,413 914
Yugoslavia 48 70
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Table A.15: Descriptive Statistics: GSS 1978-2014
Cohort 1970 Cohort 2010
Variables with a 50-year lag with a 50-year lag
Mean SD Mean SD
Age 51.41 16.93 36.98 14.27
Men 0.44 0.50 0.46 0.50
Education 13.22 2.95 13.89 2.58
Income 10.5 2.46 10.81 2.35
Employed 0.59 0.49 0.72 0.45
Unemployed 0.04 0.21 0.06 0.24
Protestant 0.66 0.47 0.39 0.49
Catholic 0.22 0.41 0.35 0.48
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Table A.16: Inherited Trust in 1970 and 2010: with a 50-year lag
Dependent variables
Inherited trust Inherited trust
in 1970 in 2010
Coefficient SD Coefficient SD
Country of Origin Reference: Swedish ancestors - 1970
Sweden 0.003 (0.02)
Africa -0.250 (0.022) -0.190 (0.027)
Austria 0.059 (0.019) -0.022 (0.019)
Belgium 0.200 (0.020) -0.015 (0.020)
Canada -0.016 (0.022) 0.023 (0.021)
Czechoslovakia -0.023 (0.017) 0.003 (0.018)
Denmark 0.015 (0.018) 0.200 (0.017)
Finland -0.006 (0.016) 0.010 (0.015)
France 0.003 (0.020) -0.095 (0.021)
Germany -0.006 (0.019) -0.031 (0.022)
Greece 0.110 (0.018) -0.230 (0.019)
Hungary 0.050 (0.017) 0.003 (0.018)
India -0.210 (0.026) -0.330 (0.028)
Ireland -0.016 (0.020) -0.023 (0.023)
Italy -0.036 (0.019) -0.100 (0.022)
Japan -0.047 (0.017) -0.022 (0.018)
Mexico 0.055 (0.022) -0.130 (0.025)
Netherlands -0.083 (0.020) 0.004 (0.021)
Norway 0.085 (0.019) 0.021 (0.020)
Poland -0.006 (0.020) -0.077 (0.021)
Portugal -0.004 (0.020) -0.099 (0.020)
Russian Federation -0.046 (0.016) -0.031 (0.017)
Spain -0.074 (0.023) 0.018 (0.025)
Switzerland 0.005 (0.020) 0.053 (0.019)
United Kingdom -0.001 (0.019) 0.015 (0.022)
Yugoslavia -0.003 (0.016) -0.018 (0.021)
Notes: The dependent variable is the level of trust inherited by US im-
migrants from the periods 1970 and 2010 and measured by the following
question, “Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be
trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people?” We
construct a binary trust variable that takes 1 if the respondent answered
“Most people can be trusted” and takes 0 if the answer was either “Can’t
be too careful” or “Depends.” Additional controls included in the model
are: age, age squared, gender, education, income, employment status, and
religion as well as year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the
country level.
Source: General Social Survey: 1978-2014
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Table A.17: Correlation between inherited trust of US descendants
and trust in the country of origin: with a 50-year lag, 1970-2010
Dependent variables
Inherited trust Inherited trust
in 2010 in 1970
Trust in source country 0.379*** 0.425**
(0.100) (0.191)
Age 0.004*** 0.003***
(0.001) (0.000)
Men 0.048** 0.016**
(0.019) (0.007)
Education 0.033*** 0.035***
(0.002) (0.002)
Income 0.002 0.010***
(0.003) (0.001)
Unemployed -0.045** 0.019
(0.018) (0.023)
Employed 0.019 0.032**
(0.028) (0.015)
Catholic 0.016 0.073***
(0.032) (0.024)
Protestant 0.017 0.011
(0.016) (0.016)
Observations 4,836 11,499
R-squared 0.069 0.083
Notes: The dependent variables in (1) and (2) are the level of
trust inherited by all immigrants (2nd, 3rd and 4th) in 2010
and in 1970, respectively. Trust in source country is the average
level of trust in the country of origin of the immigrants in 2010.
Standard errors are clustered at the country level.
Source: General Social Survey 1978-2014, World Values Survey
and European Social Survey wave 2010.
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Table A.18: Correlation between inherited trust of US descendants and trust in the
country of origin: Sample decomposition by generation
with a 50-year lag, 1970-2010
Dependent variables
Inherited trust Inherited trust Inherited trust Inherited trust
in 2010 in 2010 in 1970 in 1970
2nd 3rd generation 4th generation 2nd 3rd generation 4th generation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Trust in source country 0.297*** 0.456*** 0.312*** 0.419*
(0.056) (0.117) (0.104) (0.209)
Observations 3,042 1,794 1,980 9,519
R-squared 0.054 0.076 0.059 0.087
Notes: The dependent variables in (1) and (2) are the level of trust inherited by second-, third-generation
immigrants in cohort 2010 and fourth-generation immigrants in cohort 2010, respectively. The dependent
variables in (3) and (4) are the level of trust inherited by second-, third-generation immigrants in cohort 1970
and fourth-generation immigrants in cohort 1970, respectively. Trust in source country is the average level of
trust in the country of origin of the immigrants in 2010. Standard errors are clustered at the country level.
Source: GSS 1978-2014, WVS 2010, ESS 2010.
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A.3 Further Data Description
The choice of our sample countries is guided by the set of countries of origin in the
General Social Survey (GSS) that the respondents could choose from and they include
some countries that do not perfectly overlap with current geographic boundaries (as of
2010 which is our data end point) such as Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and the Soviet
Union. The survey also does not allow respondents to choose specific African countries
from which their ancestors came since the whole continent (Africa) is provided as a single
category. Thus in this section we explain how relevant countries are combined in order
to make them consistent with our sample.
CO2 Emissions We use fossil fuel CO2 emissions data from the Carbon Dioxide
Information Analysis Center (CDIAC). The data is given in thousand metric tons of
carbon, which convert to thousand metric tons of carbon dioxide by multiplying the
figures by 3.667 as advised. The 1950 to present CO2 emission data are derived primarily
from energy statistics published by the United Nations (2016).
We make modifications for the following five cases to make the emissions variable
consistent with our unit of observations: Germany, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, the So-
viet Union and Africa. First, Germany has two observations for each year between 1945
and 1990 since the country was divided into Federal Republic of Germany and Former
German Democratic Republic. We sum up emissions from these two parts of the country
to one observation. Second, Czechoslovakia has one observation up to 1991 and from 1992
onwards emissions are separately reported for Czech Republic and Slovakia, which again
corresponds to the political dissolution Czechoslovakia into two mentioned independent
countries. However, since Czechoslovakia is the category used in the GSS we combine the
emissions from Czech Republic and Slovakia and make them one observation. Yugoslavia
is similar to the case of Czechoslovakia. It has one observation per year up to 1991 and
splits to five observations (Bosnia & Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Slovenia and Mon-
tenegro & Serbia) from 1992. Again, we combine the five observations per year to one
observation per year to make it comparable to the GSS division of the world. A similar
treatment is applied to the former Soviet Union, which dissolved into 15 independent
states in 1991 (namely, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Estonia, Goergia, Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Moldova, Lithuania, Russian Federation, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan,
Ukraine and Uzbekistan). We sum emissions from the 14 states (Moldova is missing in
the dataset) to convert them into one observation.
The number of African countries in the dataset slowly increases over time, from 25
in 1950 (the starting point of our analysis) and 51 in 2010 (the end point of our anal-
ysis) out of 54 countries that make up Africa. We believe this omission is due to the
small, almost negligible amount of emissions from African countries in earlier years. For
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instance, in 1950 the reported CO2 in South Africa, the largest emitter in the continent,
constitutes only about 1 percent of the global emissions and Egypt, the second largest
emitter, accounts for less than 0.2 percent. Thus we proceed as we did with other coun-
tries and sum up emissions from all African countries included in the dataset for each year.
GDP per capita and Population Data on GDP per capita and population come
from the Maddison Project that provides information on economic growth across countries
between AD 1 and 2010. Fortunately, the database includes information on Czechoslo-
vakia, Yugoslavia, the Soviet Union and Africa as a whole, so we did not have to process
these variables to make them compatible with our sample countries.
Trade Openness We use version 7.3 of the Penn World Table for data on trade
openness, which is defined as the sum of import and export divided by the GDP of
the country. One peculiarity of this dataset is that for countries that constituted former
Czechoslovakia, former Yugoslavia and the former Soviet Union the data begin in 1990.
Thus we, reluctantly, replace the missing values for year 1950 with the values of 1990 for
the relevant countries. However, as we discuss in footnote 19, excluding these countries
does not affect the results of our analysis. For Africa, similarly as for GDP per capita and
population data, we calculate the average openness to trade across all African countries
for each year in our sample.
Quality of Political Institutions We use the Polity IV dataset by the Center for
Systemic Peace for our variables related to the quality of formal institutions. What we do
here is identical to what we do for the data on CO2 emissions for the same set of relevant
countries, except that now we calculate the mean instead of the sum.
Sectoral composition of economy We use International Historical Statistics by
B.R. Mitchell (2013) for the measure of sectoral composition of economies worldwide.
The database includes information on Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and the Soviet Union.
For Africa, we again calculate the average share of manufacturing industry for each year.
Switzerland is missing in the database, so we complement the variable using Stohr et al.
(2014). Dropping Switzerland does not affect our findings (detailed results available upon
request from authors).
Educational Attainment For historical data on primary school enrolment, we rely
on Lee and Lee (2016). The data begin in 1820 and continue to 2010 at a five-year inter-
val. Former Yugoslavia countries and Slovak Republic are missing in the dataset. Thus
we leave Yugoslavia as missing and allow Czech Republic to represent Czechoslovakia.
For Africa, we again calculate the average rate of primary school enrolment in African
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countries for each year.
Religion Data on the share of non-religious individuals and religious fractionalisation
in a country come from Barro (2003). The dataset includes only three time periods, 1900,
1970 and 2000. Thus we use 1970 and 2000 values for 1950 and 2010, respectively, in our
analysis. For 1970, Germany is split in two states, East and West Germany, so we calcu-
late the mean of the two values for that year. For Africa, we again calculate the average
share of non-religious individuals and religious fractionalisation in African countries for
each time period.
Urbanization and Population Density We use data on urbanization and popu-
lation density from the World Bank. Unfortunately, the data begin in 1960, so for year
1950 we instead use the values of 1960 for 1950. To form a variable for former Yugosla-
vian countries, we take the average of the five countries (Bosnia & Herzegovina, Croatia,
Macedonia, Slovenia and Montenegro & Serbia) for each year.
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Appendix B
Appendix to Chapter 2
B.1 Wealth as a competing factor?
In studying the relationship between trust and the stringency of climate change regula-
tion, it is important to take into account the relative wealth of countries for two reasons;
(1) the argument that rich, developed countries have emitted greater emissions over a
longer period and therefore they are primarily responsible for climate change impacts,
has led to more active mitigation efforts by richer economies (Adger, 2006); (2) trust
tends to be positively correlated with wealth across countries (e.g. Algan and Cahuc,
2010). Then, it is possible that the positive correlation we observe between trust and the
stringency of climate change legislation may simply reflect that richer nations contribute
more actively to climate change mitigation.
However, column (2) in Table B.6 shows that the correlation between trust and the
stringency of climate change policy measured by the target share of renewable energy in
total consumption by 2020 remains strong even when I control for log GDP per capita as
well as educational attainment (since it has been pointed out that countries with more
educated citizenry are more likely to have stringent climate change polices).
As a simple placebo test, I use another measure of climate change regulation stringency
that is comparable across EU countries: the national emission targets for 2020 set by
the Effort Sharing Decision in the EU to reduce emissions from sectors not included in
the EU ETS. Unlike the measure used above (which is based on National Renewable
Energy Action Plan), these targets have been assigned on the basis of member states’
relative wealth, therefore not voluntary. Given the positive relationship between trust and
national wealth, this measure may also display a positive correlation with trust. However,
the correlation should disappear once income is controlled for, because the involuntary
nature of this policy rules out the argument put forward in this paper that trust could
matter (independently or in addition to the country’s wealth) via lower enforcement costs
when countries are voluntarily choosing their own policies to contribute to joint objectives
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(EU level binding targets in this case).
[Table B.6]
Column (3) and (4) confirm this intuition. The positive correlation between trust
and the measure of involuntary climate policy in column (3) is absent when income and
education are included in column (4). It is also interesting to note that log per capita
GDP barely predicts the voluntary measure of climate policy in column (2) (increasing
R-squared by only 0.02), whereas it accounts for a substantial share of variation in the
involuntary measure of climate policy as anticipated (increasing R-squared by 0.49).
B.2 Domestic demand for environmental regulation
Previous studies that investigate the heterogeneity in the stringency of regulations (mostly
economic regulations) across countries have emphasized the link that runs as follows: (1)
trust and the public demand for regulations, (2) the public demand for and the actual
stringency of regulations, and consequently (3) trust and the stringency of regulations.
Does this link hold in the context of environmental legislation as well? Here I refer to
environmental regulations at large, not exclusively climate change legislation due to data
availability.
I obtain data on the demand for environmental regulations from the International
Social Survey Programme (ISSP), which is the same survey used by (Aghion et al., 2010)
to show the negative correlation between trust and demand for labor market regula-
tion. I use the 2010 wave that includes questions both on trust and attitudes towards
environmental regulation. The question that captures the degree of the demand for envi-
ronmental regulations reads as follows: “Government should pass laws to make businesses
protect the environment, even if it interferes with businesses’s rights to make their own
decisions”.1 I construct a binary variable from this question that takes 1 if respondents
agreed with the given statement and 0 otherwise, and calculate the country average of
this measure. For the stringency of environmental regulations, I use the Environmental
Policy Stringency (EPS) Index in Figure B.2 that measures the stringency of regulatory
instruments primarily related to climate and air pollution.
[Figure B.8, B.9]
1There is another related question that reads, “Government should pass laws to make ordinary people
protect the environment, even if it interferes with people’s rights to make their own decisions”. I do not
use this question for the public demand for environmental regulations because the measures for the
stringency of environmental regulations mostly cover policy instruments that apply to industrial sectors
(Botta and Koz´luk, 2014), rather than ordinary individuals. However, results in this section are similar
when I use this question as an alternative.
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Figure B.8 reveals no discernible association between trust and the public demand
for environmental regulations. Moreover, the correlation between the demand for and the
actual stringency of environmental regulations is also weak as depicted in Figure B.9,
which stands in contrast to the previous studies that explain the stringency of a variety
of regulations as a function of the public demand.2 Thus, the link (1) and (2) do not
seem to hold when it comes to environmental regulations. However, we have seen the
strong positive correlation between trust and this measure of environmental legislation
stringency in Figure B.2, which is to say the link (3) holds despite the absence of the first
two links. Taken together, I believe this casual inspection suggests that the influence of
domestic demand is muted in this context and provides further support for the importance
of supply side dynamics such as enforcement costs and the degree of public acceptability
in the provision of environmental protection legislation across countries.
2One likely explanation is based on the environment being a secondary policy issue. There is a
consensus that the public or the voters’ preferences have large effects on “frontline” policies (mostly
economic) such as government spending or wealth redistribution, there is widespread recognition that
secondary policy issues, that concern only relatively small groups in society, such as environmental policy
and gun control do not sensitively reflect preferences held by voters (List and Sturm, 2006).
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Figure B.1: Correlation between Trust and Regulation of Business Entry
Note: the graph plots the relationship between the level of average trust and the stringency of market
regulation measured by the number of steps that an entrepreneur has to complete to open a business
across countries. This data on regulations on market entry is provided by Djankov et al. (2002) for the
year 1999. The level of average trust measure is constructed based on the the European Social Survey
(2000-2014).
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Figure B.2: Correlation between Trust and the Environmental Policy Stringency (EPS)
Index
Note: the graph plots the relationship between the level of average trust and the OECD Environmental
Policy Stringency (EPS) Index. The level of average trust measure is constructed based on the European
Social Survey (2002-2014).
Figure B.3: Distribution of Noncompliance Rates
Note: the plot shows the distribution of noncompliance rates across countries. The data on compliance
in the ETS is provided by the European Union Transaction Log (EUTL) at the installations level and I
collapse the data over time across countries to calculate average compliance rates.
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Table B.1: Descriptive Statistics: Firm-level Variables
Country Number of Number of Number of Total assets Operating revenue
firms employees installations Thousand USD Thousand USD
per firm
Austria 146 712 1.72 626,484 487,542
Belgium 248 945 1.54 3,320,201 814,570
Bulgaria 112 413 1.35 96,637 107,210
Czech Republic 278 850 1.58 279,192 223,508
Denmark 269 815 1.60 383,084 424,302
Estonia 37 184 1.54 144,959 60,214
Finland 183 802 3.68 514,466 412,311
France 669 5,281 1.85 3,173,589 1,624,696
Germany 1,194 2,730 1.92 1,719,551 1,614,392
Greece 104 584 1.46 508,478 409,479
Hungary 136 881 2.07 407,152 370,139
Ireland 113 4,386 1.39 5,439,998 4,342,960
Italy 747 1,037 1.68 971,609 707,199
Latvia 75 304 1.49 109,923 59,061
Lithuania 78 265 1.49 105,722 127,252
Netherlands 327 527 1.43 382,333 588,377
Norway 87 599 1.56 1,916,191 1,552,504
Poland 584 776 1.70 216,743 216,529
Portugal 242 188 1.19 163,830 137,704
Romania 209 845 1.34 171,379 153,741
Slovakia 152 726 1.35 216,850 203,772
Slovenia 91 666 1.10 189,347 142,437
Spain 957 529 1.34 448,584 364,320
Sweden 279 980 3.09 855,421 493,645
United Kingdom 839 6,750 1.65 8,159,246 3,469,543
Average 335 1,348 1.68 1,267,680 791,675
Notes: The table reports summary statistics of the financial variables of 8,156 firms used in the regressions
by country. The data comes from Bureau Van Dijk’s Orbis Database.
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Table B.2: Descriptive Statistics: Number of Second-generation Immigrants from Each
Source Country
Country of origin Number of
second-generation immigrants
Austria 333
Belgium 153
Czech Republic 382
Denmark 143
Estonia 38
Finland 315
France 520
Germany 1299
Greece 169
Hungary 347
Ireland 233
Italy 971
Latvia 78
Lithuania 80
Netherlands 187
Norway 128
Poland 835
Portugal 186
Romania 388
Slovakia 373
Slovenia 44
Spain 251
Sweden 149
United Kingdom 510
Notes: The table reports the number of second-
generation immigrants from each country that I use to
estimate inherited trust. The data comes from the Eu-
ropean Social Survey.
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Figure B.4: Noncompliance Rate between 2006 and 2015 (Excluding 2005)
Note: the plot shows variation in noncompliance rates across countries, excluding 2005. The data on
compliance in the ETS is provided by the European Union Transaction Log (EUTL) at the installations
level and I collapse the data over all years (excluding 2005) to calculate average compliance rates.
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Table B.3: Trust and Noncompliance in the EU ETS between 2005 and 2015:
Robustness Checks for Country-level Analysis
Dependent variable: Indicator for noncompliance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Estimation method IV Probit IV Probit IV Probit IV Probit IV Probit IV Probit IV Probit Poisson
Trust measured -0.814** -0.923** -0.835* -0.869* -0.871* -0.837* -0.699 -1.505*
in the country of operation (0.351) (0.454) (0.451) (0.483) (0.465) (0.453) (0.430) (0.878)
Observations 71,158 73,498 73,563 73,146 73,498 73,498 73,498 77,558
Firm-level controls (4) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region-level controls (3) Yes No No No No No No No
Country-level controls (5) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies (10) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry dummies (35) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustering Country Country Country Country Country Country Country Country
Number of clusters 25 23 25 25 25 25 25 25
First stage F stat 35.3 55.7 60.2 61.0 61.8 70.4 37.5
Notes: The dependent variable in each column is a binary noncompliance measure that takes 1 if the installation is out of compliance
and 0 otherwise. Standard errors are clustered at the level shown in each column. “Industry dummies” are based on the main activity
type information provided in the European Transaction Log. Column (1) adds region-level controls and column (2) drops ETS late join-
ters (Bulgaria and Romania) in my sample. Column (3) and (4) try an alternative measure of trust that I constructed as follows: I first
regress trust on year dummies, form residuals, and then compute the means of these residuals by country. This measure takes into account
year-specific shocks since I pool multiple waves conducted in different years to calculate the average level of trust in each country. In
column (5) and (6), I construct another alternative measure for trust using the point estimates on country dummies from an individual-
level regression (similarly as in column (5) and (6) in Table 4). The point estimates and associated standard errors are reported in Table
A4. In column (7), I try an alternative specification for the instrument. Column (8) tries an alternative measure for noncompliance that
measures the amount by which installations are noncompliant. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.
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Table B.4: Alternative Measure of Trust: Coefficients on the Country Dummies
from the European Social Survey
Dependent variable: Trust
Country
Indicator Coefficient SD
Austria 0.856*** (0.016)
Belgium 0.216*** (0.01)
Czech Republic 0.134*** (0.014)
Germany Reference category
Denmark 2.288*** (0.003)
Estonia 1.191*** (0.012)
Spain 0.453*** (0.018)
Finland 1.781*** (0.006)
France -0.293*** (0.011)
United Kingdom 0.598*** (0.005)
Greece -0.772*** (0.03)
Hungary -0.185*** (0.014)
Ireland 0.744*** (0.006)
Italy -0.087*** (0.032)
Lithuania 0.558*** (0.026)
Latvia -0.095*** (0.045)
Netherlands 1.049*** (0.005)
Norway 1.823*** (0.006)
Poland -0.507 (0.019)
Portugal -0.314*** (0.058)
Romania -0.129 (0.053)
Sweden 1.545*** (0.009)
Slovenia -0.318*** (0.02)
Slovak Republic -0.175 (0.018)
Observations: 283,181
R-squared: 0.16
Notes: I report the point estimates on country dummies
used as an alternative measure of trust across countries in
column (5) and (6) in Table A3. The coefficients measure
the level of trust in each country relative to Germany, which
is the omitted reference category. Apart from the country
dummies, the regression also included gender, age, educa-
tion and income as well as year dummies (not reported).
Standard errors are clustered at the country level. * signif-
icant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.
Source: European Social Survey 2002 - 2014.
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Table B.5: Alternative Measure of Trust: Coefficients on the Country Dummies
from the World Value Survey
Dependent variable: Trust
Country Country
Indicator Coefficient SD Indicator Coefficient SD
Australia 0.093*** (0.003) Japan 0.014* (0.008)
Brazil -0.299*** (0.009) South Korea -0.100*** (0.006)
Bulgaria -0.112*** (0.005) Latvia -0.138*** (0.010)
Canada 0.000 (0.01) Mexico -0.160*** (0.006)
Switzerland 0.055*** (0.005) Malaysia -0.283*** (0.005)
Chile -0.201*** (0.007) Netherlands 0.240*** (0.006)
China 0.204*** (0.005) Norway 0.332*** (0.005)
Cyprus -0.265*** (0.006) Philippines -0.335*** (0.013)
Czech Republic -0.084*** (0.01) Poland -0.164*** (0.002)
Germany Reference category Romania -0.220*** (0.002)
Estonia -0.054*** (0.006) Russian Federation -0.112*** (0.002)
Spain -0.123*** (0.006) Saudi Arabia 0.114*** (0.023)
Finland 0.176*** (0.006) Sweden 0.255*** (0.006)
France -0.164*** (0.01) Singapore -0.107*** (0.012)
Hong Kong 0.081*** (0.005) Slovenia -0.179*** (0.004)
Hungary -0.071*** (0.01) Slovakia -0.100*** (0.011)
Indonesia 0.069*** (0.008) Turkey -0.260*** (0.01)
Israel -0.182*** (0.024) Ukraine -0.085*** (0.003)
India -0.08*** (0.007) United Kingdom -0.067*** (0.006)
Italy -0.037*** (0.01) United States -0.020*** (0.006)
Jordan -0.136*** (0.007) South Africa -0.187*** (0.009)
Observations: 263,695
R-squared: 0.109
Notes: I report the point estimates on country dummies used as an alternative measure of
trust across countries in column (6) in Table 5. The coefficients measure the level of trust in
each country relative to Germany, which is the omitted reference category. Apart from the
country dummies, the regression also included gender, age, education and income as well as
year dummies (not reported). Standard errors are clustered at the country level. * significant
at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.
Source: World Value Survey 1981 - 2013.
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Figure B.5: Correlation between Trust in Source Country and Inherited Trust
with a 25-year Lag
Note: the plot shows a correlation between inhered trust of second-generation immigrants and the level of
trust in their countries of origin. These measures are constructed based on the following survey question
“Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you can’t be too careful in
dealing with people?” in the European Social Survey (2002-2014).
Figure B.6: Global: Correlation between Trust in Source Country and Inherited Trust
Note: the plot shows a correlation between inhered trust of second-generation immigrants and the level
of trust in their countries of origin. The average trust measure across countries in the global sample is
based on the World Value Survey (1984-2014). The inherited trust measure is constructed based on the
European Social Survey (2002-2014).
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Figure B.7: Global: Correlation between Trust in Source Country and Inherited Trust
with a 25-year Lag
Note: the plot shows a correlation between inhered trust of second-generation immigrants and the level
of trust in their countries of origin. The average trust measure across countries in the global sample is
based on the World Value Survey (1984-2014). The inherited trust measure is constructed based on the
European Social Survey (2002-2014).
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Table B.6: Correlation between trust and measures of climate policy
Voluntary policy Involuntary policy
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Average trust 9.650*** 12.139*** 11.043*** 1.895
(2.233) (3.158) (2.453) (1.106)
Log per capita GDP -5.011 18.147***
(4.495) (1.445)
Share of population -0.159 -0.151**
with tertiary education (0.209) (0.065)
Observations 30 30 27 27
R-squared 0.40 0.43 0.44 0.94
Notes: The table reports macro-level correlations between trust and different mea-
sures of climate policy stringency. The dependent variable in column (1) and (2)
is a measure of voluntary climate policy measured by target shares of renewable
energy in total consumption by 2020. The dependent variable in column (3) and
(4) is a measure of involuntary (assigned) climate policy represented by emission
targets for 2020 set by the Effort Sharing Decision at the EU level. Data on per
capita GDP and education comes from the Eurostat.
Figure B.8: Correlation between Trust and Demand for Environmental Regulations
Note: the graph plots the relationship between trust and public demand for environmental regulations.
Data on both measures comes from the International Social Survey Programme (2010).
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Figure B.9: Correlation between Demand and the Stringency of Environmental
Regulations
Note: the graph plots the relationship between the public demand for and the stringency of environmental
regulations measured by the OECD Environmental Policy Stringency Index.. The data on the public
demand comes from the International Social Survey Programme (2010).
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B.3 Proofs
The presence of the threshold type The existence of a cutoff type θ∗, above which
all types violate and below which all types comply with the regulation, directly follows
from the monotonicity of firms’ actions. Firm i chooses an action bi to maximize its
expected payoff written as:
Eui(bi, θi) = −a(bi − θi)2 − (1− a)(bi −Bj)2 − γ
∑
i∈N
bi if bi ≤ L (B.1)
Eui(bi, θi) = −µ[a(L− θi)2 + (1− a)(L−Bj)2 + φ]
− (1− µ)[a(bi − θi)2 + (1− a)(bi −Bj)2]− γ
∑
i∈N
bi if bi > L
(B.2)
where (3) represents the expected payoff of abiding by the law and (4) represents the
expected payoff of violating the law.
The first order conditions are:
bi = min[aθi + (1− a)Bj − γ
2
, L] if bi ≤ L (B.3)
bi = aθi + (1− a)Bj − γ
2
if bi > L (B.4)
Note that both (5) and (6) are nondecreasing in θi and (6) is always greater than
(5). Thus, the only possible violation of the monotonicity property is where the payoff-
maximizing action at θi is smaller than (or equal to) L, while at θ
′
i < θi the payoff-
maximizing action is greater than L. To rule out this scenario, it suffices to show that
for any blow and bhigh such that blow ≤ L and bhigh > L, Eui(bhigh, θi) − Eui(blow, θi) is
increasing in θi.
From (2) and (3), it follows that
Eui(bhigh, θi)− Eui(blow, θi) = −µ[a(L− θi)2 + (1− a)(L−Bj)2 + φ]
− (1− µ)[a(bhigh − θi)2 + (1− a)(bhigh −Bj)2] + a(blow − θi)2 + (1− a)(blow −Bj)2
(B.5)
Differentiating with respect to θi yields:
2aµ(L− bhigh) + 2a(bhigh − blow) (B.6)
It is straightforward to see that the above expression is positive given the definition
of blow and bhigh that are smaller (or equal to) and greater than L, respectively for any
a ∈ [0, 1] and µ ∈ [0, 1]. From this monotonicity property, the existence of the threshold
θ∗ follows. QED
θ∗ as a decreasing function of Bj I characterize the expression for a threshold θ∗
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by balancing the costs and benefits of violating the regulation for the threshold firm at
θ∗.
Suppose that firm θ∗ decides to violate the regulation. Then the expected payoff will
be:
− µ[a(L− θ∗)2 + (1− a)(L−Bj)2 + φ]
− (1− µ)[a(aθ∗ + (1− a)Bj − γ
2
− θ∗)2 + (1− a)(aθ∗ + (1− a)Bj − γ
2
−Bj)2]
(B.7)
Suppose instead that firm θ∗ decides to abide by the regulation.
− a(L− θ∗)2 − (1− a)(L−Bj)2 (B.8)
The threshold θ∗ is given by setting (11) equal to (12). Differentiating both sides of
the resulting equation with respect to B yields:
a(L− θ) ∂θ
∗
∂Bj
+ (1− a)(L−Bj) = −a(1− a)(θ∗ −Bj)( ∂θ
∗
∂Bj
− 1) (B.9)
Solving for ∂θ
∗
∂Bj
and simplifying the expression yields 1 − 1
a
, which is negative for any
a ∈ [0, 1).
QED
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B.4 Further Data Description
Trust
European Social Survey I build trust measures using the European Social Survey
(ESS), a collection of cross-country surveys on the individual beliefs, values and social
norms as well as basic demographic information of respondents such as age, education,
religion and occupation, etc. I pool data from the seven waves collected so far (from 2002
to 2014), which includes all European countries in my sample.
The survey elicits trust of respondents by asking the standard question, “Generally
speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can’t be too careful
in dealing with people?” Answers are given on a scale of 0 to 10, where 0 implies “You
can’t be too careful” and 10 means “Most people can be trusted”. The frequency of in-
dividual responses used to build the trust measure by country and wave is reported in
Table C1.
World Value Survey In Section 2.5.2, I exploit the difference in the country where
the regulated installations’ global headquarters are located, which include a number of
non-European countries. For this specification, I rely on the World Value Survey for the
data on trust since its geographic coverage is world-wide, while the ESS covers Europe
only. The WVS allows me to exploit the geographical variation in trust across 44 countries
shown in Table A5.
The WVS measures trust by asking the exact same question that appears in the ESS,
which makes the two measures based on the two surveys reasonably comparable. The
only difference is that the answer to the trust question in the WVS is binary, while the
ESS uses a scale of 0 to 10.
Similarly as with the ESS, I pool together seven successive waves administered so
far (1984-2014) and compute the country level trust by taking the simple average over
all observations available for each country available across all waves. The frequency of
individual responses used to build the trust measure by country and wave is reported in
Table C2.
European Commission Bilateral Trust The data on bilateral trust between a
pair of countries directly comes from Panel A in Table 1 of Guiso et al. (2009). The
data is collected in a series of Eurobarometer surveys commissioned by the European
Commission. They ask the following question, “I would like to ask you a question about
how much trust you have in people from various countries. For each, please tell me
whether you have a lot of trust, some trust, not very much trust, or no trust at all.”
This was asked to all European Union Member States about each other and a number of
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other countries (including the United States, China, and Japan). I use the average level
of trust country A has for country B to predict the probability of noncompliance of an
installation operating in country B but owned by a multinational firm headquartered in
country A.
Compliance in the ETS
The data on compliance behavior in the EU ETS is provided by the European Union
Transaction Log (EUTL), a system harmonized at the EU level that publishes information
on permit allocation, verified emissions and surrendered allowances at the installation
level. I drop countries with less than 50 installations (Cyprus, Iceland, Liechtenstein,
Malta, and Luxembourg). The number of installations in each country is reported in
Table C3.
In addition to this detailed information, the EUTL also automatically calculates the
compliance status of each installation. There are five possible codes installations can be
given: (1) A, which implies “the number of allowances and ERUs/CERs surrendered by
30 April is greater than or equal to verified emissions.”, (2) B, which implies “the number
of allowances and ERUs/CERs surrendered by 30 April is lower than verified emissions.”,
(3) C, which implies “verified emissions were not entered until 30 April.”, (4) D, which
implies “verified emissions were corrected by competent authority after 30 April of year
X. The competent authority of the Member State decided that the installation is not in
compliance for year X-1.”, and (5) E, which implies “verified emissions were corrected by
competent authority after 30 April of year X. The competent authority of the Member
State decided that the installation is in compliance for year X-1.” CERs refer to Certified
Emission Reductions and ERUs refer to Emission Reduction Units (ERUs) from the
Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and Joint Implementation (JI) that can be used
as permits in the ETS.
Country-level controls
Governance indicators I use two governance indicators developed by the World
Bank to control for law enforcement or institutional capacity between 2005 and 2015.
One is a measure of country-wide ‘rule of law’ defined as “perceptions of the extent to
which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the
quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as
the likelihood of crime and violence”. The values range between -0.171 and 2.12 in my
sample. The second measure is the perceived regulatory quality defined as “perceptions of
the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations
that permit and promote private sector development”. The values range between 0.213
and 1.921 in my sample. The data can be accessed at: http://data.worldbank.org/data-
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catalog/worldwide-governance-indicators.
Economic controls For country-level economic controls, I use GDP per capita in
Euro, the percentage of population with tertiary education and total population between
2005 and 2015. The data comes from the Eurostat. Descriptive statistics for all country-
level controls is reported in Table C5.
Region-level controls
I follow the NUTS classification (Nomenclature of territorial units for statistics) to define
regions in Europe. For most countries, areas at NUTS 2 level are considered as regions,
while I use NUTS 1 level for some countries (France, Germany, Greece, Poland, Romania,
Spain, and Belgium) in order keep the number of regions within countries relatively
comparable across countries (for instance, if I apply NUTS 2 for Germany there will
be 39 regions in Germany when on average there are 6.5 regions in each country). The
three Baltic countries (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania) are only broken down to NUTS
3 level (with NUTS 2 level being the entire territory) and most regional statistics by the
Eurostat is only available at NUTS 2 level. Thus region-level controls for these countries
are unavailable. The economic data at region level comes from the Eurostat. Descriptive
statistics for all region-level controls as well as the number of regions in each country are
reported in Table C6.
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Table B.7: European Social Survey: Number of Respondents
Country Wave 1 Wave 2 Wave 3 Wave 4 Wave 5 Wave 6 Wave 7 Total
Austria 2,257 2,256 2,405 2,255 2,259 0 1,795 13,227
Belgium 1,899 1,778 1,798 1,760 1,704 1,869 1,769 12,577
Bulgaria 0 0 1,400 2,230 2,434 2,260 8,324
Czech Republic 1,360 3,026 0 2,018 2,386 2,009 2,148 12,947
Denmark 1,506 1,487 1,505 1,610 1,576 1,650 1,502 10,836
Estonia 0 1,989 1,517 1,661 1,793 2,380 2,051 11,391
Finland 2,000 2,022 1,896 2,195 1,878 2,197 2,087 14,275
France 1,503 1,806 1,986 2,073 1,728 1,968 1,917 12,981
Germany 2,919 2,870 2,916 2,751 3,031 2,958 3,045 20,490
Greece 2,566 2,406 0 2,072 2,715 0 0 9,759
Hungary 1,685 1,498 1,518 1,544 1,561 2,014 1,698 11,518
Ireland 2,046 2,286 1,800 1,764 2,576 2,628 2,390 15,490
Italy 1,207 1,529 0 0 0 960 0 3,696
Latvia 0 0 1,960 1,980 0 0 0 3,940
Lithuania 0 0 0 2,002 1,677 2,109 2,250 8,038
Netherlands 2,364 1,881 1,889 1,778 1,829 1,845 1,919 13,505
Norway 2,036 1,760 1,750 1,549 1,548 1,624 1,436 11,703
Poland 2,110 1,716 1,721 1,619 1,751 1,898 1,615 12,430
Portugal 1,511 2,052 2,222 2,367 2,150 2,151 1,265 13,718
Romania 0 0 2,139 2,146 0 0 0 4,285
Slovakia 0 1,512 1,766 1,810 1,856 1,847 0 8,791
Slovenia 1,519 1,442 1,476 1,286 1,403 1,257 1,224 9,607
Spain 1,729 1,663 1,876 2,576 1,885 1,889 1,925 13,543
Sweden 1,999 1,948 1,927 1,830 1,497 1,847 1,791 12,839
United Kingdom 2,052 1,897 2,394 2,352 2,422 2,286 2,264 15,667
Source: European Social Survey (ESS, 2002-2014).
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Table B.8: World Value Survey: Number of Respondents
Country Wave 1 Wave 2 Wave 3 Wave 4 Wave 5 Wave 6 Total
Australia 1,228 0 2,048 0 1,421 1,477 6,174
Brazil 0 1,782 0 0 1,500 1,486 4,768
Bulgaria 0 0 1,072 0 1,001 0 2,073
Canada 0 0 0 1,931 2,164 0 4,095
Chile 0 1,500 1,000 1,200 1,000 1,000 5,700
China 0 1,000 1,500 1,000 1,991 2,300 7,791
Cyprus 0 0 0 0 1,050 1,000 2,050
Czech Republic 0 924 1,147 0 0 0 2,071
Estonia 0 0 1,021 0 0 1,533 2,554
Finland 1,003 0 987 0 1,014 0 3,004
France 0 0 0 0 1,001 0 1,001
Germany 0 0 2,026 0 2,064 2,046 6,136
Hong Kong 0 0 0 0 1,252 1,000 2,252
Hungary 1,464 0 650 0 1,007 0 3,121
India 0 2,500 2,040 2,002 2,001 5,659 14,202
Indonesia 0 0 0 1,000 2,015 0 3,015
Israel 0 0 0 1,199 0 0 1,199
Italy 0 0 0 0 1,012 0 1,012
Japan 1,204 1,011 1,054 1,362 1,096 2,443 8,170
Jordan 0 0 0 1,223 1,200 1,200 3,623
Korea, Republic of 970 1,251 1,249 1,200 1,200 1,200 7,070
Latvia 0 0 1,200 0 0 0 1,200
Malaysia 0 0 0 0 1,201 1,300 2,501
Mexico 1,837 1,531 2,364 1,535 1,560 2,000 10,827
Netherlands 0 0 0 0 1,050 1,902 2,952
New Zealand 0 0 1,201 0 954 841 2,996
Norway 0 0 1,127 0 1,025 0 2,152
Pakistan 0 0 733 0 0 0 733
Philippines 0 0 1,200 1,200 0 1,200 3,600
Poland 0 938 1,153 0 1,000 966 4,057
Romania 0 0 1,239 0 1,776 1,503 4,518
Russian Federation 0 1,961 2,040 0 2,033 2,500 8,534
Saudi Arabia 0 0 0 1,502 0 0 1,502
Singapore 0 0 0 1,512 0 1,972 3,484
Slovakia 0 466 1,095 0 0 0 1,561
Slovenia 0 0 1,007 0 1,037 1,069 3,113
South Africa 1,596 2,736 2,935 3,000 2,988 3,531 16,786
Spain 0 1,510 1,211 1,209 1,200 1,189 6,319
Sweden 954 0 1,009 1,015 1,003 1,206 5,187
Switzerland 0 1,400 1,212 0 1,241 0 3,853
Turkey 0 1,030 1,907 3,401 1,346 1,605 9,289
Ukraine 0 0 2,811 0 1,000 1,500 5,311
United Kingdom 0 0 1,093 0 1,041 2,134
United States 2,325 0 1,542 1,200 1,249 2,232 8,548
Source: World Value Survey (WVS, 1984-2014).
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Table B.9: Number of Installations in the ETS by Country
Country Number of installations
Austria 275
Belgium 481
Bulgaria 172
Czech Republic 464
Denmark 455
Estonia 65
Finland 679
France 1,520
Germany 2,532
Greece 207
Hungary 287
Ireland 215
Italy 1,482
Latvia 118
Lithuania 124
Netherlands 622
Norway 173
Poland 1,020
Portugal 358
Romania 284
Slovakia 221
Slovenia 104
Spain 1,362
Sweden 875
United Kingdom 1,373
Total 15,468
Source: European Union Transaction Log
(EUTL).
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Table B.10: Descriptive Statistics: Country-level Variables
Country Rule of Regulatory GDP Tertiary Population
law quality per capita education
(Euro) (level 3-8, %)
Austria 1.870 1.528 35,645 76.9 8,368,325
Belgium 1.360 1.291 33,591 67.5 10,861,533
Bulgaria - 0.120 0.600 5,045 73.9 7,429,690
Czech Republic 0.962 1.134 14,300 85.5 10,406,087
Denmark 1.956 1.821 44,009 70.4 5,530,786
Estonia 1.153 1.440 12,273 81.9 1,333,244
Finland 1.974 1.769 35,573 76.7 5,352,147
France 1.442 1.202 30,909 68.7 64,631,834
Germany 1.696 1.571 32,673 79.0 81,483,174
Greece 0.593 0.667 18,855 62.5 11,025,804
Hungary 0.721 1.023 10,018 75.3 9,990,034
Ireland 1.729 1.707 41,555 69.4 4,469,781
Italy 0.377 0.840 26,773 53.9 59,184,429
Latvia 0.748 1.020 9,882 79.8 2,117,490
Lithuania 0.756 1.074 9,918 82.9 3,120,577
Netherlands 1.822 1.751 37,791 69.1 16,578,149
Norway 1.950 1.495 66,745 74.8 4,868,568
Poland 0.620 0.914 9,218 81.8 38,085,752
Portugal 1.055 0.926 16,445 34.6 10,512,146
Romania 0.014 0.545 6,336 69.5 20,479,399
Slovakia 0.503 1.015 11,927 83.4 5,392,052
Slovenia 0.962 0.738 17,418 79.5 2,035,400
Spain 1.077 1.068 22,845 52.1 45,787,350
Sweden 1.930 1.713 40,409 75.8 9,345,354
United Kingdom 1.715 1.744 32,909 75.6 62,513,575
Average 1.116 1.195 24,355 72.142 19,430,388
Source: Eurostat and the World Bank.
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Table B.11: Descriptive Statistics: Region-level Variables
country Number of GDP per capita Education Population
regions (Euro) (level 5-8)
Austria 9 34,627 19.8 929,814
Belgium 3 40,058 36.8 3,620,511
Bulgaria 6 4,508 22.2 1,238,282
Czech Republic 8 14,389 17.0 1,300,761
Denmark 5 40,265 31.9 909,087
Finland 5 36,493 36.1 1,070,429
France 9 27,850 27.4 7,130,197
Germany 16 30,904 26.4 5,004,642
Greece 4 18,182 23.1 2,756,451
Hungary 7 8,792 18.2 1,427,148
Ireland 2 35,955 35.1 2,234,890
Italy 5 26,024 14.6 11,836,886
Netherlands 12 35,096 30.5 1,381,512
Norway 7 55,450 35.6 695,510
Poland 6 8,726 21.4 6,347,625
Portugal 7 16,155 15.0 1,501,735
Romania 4 6,599 14.2 5,242,526
Slovakia 4 14,482 19.7 1,348,013
Slovenia 2 17,673 28.6 187,453
Spain 7 22,657 31.0 6,541,050
Sweden 8 38,269 32.3 1,168,169
United Kingdom 12 30,950 34.1 4,671,064
Average 6.5 24,964 25.6 3,073,368
Source: Eurostat.
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Appendix C
Appendix to Chapter 3
Table C.1: Descriptive statistics: social relations and interactions
Urban areas Rural areas
Mean Mean Diff.
Favors 2.37 2.63 0.25***
Watch over house 2.49 2.64 0.14***
Advice on family matters 2.07 2.33 0.25***
Parties 2.12 2.38 0.25***
Gathering 2.12 2.43 0.31***
NOTE: Each variable is an answer to (1): “How often do people from
your community do favors to each other?”, (2): “When a neighbor is away,
how often do you or your neighbors watch his/her house?”, (3): “How of-
ten do you and other people from your community ask for advice to each
other about things like raising your children or getting a new job?”, (4):
“How often do people from your community have parties in which you in-
vite other people from the community?”, and (5): “How often do you and
other people from your community gather in each other’s houses or on the
street?” in 2009 wave of the MXFLS. Respondents answer the questions
by choosing from “Never”, “Rarely”, “Frequently” or “Always”. Higher
values correspond to higher frequency. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table C.2: Heterogeneity: the effect of out-migration on other measures of social capital
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variables Help Value sharing Index
Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural
Out-migration rate -3.621*** 1.829 -4.166*** 0.021 -7.819*** -0.358
(1.288) (4.115) (1.471) (6.050) (2.945) (10.067)
Exogenous controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
First-stage F -statistics 52.72 4.074 55.70 3.579 55.25 3.471
Number of municipalities 103 73 102 73 100 73
Observations 3,319 2,885 3,061 2,776 2,945 2,736
R-squared 0.007 0.036 0.008 0.029 0.009 0.030
NOTE: Each regression includes the full set of exogenous controls and state fixed effects. Willingess
to Help is the answer to the following statement: “people around here are willing to help their neigh-
bors”.Value Sharing is the answer to the following statement: “people from this neighborhood share
the same values”. Index is created based on the four social capital measures, trust, willingness to
help and value sharing. Standard errors are in parentheses and clustered at the municipality level.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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C.1 Net- and in-migration
While out-migration has a strong theoretical prediction for its negative impact on trust,
in-migration is expected to have indirect effects through increased population density or
urbanisation. As I discussed in Section 3.2 it could also have substantial effects if migrants
are ethnically and linguistically distinct and therefore find it more difficult to integrate
into pre-existing community social networks. However, overall its impact is expected to be
small given the ethnic and linguistic homogeneity of Mexico. As for the role of pre-existing
social networks, I later investigate it further in the heterogeneity section. Net-migration is
then expected to have ambiguous or, if anything, positive effects on trust as it is negatively
correlated with out-migration or no significance at all since, as what matters is the changes
in the composition rather than the absolute size of the population. In this section, I
explore the distinct effects of net- and in-migration and find empirical support for the
above theoretical conjectures. For the net-migration variable, I use both the predicted
in- and out-migration (that excludes within-state migrants) as instruments and for the
in-migration variable, I only include the predicted in-migration rate as an instrument.
There exists a concern, however, for the exclusion restriction being violated in the case of
predicted in-migration flows if the inflows based on settlement pattern observed 10 years
ago are correlated with the recent changes in trust between existing residents (note that
the dependent variable is in first-difference). Given the original hypothesis that migration
inflows dilute trust established by existing residents through increased population density
and therefore negatively affect trust, predicted in-migration flows based on historical
settlement pattern would drive the estimates upward if people are more likely to trust
immigrants from their own origin areas. However, as I present later the IV estimate for
the in-migration rates are lower than OLS estimate, not higher, which alleviates this
concern.
[Table C.3]
Table C.3 shows the results from the first-stages of the IV estimation for the net- and
in-migration. In both regressions, the instruments display expected signs and have strong
predictory power over the actual migration flows. For net-migration, the predicted in- and
out-migration rate are positively and negatively related, respectively, with the endogenous
variable and have the F -statistics on the joint significance around 19.6 (column 1). The
predicted in-migration rate also appears to be a strong predictor of the actual in-migration
rate (column 2).
[Table A4]
Table C.4 presents the IV estimation results for the effects of net-migration and in-
migration on trust. As predicted, net-migration has a weak and positive impact on trust
among neighbors. The effect of in-migration is negative but statistically insignificant.
In column 3, I present the results from the IV estimation that includes both out- and
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in-migration rates with corresponding instruments. The first stage results from this just-
identified 2sls estimation with two endogenous variables are presented in Table C.5. This
specification does not alter the results. The coefficients change very little and especially
the out-migration rate variable displays a very similar coefficient to the one reported in
column 2, Table 3.3 in the main text. The analysis here again points to a negative and
statistically significant impact of out-migration on how much individuals trust each other.
Table C.3: First-stage regressions: relation between predicted and actual migration,
2005-2010
(1) (2)
Net-migration rate In-migration rate
Predicted out-migration rate -1.366***
(0.242)
Predicted in-migration rate 1.177*** 1.052***
(0.269) (0.257)
First-stage F -statistics 19.6 14.8
Exogenous controls Yes Yes
State fixed effects Yes Yes
Number of municipalities 152 152
Observations 6,158 6,158
R-squared 0.346 0.412
NOTE: Regressions include all exogenous controls from the second stage and
state fixed effects. Standard errors are in parentheses and clustered at the mu-
nicipality level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table C.4: The effect of net- and in-migration on trust: Mexico, 2005-2010
(1) (2) (3)
FD-IV FD-IV FD-IV
Net-migration rate 0.775*
(0.462)
In-migration rate -0.941 -0.838
(1.216) (1.174)
Out-migration rate -1.932**
(0.922)
Exogenous controls Yes Yes Yes
State fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Number of municipalities 152 152 152
Observations 6,158 6,158 6,158
R-squared 0.010 0.009 0.009
NOTE: Each regression includes state fixed effects. Trust
is the answer to the following statement: “People from this
locality/community are trustworthy.” Standard errors are
in parentheses and clustered at the municipality level. ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table C.5: First-stage regressions: with two endogenous variables
(1) (2)
Out-migration rate In-migration rate
Predicted out-migration rate 1.180*** -0.187
(0.199) (0.163)
Predicted in-migration rate -0.100 1.076***
(0.193) (0.275)
Exogenous controls Yes Yes
State fixed effects Yes Yes
First-stage F -statistics 17.73 8.33
Number of municipalities 152 152
Observations 6,158 6,158
R-squared 0.488 0.417
NOTE: The results are from the first stage regressions of just-identified 2sls
estimation with two endogenous variables (out- and in-migration rates). Re-
gressions include all exogenous controls from the second stage and state fixed
effects. Standard errors are in parentheses and clustered at the municipality
level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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